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Abstract 
Foreign policy development in the United States is constitutionally granted to the 
Executive Office. The President has the responsibility for determining when, where, and 
how soft and/or hard power will be employed in the pursuit of national interests. In the 
case of U.S. policy regarding Syria, over the course of the Clinton, Bush and Obama 
administrations, some significant policy transformations have occurred. This qualitative 
research study examines the evolution of such policies over the course of three different 
presidential administrations, seeking an answer to the question of whether or not it was 
likely that U.S. Syrian policy would include a military “boots on the ground” presence 
against the Al Assad regime. The problem is significant in light of the fact that Syria is 
increasingly becoming a failed state and continues to experience a violent civil war.  This 
violence is a consequence of both resistance to the Al Assad regime and the presence of 
ISIS. Using International Relations theory (specifically, Liberalism and Realism), and 
applying the theory of Coalition Building, it is argued that all three presidents were 
largely Realists in their Syrian policies. It is further argued that it is highly unlikely that 
even under a new presidential administration that the US will enhance its military 
presence in Syria to any great extent. The study contributes to the field of Conflict 
Resolution by highlighting the complexities of establishing and maintaining an effective 
foreign policy in a situation that is ridden with conflict, essentially fluid, and in which 
multiple actors are engaged. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background of the Topic 
All governments are required by the nature of their relationships with other 
sovereign entities to develop foreign policies that directly shape and inform state-to-state 
interactions and position the country with respect to its objectives, its mission in the 
world, and its ideological posture (Sodaro, 2004). Some have argued that what makes a 
foreign policy successful with respect to a country, a region, or the entire community of 
nations is nothing more and nothing less than the ability to choose ends that can be 
achieved, and then the capacity to identify the optimum means of achieving those ends 
(Judis, 2014). This suggestion, while admittedly overly simplistic, acknowledges that a 
country’s foreign policy under any circumstances contains both a set of goals and 
objectives and a strategy for meeting those goals and objectives. 
Theorists have pointed out that creating an effective foreign policy requires 
balancing many different, and often conflicting, interests, needs, and values (Genest, 
2004). Rarely does a nation develop a policy toward another sovereign state without 
considering many variables which complicate the entire process. There are many 
different factors as yet unknown that can and often do essentially hamper the 
implementation of a consistent policy designed to simultaneously achieve a country’s 
own goals while respecting the goals, objectives, and interests of both allies and 
adversaries.   
This speaks to the fact that contemporary nation-states function in a complex 
global environment in which a degree of volatility is likely to be inevitable (Buchan, 
2002). Ideally, those individuals in positions of power who are responsible for the 
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development of effective foreign policies work within the context of a specific theoretical 
orientation.  Common theories found in the field of International Relations (IR) are those 
of the realist, liberal, neoconservative, and democratic peace constructs; a useful theory 
in Conflict Resolution (CR) that is particularly applicable herein is Coalition Building 
Theory, especially important in cases wherein a coordinated effort on the part of several 
state actors is required or desirable (Sodaro, 2004). These theories, each from a somewhat 
different perspective, propose that a nation’s foreign policy initiatives are designed to 
serve specific purposes relevant to the overarching ideology of the country as well as its 
perceived needs and roles in the geopolitical community. When a conflict of significance 
involving internal violence exists, and when it is necessary for external actors to 
intervene in the affairs of a sovereign nation state, Coalition Building Theory lends itself 
to achieving a resolution to the conflict and a return to order and stability.    
These theoretical lenses are particularly useful when one is considering, as is the 
case here, a longitudinal analysis of a foreign policy program that has evolved and been 
transformed over time, and projecting a likely continuation or modification of existing 
policy. The case in point herein is United States’ foreign policies towards Syria beginning 
in 1993, with the presidency of Bill Clinton, continuing through the eight years of the 
George W. Bush administration, and through the second term of the presidency of Barack 
Obama. It should be noted that as this analysis was being finalized, the United States 
elected Donald Trump as the 45th president; certainly, President Trump will develop and 
implement his own policies regarding Syria and other nations, but any in-depth 
discussion of those policies is beyond the scope of this study.   
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During the target time frame, there have been significant shifts in U.S. policy, 
shifts that have not yet facilitated a resolution to the conflict that continues unabated in 
Syria (Kanter & Higgins, 2015). The creation and expansion of the group known as 
ISIS/ISIL (the Islamic State in Syria or the Islamic State in the Levant), plus the entry of 
Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia into the situation, add layers of complexity to an already 
complex situation. 
The Syrian situation has changed dramatically during this particular period 
(Glass, 2015).  From the beginning of the ascendancy of the Al Assad family in the 1960s 
to the present, Syria has been a country experiencing frequent internal conflicts (Central 
Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2015; Galvani, 1974; Zunes, 2004). Most recently, Syria has 
devolved into what clearly amounts to a failed state – a state under assault from a number 
of dissident and rebel groups as well as under attack from the rising tide of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the form of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) which seeks to re-
establish the Caliphate and has seized control of substantial swaths of territory in Syria 
and Iraq (Interfax, 2015).   
Syria is geographically positioned in a manner which has rendered it vulnerable to 
movements from east to west and back again for a prolonged period (Wolley, 1946). As a 
centrally located Middle Eastern state, Syria as it is now constructed represents a 
somewhat artificial state that was created in the years following the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire.  Because this is the case, as Sodaro (2004) notes, conflict within Syria 
has been endemic over time. The remnants of this conflict continue to divide Syria today.  
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2015), noting that until independence in 
1946, Syria was governed via a French mandate, further stated that stability was absent 
4 
 
from the Syrian polity from the very beginning of its life as a sovereign state. In its first 
decades of existence, several military coups occurred. In 1958, Syria partnered with 
Egypt to create the United Arab Republic which was to last only until 1961, at which 
time the Syrian Arab Republic and an autonomous Egypt re-emerged. By 1970, Hafiz Al 
Assad, a socialist member of the Ba’ath Party and the scion of a minority sect known as 
the Alawis, assumed power and ushered in a period of relative political stability.   
When President Hafiz Al Assad died, Bashar Al Assad was made president by 
popular referendum and has served in that position since July of 2000 (CIA, 2015). The 
Ba’ath military coup in March of 1963 established this particular party as the dominant 
authority in Syria (Galvani, 1974). Under the Al Assads, the Alawi sect or tribe gained 
virtual control over all aspects of the Syrian government and economy. The Al Assads 
partnered with the Soviet Union, and later with Russia, for which it functioned somewhat 
as a client state; in return, Syria received hundreds of millions in military and other aid – 
all of which bolstered the influence of the Al Assads while simultaneously undermining 
American influence in the region (Chernoff, 2009). 
In 2007, Bashar Al Assad was re-elected to the presidency for a second term. 
However, the CIA (2015) reports that opposition to the Al Assad regime has been 
ongoing. Attached as Appendix A to this dissertation is a chronology identifying the key 
U.S. foreign policy approaches toward Syria from 2004, during what amounted to Bashar 
Al Assad’s first term as president, to 2015. As this chronology demonstrates, the U.S. has 
been concerned about conditions in Syria for some time, beginning in May of 2004 to 
impose economic sanctions on Syria because of convictions in the United States that 
Syria was supporting terrorism (BBC News, 2015).  
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In the two decades leading up to anti-government protests in March 2011 in 
southern Dar’a Province, escalating domestic conflict was a key characteristic of Syria’s 
existence (CIA, 2015). The Muslim Brotherhood introduced Islamist political activism 
into Syria and helped to politicize opposition to Bashar Al Assad. During anti-
government protests in 2011, there were calls to repeal an emergency law the Al Assad 
regime had issued to permit arrests and detainment without charges and to deny political 
parties the right to function. Demonstrations quickly spread across Syria, with the Al 
Assad regime repealing the emergency law and liberalizing local and national elections 
on the one hand while using security operations to violently put down unrest on the other 
(CIA, 2015). 
Bashar Al Assad is often the target of criticisms leveled against the Syrian 
government in large measure because he has demonstrated no willingness to compromise 
on critical issues and no interest in sharing power with opposition forces (CIA, 2015). 
International pressure directed against Bashar Al Assad has been generated by the United 
States, neighboring Turkey, the Arab League, and the European Union, among others. 
These disparate groups have imposed economic and other sanctions on Syria to no avail.   
The current crisis – now a full-blown regional crisis that goes far beyond civil war 
pitting the Al Assads against domestic opponents - can be traced to 2012, when 130 
countries recognized the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition forces 
as the legitimate representative of the Syrian polity. Throughout 2013, the Al Assad 
regime and various opposition or rebel groups engaged in violent conflict, leading to a 
death toll in the hundreds of thousands. A January 2014 effort sponsored by the United 
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Nations to broker a treaty between the Syrian opposition coalition and the Al Assad 
regime failed to bear fruit (CIA, 2015). 
Hubbard (2015) reported that the reality in Syria is that the government, the 
Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), and an array of insurgents are engaged in a complex civil war 
that has spread into neighboring Iraq. The Islamic State or Caliphate represents a major 
challenge to regional stability as well as to the Al Assad regime. It further represents a 
challenge for American foreign policy. Hubbard (2015) also pointed out that the United 
States has struggled to find an appropriate partner in Syria, a partner that would 
simultaneously reject the Caliphate and oppose the Al Assad regime. One such group is 
Ahar al-Sham, or the Free Men of Syria, a group that cooperates with the Syrian affiliate 
of Al Qaeda and has welcomed former associates of Osama bin Laden and who does not 
meet American criteria for “moderation” (Hubbard, 2015). 
The problem, therefore, for the United States as it goes forward with respect to its 
relationship with Syria, is to determine what local actors have sufficient standing to be 
viewed as partners for the United States and, just as significantly, if the United States can 
influence Syrian politics if it provides military action in support of a particular group. 
The problem is made more complex by the fact that Russia has elected to provide 
substantial new military support to the Al Assad regime (Interfax, 2015).   
As Galvani (1974) reported, the Ba’athist military coup of March 1963 
established a socialist government in Syria. When Hafiz Al Assad and his Alawite clan 
assumed control, a political elite became an entrenched entity that maintained power by 
exerting violence and tight control on domestic and foreign policy. Bashar Al Assad, an 
ophthalmologist by profession, returned to Syria and assumed the leadership of the 
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Ba’ath Party and the presidency when his father died. Re-elected to a second presidential 
term in 2007, Bashar Al Assad’s regime has experienced conflict from that point forward. 
Nearly every city in Syria has at one time or another over the past 10 years experienced 
some type of violent hostilities between regime opponents and the regime itself.     
Calls for Assad to step down from power have been forthcoming not only in 
Syria, but also from outside actors, including Turkey, the United States, and the European 
Union. The CIA (2015) further reports that efforts since 2012 to broker a ceasefire 
between the Syrian regime and groups such as the National Coalition of Syrian 
Revolution and Opposition forces have been unproductive. Though there have been peace 
talks underway at the United Nations’ Geneva II Conference since 2014, hostilities have 
not ended; in fact, escalating domestic conflict has become the order of the day. This 
been further exacerbated by the rise of ISIS and its attempts to gain control over large 
swaths of Syrian territory.   
Recently, the Assad regime has received assistance from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, 
as Russia has entered into the conflict by providing on the ground troop support and air 
support against domestic opponents but not against ISIS (Snyder, 2015). Iran has also 
made its presence known in Syria in support of the Al Assad regime (Shuster & 
Calabresi, 2015). The United States, Turkey, and an assortment of European allies do 
provide some assistance to the Syrian opposition and against ISIS particularly with 
respect to air strikes (Powell, Bennett, & Parsons, 2015).  
This is the historical background in which the Syrian conflict is positioned. The 
problem, as described by Snyder (2015) and Martin (2015), is that there are essentially 
two crises in Syria at the present time. The original crisis centers upon the conflict 
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between Bashar Al Assad and Syrian opposition groups that find his regime to be 
oppressive. This has been exacerbated by the emergence of ISIS/ISIL and the 
intervention of Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia as well as the activities of the U.S. It is the 
resulting conflict in Syria that has created a sustained civil war and has brought about the 
massive refugee crisis that is now disrupting life in Syria, in neighboring Lebanon, and in 
the European Union (Friedman, 2013).   
Given that this is the case, examining U.S. foreign policy towards Syria is a 
timely enterprise that provides a unique opportunity to examine not only the evolution of 
policy over time, but also to consider future transformations and their possible effects. 
Researchers, including Berman (2014), argue that the Syrian situation represents a 
catastrophe of epic proportions, with more than 200,000 people having been killed thus 
far and entire regions of the country now under the total domination of ISIS. Millions of 
Syrians have become refugees, leaving behind their homes, careers, and country to seek 
asylum in Europe.   
The Assad administration no longer possesses the capacity for governing in light 
of the fact that much of the country is in constant turmoil (Glass, 2015). Critics have 
argued that the policies of the Obama administration, which included the use of drone 
strikes to target ISIS beginning in early 2015, were ineffective (Yeginsu & Cooper, 
2015). Sanctions against Syria impacting the regime of Bashar Al Assad have been 
combined with political isolation and strategic engagement. Noticeably absent in the 
policies of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama are what can be referred to as boots on 
the ground – direct military engagement on Syrian soil deploying military troops and 
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material by the United States (Obama, 2011). It is in this general background that the 
present research effort is positioned.   
Key Stakeholders 
Charap (2013) pointed out that from the very beginning of the Syrian crisis, even 
before ISIS/ISIL emerged and Russia became involved, there were multiple stakeholders 
directly impacted by the crisis and its precipitating events and trends. Certainly, there are 
a number of discrete opposition groups within Syria, such as the National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces; the Kurdish Supreme Commission; the 
Syrian Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al Nusra; the Syrian National Council; the National Co-
Ordination Committee; the Free Syrian Army; and other smaller unaffiliated groups 
(BBC, 2013). These groups are further categorized by regions, as well as the entry of 
Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah into the theater of war and the presence of ISIS as a key 
factor in fostering ongoing hostilities (Charap, 2013). 
Additionally, Hokayem (2015) suggests that one must include Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates as stakeholders whose engagement on behalf of 
different groups opposing the Al Assad regime has played a role in reshaping the conflict. 
The presence of Iran and the major Gulf States, said Hokayem (2015), “has influenced 
the calculations, positioning, behavior, and fortunes of the principal Syrian players” while 
also having “exacerbated the polarization of the Middle East” (p. 59). The Al Assad 
regime is a stakeholder with a great deal to lose in this situation.   
Other external stakeholders now include neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, and 
Jordan as well as a number of European countries that have been impacted by the Syrian 
refugee crisis (Hokayem, 2015). These countries and the United States are stakeholders 
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not merely by choice but out of necessity. The influx of desperate refugees into European 
Union countries has placed enormous burdens on those countries. In the United States, 
there is extensive opposition to admitting Syrian refugees due to fears that terrorists may 
be included among this population.  Thus, from the perspective of Conflict Resolution 
theory and practice, as articulated by Pruitt and Kim (2004), one must consider the 
widespread impact of what is no longer a domestic crisis and ought to accept the notion 
that external actors have a vested interest in bringing about a resolution to the Syrian 
crisis. One strategy for achieving this is through coalition building.   
Problem Statement 
The problem of Syria and ISIS is of enormous significance; according to Wood 
(2014), taken together, the Syrian civil war and the assault of the caliphate on regional 
governments represent enormously destabilizing influences. The question of whether or 
not a more activist U.S. policy in the form of military intervention or “boots on the 
ground” would be viable and effective is significant, as is the question of whether or not 
such a policy is even likely to be forthcoming. This study examines the aforementioned 
theories, considers the Syrian policies of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, and 
employs a qualitative case study design to explore the potential for transforming U.S. 
policy to potentially include an enhanced physical presence in Syria as a strategy for 
bringing about an end to the Syrian civil war and inhibiting the spread of ISIS and its 
capacity for destabilizing the region (Polonsky, 2015).   
The argument advanced herein is that regardless of which particular theoretical 
lens one applies to the case of Syria, it is highly unlikely that the United States, even 
under a new presidential administration in 2017, will adopt a boots-on-the-ground 
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military intervention in Syria or in response to the ISIS effort to establish a new caliphate 
in the Middle East. It is true that U.S. foreign policies have often played a significant role 
in shaping the geopolitical structure of the Middle East (Abdul-Aziz, 2014; Sodaro, 2004; 
Knapp, 1954). That said, a case study of past presidential policies from the Clinton, Bush, 
and Obama administrations reveals that American presidents, regardless of their own 
ideological orientation, tend to develop foreign policies that are framed within the Realist 
theoretical perspective as they pursue those goals and objectives that most clearly 
coincide with the needs and interests of the United States itself; similarly, the U.S. has in 
recent decades pursued the resolution of conflicts and geopolitical crisis through a 
strategy of Coalition Building that engages multiple actors with a stake in securing a 
desirable outcome to the crisis (Judis, 2014). 
The research problem has been conceptualized in terms of a variety of factors 
among which shifts in American foreign policy orientations are of significance (Berman, 
2014).  Further, these crises are seen as a challenge to the world and the region based 
upon the avowed attempt to establish a jihadist Muslim state that will incorporate large 
portions of territory legitimately contained within Iraq and Syria (Glass, 2015).    
It is also important to recognize that whereas the policies of the Clinton and Bush 
administrations toward Syria were relatively well defined, some critics, including Glass 
(2015) and Hirsch (2013), argue that the same cannot be said for the Obama 
administration’s policies, which never coalesced around a particular strategic thrust or, 
for that matter, a specific theoretical underpinning. For example, where President Clinton 
is said by Sodaro (2004) and Miller (1994) to have employed a Realist lens in developing 
the policies of enlargement and engagement, President Obama’s polices were oriented 
12 
 
toward Realism with the caveat that American activism in any hot spot like that of Syria 
would be minimalized (Abdulaziz, 2014).  President George W. Bush relied upon a 
Neoconservative ideological posture that was nevertheless rooted in a Realist perspective 
on the question of what a foreign policy was supposed to do for a country (Genest, 2004).  
Each of these Chief Executives, to varying degrees, have employed Coalition Building 
strategies to create a coordinated international response to the Syrian issue and, 
consequently, to the development of strategies for bringing about an end to the crisis in 
all its various manifestations.    
Guiora (2011) stated that given that international law does not articulate specific 
standards as to when international humanitarian or military intervention is fully justified, 
national leaders in a position to do so arguably acquire a responsibility to act when it 
becomes apparent that a humanitarian crisis is underway.  Over its entire life, according 
to Guiora (2011), the Al Assad rulers of Syria have demonstrated that human rights 
violations do not trouble them.  Bashar Al Assad demonstrably employed chemical 
weapons against his people but, as Guiroa (2011) states, “the international community 
has determined – whether actively or passively – that the massacre of the Syrian 
population by the Assad government does not justify international humanitarian 
intervention” (p. 215).   
Only with the emergence of ISIS, a terrorist group that has far surpassed Al 
Qaeda in terms of its broad impact upon an already volatile Middle East (Hubbard, 2015), 
has intervention become more apparent and moved beyond the use of largely ineffective 
sanctions and isolation. Abdul-Aziz (2014) has criticized the U.S. policy towards Syria, 
calling it marked by a lack of vision and weakness. ISIS shows no signs at the present 
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time of retreating and its influence seems to be growing despite American use of drones 
to target selected ISIS strongholds (Tattersall, 2015).  There is ongoing debate over what 
the ultimate impact of U.S. drone strikes in Syria is likely to be and whether or not a 
more focused, expansive, and physical U.S. response on the ground would be more 
beneficial (U.S. drone strikes north Syria, 2015). 
As the U.S. approaches the end of eight years of the administration of Barack 
Obama, there is still opportunity for a policy shift. Identifying the likely effect of one 
such shift is a useful task not only with respect to demonstrating understanding of conflict 
management, but also with respect to assessing the efficacy of different foreign policy 
approaches. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to employ a qualitative research method (i.e., the 
unique case study) to develop an answer to the following overarching research question: 
What are the likely effects of a transformation in American policy towards Syria 
that would include “boots on the ground” military intervention designed to 
stabilize a country that is torn by war and the insurgence of military Islam seeking 
to establish a new Caliphate? 
The research sub-questions to be explored in the dissertation are:  
1. What specific theoretical perspectives have been employed by the Clinton, Bush, 
and Obama presidential administrations in the design and implementation of 
foreign policy toward Syria? 
2. What are the situational elements that have contributed, over time and in the 
present, to the development of American foreign policy toward Syria?  
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Each of these questions speaks to the purpose of identifying how theory informs 
the actual development and implementation of a country’s policies vis-à-vis the global 
community.  Foreign policy, as described by Judis (2014), represents a balancing of 
conflicting interests, needs, and values that are subject to change as circumstances 
themselves change. Today, a country such as the United States inevitably functions 
within what Buchan (2002) called a complex and often volatile government environment 
where change is the one constant.   
In the case of Syria, it is within the last several months that Russia has become a 
key actor – an actor with the potential to reshape American responses and to redefine the 
crisis in Syria itself (Kalb, 2015). While it may appear, at this juncture, to be somewhat 
unlikely that the Obama administration in its last months in power will contemplate a 
shift from its current policy of aerial bombing to a more activist boots on the ground 
policy, this does not mean that such a shift is impossible. Nor does it mean that a new 
administration taking office in January of 2017 will not choose a more activist policy in 
the response to the conditions that are prevalent at that time.  
A unique case study design is the research methodology recommended herein. 
The qualitative method known as the case study is described by Reissman (2008) as a 
narrative research strategy that produces context dependent knowledge. Rather than 
operating from rules, experts operate on the basis of detailed case knowledge. While rule-
based knowledge and predictive theories are also used in the social sciences, they are 
relatively rare in this particular discipline. What the case study provides is the 
opportunity to focus attention on narrative details because as Reissman (2008) put it, 
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“important insights can unfold from the many sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting 
stories of actors in the field” (p. 194). 
What a theory-based study of this type does is to offer a unique opportunity to 
examine real world applications of theoretical constructs and to assess their viability and 
their capacity for long-term use. As Babbie (2004) pointed out, case studies allow for 
investigation of relevant materials and the development of a comprehensive 
understanding of those materials.   
It should be noted that the study is largely qualitative, focused on exploration 
rather than specifically on explanation, as is typical in the case of a hypothesis-driven 
research effort (Babbie, 2004). A qualitative research design, as described by Babbie 
(2004), is generally one which does not generate a wealth of statistical data.  The present 
study employs a qualitative case study research design. The review of literature 
incorporates forecasts and projections from scholars, journalists, political officials, and 
military analysts as to the likely effect of current and transformed American policies 
toward Syria.   
Drawing upon an extensive assortment of relevant textual materials, it is argued 
that while military intervention is a policy option available to the United States, such an 
option is not likely to be selected in the near or foreseeable future. Other strategies – 
ranging from the imposition of new or enhanced sanctions against Syria, to increased air 
strikes against Syrian and ISIS targets, humanitarian aid, military advisors and arms 
shipments and so on – are likely to be considered and implemented as opposed to a full 
military incursion. Coalition Building efforts are likely to continue to serve as the 
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foundation of U.S. policy initiatives for the remainder of the Obama Administration and 
under a new Chief Executive.  
Significance of the Study 
The issue is of significance in that Syria and the surrounding region represent a 
highly volatile hot spot in which unsettled conditions are creating not only a failed state, 
but also facilitating the rise of a determined terrorist movement in the form of the Islamic 
State in Syria/Islamic State in the Levant (ISIS/ISIL). The crisis shows no signs of 
abating, as violence in Syria and the surrounding region continues.  Efforts to broker a 
cease fire in the Syrian Civil War and to effectively eliminate ISIS/ISIL are forthcoming, 
but such efforts are not as yet successful (Kanter & Higgins, 2015).    
The refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian conflict has become an international 
humanitarian crisis that is quite controversial. The European Union (EU) has itself been 
under enormous pressure from Germany and other member states to halt the flow of 
asylum seekers into the 28-nation bloc (Kanter & Higgins, 2015). German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel led a move in the EU to create a fund of €3 billion Euros (about $3.2 
billion) plus other inducements to convince Turkey to assist in stemming the migrant 
flow and allowing migrants to seek refuge in Turkey as an alternative to attempting to 
enter Western Europe. With these concerns in mind, the present study focused on an 
analysis of the policies of three U.S. presidential administrations toward Syria is both 
timely and useful.  
What is lacking in the literature is a synthesis of the three presidential policy 
regimes and their theoretical foundations specific to the case of Syria. The task of 
examining this case is made more complex by the fact that the Syrian situation is ongoing 
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with events ebbing and flowing on an almost daily basis. Further, the Obama 
administration has about six months more to run, during which time it is quite likely that 
there will be a need for reviewing existing policies and moving forward and developing 
new strategies to bring about an end to the Syrian conflict. 
Plan of the Study 
This study offers an overview of the theories of CR and foreign policy that will be 
used in assessing U.S. foreign policy. Following this presentation of theory, the study 
presents an historical overview of the Syrian conflict to identify its transformation over 
time and to set the stage for consideration of American policies under three separate 
presidential administrations (i.e., those of Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and 
Obama). Included is an analysis of the new intervention of Russia in the crisis and the 
impact of this intervention on possible U.S. responses under the Obama Administration.  
Next, the study focuses more closely on likely changes in present U.S. foreign 
policy during the remaining months of the Obama administration. It will speculate as to 
the likely effects of a shift in policy which would include a military presence in Syria and 
briefly discuss whether or not such a policy shift might be forthcoming as a new 
president takes office in January of 2017. The study concludes with a summary and 
recommendations for further research.  
Conclusion 
This study provides a unique synthesis of 24 years of U.S. policy initiatives 
centered on Syria. These initiatives span three eight-year-long presidential 
administrations beginning with President Bill Clinton in 1992 through President George 
W. Bush in 2000 and President Barack Obama in 2008. These three presidential 
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administrations span a period during which the Syrian situation, with regard to animosity 
focused on the Al Assad regime, emerged, escalated, and expanded to include not only 
actors within Syria, but also the creation of an extremist Jihadi movement that has 
succeeded thus far in establishing a state-like entity known as the caliphate or the Islamic 
State in Syria/the Levant.   
Conducting a case study designed to synthesize the policies of three quite 
different American presidents in the context of more prominent theories employed in the 
field of International Relations and, to a greater extent, Conflict Resolution, will 
contribute to an understanding of how theory informs practice and how different 
Presidents have used theory in the actual development of policies. This study highlights 
options for resolving the Syrian conflict by either facilitating the stability of Syria 
through diplomatic efforts to transform the Al Assad regime and respond to Syrian 
opposition concerns or to ignore Syrian sovereignty and directly assault ISIS/ISIL, 
positioning the Caliphate and not the Al Assad regime as the primary cause for 
intervention. Answering the research questions posed herein will have contributed not 
only to our understanding of the situation in Syria as it now exists, but also offer an 
opportunity to consider how changes to the Syrian situation may ultimately generate new 
policy initiatives and reshape American activities on the ground in Syria. The study is 
timely in light of the fact that we are in the last year of the Obama administration and the 
actual situation in Syria continues to evolve. The presence of Russia and Iran and 
Hezbollah as actors in the Syria crisis is yet another reason for taking a close look at 
American policies and their likely transformations.  
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
Introduction 
This second chapter of the study focuses on transformations in U.S. foreign policy 
toward Syria under Bashar Al Assad as represented by three U.S. presidential 
administrations. A projection of future policy directions surveys four unique bodies of 
literature. The first is a review of relevant theories addressing both theories of 
International Relations (IR) that speak to the approaches employed in developing foreign 
policies at the highest levels of national leadership and a description of the theory of 
Coalition Building, which is employed in Conflict Resolution. Secondly, the literature 
will explore the historical evolution of the Syrian crisis and identify its unique nature and 
position in geopolitical relations. Third, the literature review will examine the actual 
policies that were implemented during the presidential administrations of Bill Clinton, 
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. The final section of the literature review will draw 
heavily upon published presidential and governmental documents and statements as well 
as scholarly commentary to assess the viability of the theories of IR presented herein. 
This review of literature provides a background for a comparative case of Iraq and the 
gassing of Iraqi Kurds, which is developed in subsequent chapters of the study. 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Two sets of theory are employed within this dissertation. The first set consists of 
what Spragens (1976) identified as political theories, ways of looking at politics that add 
up to a symbolic picture of an ordered whole or a vision that functions as a way of 
understanding the world of politics. Spragens (1976) says that the goal of political theory 
is “to provide a comprehensive vision of the political enterprise” and a means of 
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understanding politics “by looking at it against the background of human nature and other 
features of our world which we must take as givens” (p. 4). Political theory, which is vital 
in the field of IR, sketches the geography of politics and offers a vision of politics that is 
a symbolic picture of an ordered whole.  
Political theories are essentially metaphors that are viewed as normative in terms 
of the responses that a nation-state will make with respect to a particular situation or 
crisis. However, political theory is rarely employed in a straightforward manner. 
Spragens (1976), for example, pointed out that political theory may shape and inform a 
particular policy but more often than not policies themselves are the end result of many 
different views or concerns. A political theory of IR may actually be the result of multiple 
theoretical streams coming together to create a hybrid approach to policy formulation. 
Indeed, Zahariadis (2014) offered the idea that Multiple Streams – problems, politics, 
policy itself, policy entrepreneurs, and policy windows – coalesce to create a policy 
output that represents a multifaceted response to an issue. Thus, the theoretical lenses 
presented in this section of Chapter Two derived from the field of IR may be used by 
each of the three target presidential administrations singly or in combination. 
The second theory discussed below is Coalition Building Theory. Cakmak (2007) 
noted that the theory of Coalition Building in world politics is rarely discussed in the 
traditional IR literature, but nevertheless Coalition Building is an increasingly significant 
aspect of the responses undertaken in cases where a particular conflict involves multiple 
actors. The theory of Coalition Building is examined in this study as it pertains to 
creating a successful strategy for reconciling the Syrian conflict. While there are many 
different approaches to resolving or ending violent conflict through peacekeeping 
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strategies and reconciliation, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2012) make note of 
the fact that at its core, peacekeeping involves moving towards a settlement of armed 
conflict via the processes of negotiation and mediation; these processes may in fact 
require the participation of multiple actors. This theory, therefore, is especially useful in 
the case of the Syrian conflict, which involves multiple actors each with a vested interest 
in shaping the outcome of the conflict (Charap, 2013). 
Theories of International Relations 
Overview of the Section 
The theories of IR that are relevant to the formation of foreign policy briefly 
discussed herein are Realism, Liberalism, Democratic Peace Theory, Neoconservatism, 
Conflict Theory, Rational Choice Theory, and Dynamical Systems Theory. These broad 
categories of political theory are seen by Spragens (1976) as useful in both diagnosis and 
prescription in the political arena. The theories as described hereafter offer unique, yet 
occasionally overlapping, perspectives on what strategy, in terms of policy development, 
is most likely to serve the interests of an actor (e.g., a nation-state, a nongovernmental 
organization, a for profit entity, or an individual) in a given situation. Of course, rarely is 
a single political theory adequate for explaining the complex process that leads to policy 
formation.   
As Zahariadis (2014) suggests, the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) is a lens or 
framework explaining how policies are made by the government under conditions of 
ambiguity.  Ambiguity facilitates “taking appropriate actions and shaping preferences 
without a priori estimating the consequences” (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 25). Ambiguity refers 
to a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena. 
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These ways may not necessarily be reconcilable, creating vagueness, confusion, and 
stress. By identifying problems, policies, politics, policy windows, and policy 
entrepreneurs as the structural elements that come together to create policy output, 
Zahariadis (2014) emphasizes the complexity of the policymaking process. Each of the 
individual theories presented below are likely to have some kind of influence over the 
development of American foreign policies regarding Syria in each of the three 
presidential administrations discussed as cases.  
The Realism Approach 
Of all the theories of International Relations (IR) and of the approaches taken to 
the development of foreign policy by a sovereign nation sate, it is Realism that may in 
fact be most often encountered in the scholarly literature (Masataka, 2012). At its most 
basic, Realism advances the idea that nation-states pursue nothing more and nothing less 
than a balance of power which, when stable, prevents conflict from occurring and creates 
an environment in which peace is likely.  Realists argue, as does Masataka (2012), that 
the “balance of power has been the primary principle governing international relations 
since the establishment of an international community in modern Europe and there has 
been no peace where there was no balance of power” (p. 399). Realism is, therefore, a 
significant theoretical underpinning of the foreign policy initiatives of many leaders of 
nation-states; in this study, realism and other theories are applicable as a framework for 
presidential policies of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama. 
Realists assert that left to its own devices, society becomes chaotic, anarchic, and 
ultimately unstable (McGraw, 2001). From this particular perspective, states must, out of 
necessity, work to achieve a balance of power that protects their own interests and, when 
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possible, advances the interests of the state over the interests of others (Gilpin, 1984; 
Murray, 1997). Since the eighteenth century, Realism has remained a vital approach to 
the formulation of state policies, shaping such policies by emphasizing the development 
and maintenance of those alliances that will be supportive of a country’s own goals and 
objectives and capable of generating success in the pursuit of short-term goals (Owens, 
2007).  
Realism, as described by Richmond (2011), gives rise to the notion of states as 
transitional actors that are focused on supporting their own goals and objectives and 
approaching external conflicts with a view toward determining how those conflicts will 
impact on the state. This is not to suggest that Realists do not acknowledge the necessity 
of supporting their allies.  Nevertheless, as Owens (2007) and Sodaro (2004) have 
argued, Realists purse policies that are self-serving and varied, alternating periods of 
isolationism with periods of more active engagement. Ford (2013) argued that a Realist 
policy may very well include elements of both engagement and isolation, as has 
occasionally been used with respect to the relationship between the United States and 
Syria. In other words, Realism seems to be a somewhat ubiquitous theory that is 
incorporated into other approaches on an as needed basis. 
Liberalism 
Bell (2008) notes that Liberalism derives to some extent from Realism, moving 
beyond classical Realism to emphasize a radical, moral, or normative critique of the state 
from a leftist perspective. Liberalism, said Bell (2008), is inherently idealist and has 
become a primary mode of theoretical analysis since World War I and the ideology of 
President Woodrow Wilson. McGraw (2001) views Liberalism as initiated by the belief 
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that humans are inherently good and that cooperation between disparate nations is 
possible and certainly desirable. Liberalism blends, to an extent, with other theoretical 
formulations in shaping the ideological orientation of a leader’s decision-making; in this 
study, Liberalism is presented as a background to the policies of Presidents Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama vis-à-vis Syria and other issues of significance during their respective 
tenures in the Oval Office.   
Liberalism, said Buchan (2002), “accepts as axiomatic that the domestic nature of 
the state is a key determinant of its behavior toward other states” (p. 407). This particular 
assumption derives from the view that peace is a quality that is achieved by civil societies 
operating within states, while conflict is likely to still be endemic in the external world of 
relations between states. Liberalism asserts that liberal, civil societies are more peaceful 
than illiberal states. It also proposes that spreading liberalism will result in a reduction of 
conflict. One is tempted to conclude that those who promote the spread of democracy or 
the process of democratization are essentially advancing the Liberalist agenda (McGraw, 
2001). Given that spreading democracy was a central concern of the George W. Bush 
Administration, this theory is useful in describing his approaches to foreign policy. 
Liberal IR theorists often take the position that the role of the state is to guarantee 
individual rights, freedom, and legal protections of life and property to citizens (Buchan, 
2002).  States that do not do so are seen by Liberalism as prone to conflict, incapable of 
eliminating violence, and vulnerable to ongoing internecine power struggles as 
marginalized groups strive for participation (Sodaro, 2004). In this same context, Genest 
(2004) asserts that states are more likely to cooperate than to compete when their 
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common interests calls for cooperation and when they are developmentally in a position 
to benefit more from cooperation than from conflict.   
Liberal theorists, according to Richmond (2011), see military engagement as a 
foreign policy tool that is literally a tool of last resort. It is a tool that is brought into play 
only when other efforts at bringing about a negotiated end to a conflict have been 
exhausted. The Liberal policy initiative deployed in the context of the illiberal state like 
Syria focused on peacebuilding through what Richmond (2011) called a culture welfare 
paradox. The notion of changing the hearts and minds of actors within illiberal states is 
fundamental to this perspective. Of course, as Rada (2014) has commented, Liberalism is 
hardly alone in its determination to ensure that illiberal states transform themselves into 
democracies or liberal states. 
Democratic Peace Theory 
Tellidis (2012) states that “during the last decade, a multitude of research findings 
have critiqued the liberal peace framework concentrating mainly on the illiberal effects 
that liberal peacebuilding has had on the countries it was implemented in” (p.429). In 
discussing a post-liberal peace, Richmond (2011) strongly suggests that the framework 
through which Liberalism and its institutions function depends upon the promotion and 
maintenance of a neoliberal economy. Rarely, if ever, do international actors 
“contextualize responses to conflict by taking into account the needs and rights of the 
populations for whom peace is prepared” (Tellidis, 2012, p. 429). Democratic Peace 
Theory, as a shift from Liberalism per se, does focus on building democratic institutions 
within societies as a strategy for eliminating conflict. The theory is relevant here in that 
all three of the U.S. presidents serving as “cases” for analysis have advanced, to some 
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extent, the notion that democratic institutions are capable of facilitating a reduction in 
conflict and the establishment of viable mechanisms for resolving social and other 
problems.  
Democratic Peace Theory derives somewhat from the early philosophical work of 
Montesquieu, who is described by Patapan (2012, p. 314) as “best known for his theory 
of the separation of powers that influenced the American founders, determining the 
contours of American constitutionalism and subsequent international constitutional 
reforms based on the American model.” This approach further suggested that democratic 
peace may better be understood as commercial peace, a view that supports the imposition 
of the neoliberal agenda on the developing world without fully acknowledging the role 
that is played in fostering inequities by neoliberal economic policies.   
Montesquieu’s Doux Commerce thesis essentially argues that commercial 
interactions between sovereign nation-states tend to promote peaceful relationships 
because it is ultimately in the best interest of states to eliminate conflict. Democratic 
Peace theorists make the case that excessive engagement in military, boots on the ground, 
or other forms of conflict is antithetical to the resolution of disputes. Increasing 
opportunities for mediation, facilitation, and arbitration when conflict occurs underpins 
the Democratic Peace theory and emphasizes what Rada (2014) sees as an implicit 
understanding of the liberal notion that democracies do not make war on each other and 
that spreading democracy is the best solution to the problem of conflict. To an extent, one 
might argue that the refusal of the various U.S. Presidential administrations to employ 
military responses in Syria reflects this theoretical posture. 
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Rada (2014) sees the promotion of democracy as derived from a liberal conviction 
that there is a universal value to democracy and that a democratic world will be more 
stable and secure than an undemocratic world. Democratic peacebuilding and 
democratization seek state interests in the form of improved trade and the flow of foreign 
direct investment, the securing of collective interests of allies and the entire international 
community, and an end to authoritarianism. Democratic peacebuilding therefore shares 
some goals with Realist policies and with those that are Liberal.   
Genest (2004) makes the case that cooperation is a key goal in policies generated 
by Liberal, Democratic peacebuilding, and Realist approaches to International Relations. 
At the same time, Realists are less focused on the necessity of democratization, as long as 
undemocratic and even totalitarian states are cooperative and do not pose a direct threat 
to the interests of the democratic state (Patapan, 2012). 
Neoconservatism 
The fourth theory discussed here is less optimistic than either Liberalism or 
Democratic Peace theory. Neoconservatism shares with Realism the conviction that the 
world is more likely to be dangerous than stable and that sovereign nation-states often 
engage in what amounts to little more than a struggle between good and evil, right and 
wrong (Owens, 2007).  Neoconservatism, best understood within the context of the 
George W. Bush administration in recent years (Rappoport, 2008; Sukanta, 2006), may 
have been rooted in Liberalism with respect to its goal of peacebuilding and equality, but 
it departs dramatically from Liberalism on some key issues such as the necessity of 
disarmament. The theory, according to Rappoport (2008), is especially applicable to the 
policies of President George W. Bush. 
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Neoconservatism, as described by Muravchik (2007), emerged in the 1970s with a 
negative connotation, attempting to stigmatize liberal intellectuals who had become 
disenchanted with Liberalism orientation due to its apparent failure to bring about 
meaningful global stability (Muravchik, 2007). Neoconservatism is aggressively anti-
Communist, anti-authoritarian, and pro-democratization. While President Ronald Reagan 
embraced concepts of Neoconservatism as promoted by thinkers such as Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick and Elliott Abrams, the general public became more sensitized to 
Neoconservatism in the George W. Bush administration (Muravchik, 2007). 
Muravchik (2007) described Neoconservatives as moralists who were hostile 
toward acts of aggression committed by individuals such as Saddam Hussain, Slobodan 
Milosevic and the Al Assads in Syria. Like Liberals, contemporary neoconservatives are 
internationalists who believe that “depredations tolerated in one place were likely to be 
repeated elsewhere – and conversely that beneficial political and economic policies 
exercised their own ‘domino effect’ for the good” (Muravchik, 2007, p. 24). Third, 
neoconservatives also believe strongly in the value of democracy both domestically and 
internationally while trusting in the efficacy of military force and doubting that either 
U.N. supported sanctions or diplomacy would be sufficient to undermine a determined 
adversary. 
Like Realists, neoconservatives see the world as dangerous and as threatening to 
the security of even the most stable democratic state (Sukanta, 2006). When creating 
foreign policies, neoconservatives take the position that dangerous regimes cannot and 
should not be tolerated and that it is essentially incumbent upon a country with the will 
and the capacity to topple such regimes to do so. The neoconservative approach to 
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foreign policy is much more complex than its critics would allow. It does not deny the 
usefulness of military sanctions or of diplomacy. What it does is support the potential 
necessity of such policy tools as the preemptive strike. Consequently, it has become a 
policy orientation that many see as overly militaristic, even though it has been successful 
in some cases (Krauthammer, 2005). 
Conflict Theory 
Conflict Theory owes a great deal to the work of Karl Marx, who argued that the 
inequalities in any society are derived from the class system and essentially from 
capitalism, a mode of production that exacerbated class differences, polarized workers 
and elites, and created the kinds of tensions that would not be readily resolved (Knapp, 
1994). Marxism may form the basis of conflict theory, but contemporary conflict theory 
goes beyond a criticism of capitalism and includes the notion that factors other than 
economic ones influence such antagonisms and tensions.  
For example, Ludwig Gumplowicz proposed that civilization had historically 
been shaped as a consequence of conflict occurring between disparate cultures and ethnic 
groups.  This theorist saw war and conquest as giving rise to the development of large 
complex human societies in which a caste system was common (Lenski, 1966). Other 
theorists, such as Lester Ward, took the position that human nature itself was conflicted 
and that civilization had from the outset been the locus of a struggle among the 
competing impulses of altruism and self-aggrandizement or emotion and intellect 
(Lenski, 1966). Emile Durkheim proposed that certain types of conflict were actually 
beneficial to society; Max Weber, in contrast, departed from Marx by emphasizing the 
role played by individuals rather than groups in shaping society (Lenski, 1966). 
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Modern Conflict Theory owes much to C. Wright Mills’ theory that there are 
substantial power differences between groups and individuals within society (Knapp, 
1994).  Mills proposed that social structures are created by individuals who have differing 
or conflicting interests and resources which, in turn, are influenced by the structures that 
they create. The end result is that societies experience an unequal distribution of power 
and resources (Knapp, 1994). For Mills, a power elite in any country employs its 
resources and capacities to further its own interests and will accommodate the interests of 
others only when absolutely necessary to serve their own purposes. It was Mills’ 
conviction that the policies enacted by a power elite would inevitably lead to an 
escalation of conflict. 
Conflict Theory further assumes that all societies are inherently unequal (Sears, 
2008).  Alan Sears (2008) offered several fundamental propositions regarding conflict 
theory that are useful in this study. First, Sears (2008) suggests that societies are defined 
by inequality that produces conflict rather than order. Second, the disadvantaged have 
structural interests that challenge the status quo while human potential is suppressed via 
the unequal division of labor that is exploitative and oppressive. Third, Sears (2008) 
argues that the State exists to serve the particular interest of the most powerful, and even 
when disadvantaged groups have representation in state organs or legislative assemblies, 
their actual access to power is minimal. Finally, Sears (2008) asserts that global 
inequality is the direct result of purposive underdevelopment of certain nations that 
occurred during colonialism and which continues because global institutions such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN) 
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actually serve the interests of multinational corporations and the developed world (Sears, 
2008). 
Rational Choice Theory 
Rational Choice Theory, variously referred to as choice theory or rational actor 
theory, is one of the fundamental theories employed in the field of IR and also in CR. As 
described by Green and Shapiro (1994), this particular theoretical framework is used in 
both social and economic applications and is based on the premise that aggregate or 
group social behavior is the result of the behavior of individual actors. An additional 
assumption of this theory is that actions are based upon a calculus that is derived from 
comparing the benefits and losses that are associated with a particular choice; 
consequently, the theory proposes that people as well as groups make choices that are 
embedded in rationality or reason and are driven by a recognition of the relationship 
between cause and effect (Levin & Milgrom, 2004). 
Early work in the field of Rational Choice Theory was done by theorists such as 
George Homas who drew heavily upon behavioral psychology. Other pioneers in the 
field included Blau, Coleman, and Cook, each of whom during the 1960s and 1970s 
transformed exchange theory into a more complex theoretical perspective based upon a 
variety of assumptions as to what motivates human behavior (Levin, & Milgrom, 2004). 
The rational agent, either as an individual or a nation-state, is seen in this 
particular theory as choosing those actions that will be most beneficial to him or herself 
or to the group.  The theory, as described by Sodaro (2004), stems from the fundamental 
premise that human beings are motivated economically as well as politically by material 
self-interest. From the economic perspective, people attempt to maximize their utilities to 
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achieve a net gain rather than a net loss. Behavior aimed at achieving such an objective is 
considered to be rational. For economists, said Sodaro (2004), a rational choice is “a 
choice or a decision that is consciously calculated to maximize expected gains and 
minimize expected risks and losses” (p. 35).    
Some early theorists, including Homas, applied concepts of economic rationality 
to politics, leading to a body of work concluding that even in political behavior people 
tend to be motivated by narrowly defined notions of pure self-interest. Voters, for 
example, were said to be likely to vote for a candidate who was most capable of 
increasing their material well-being.  Politicians were assumed to be interested mainly in 
maximizing their personal power. Sodaro (2004) defines rational choice theory in the 
political or sociological arena as maintaining “that individuals behave in politics on the 
basis of self-interest, seeking to increase their expected gains and reduce their expected 
costs and risks on the basis of personal preferences and priorities” (p. 36). 
Rational Choice Theory, therefore, is an analytic framework that looks less at the 
group than at the individual (Levin & Milgrom, 2004). Applied to the actions of a nation-
state, this particular theory appears to suggest that political decisions and policies are 
ultimately the result of an aggregation of individual preferences that are designed to 
function in a transitive manner, indicating that the options available for action will be 
considered in terms of their relative benefits, evaluated in terms of their costs, and 
ultimately narrowed down to the action or outcome that provides the maximum net 
benefit. 
Further, the rational choice model is based upon the assumption that the 
individual actor has full or perfect information about the alternatives that are available 
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and can therefore rank them appropriately. Another assumption is that in circumstances 
that are uncertain, individuals continue to make judgements and choices based on the best 
information about likely outcomes.  Of course, as Sodaro (2004) points out, this 
particular theory also assumes that most actors have the ability to identify and weigh 
alternatives against each other. This suggests that there is sufficient time available for 
making a rational, decision about which course of action will be most beneficial.   
Rational Choice Theory, according to Saari (2001), addresses three imperatives: 
completeness, transitiveness, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The 
fundamental economic underpinnings of the theory may be one of its limiting factors 
when applied to political actions. Sodaro (2004) notes that the merits of the theory as a 
general explanation of political behavior are hotly debated.  In authoritarian regimes, for 
example, the theory may actually have greater relevance and utility than it does in 
democratic regimes. In a dictatorship, the chief of state may very well perceive him or 
herself to be a rational actor making choices on behalf of the governed without their input 
or consent. In democracies, where policies promoted even by an extremely popular chief 
executive or president are subject to debate and modification, the input of multiple 
stakeholders is very likely to influence a decision (Sodaro, 2004). 
Dynamical Systems Theory 
Dynamical Systems Theory has been characterized as an area of mathematics that 
is extremely useful in explaining and describing behaviors of complex dynamical systems 
via differential equations (Luenberger, 1979). Differential equations are employed in 
what is known as discrete dynamical system analysis, suggesting that this mathematically 
driven theory is most applicable to situations that lend themselves to some type of 
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quantification. An offshoot is chaos theory, which describes the behavior of those 
dynamical systems whose state evolves over time and are very sensitive to what is known 
as the butterfly effect (Luenberger, 1979).   
In the social sciences and political science, Dynamical Systems Theory, as 
described by Miller (2002), owes much to the work of Esther Thelen, who drew upon 
Newtonian science to identify the ways in which multiple factors determine behavior. 
Multiple factors are seen as interrelated with an individual’s goals and objectives, 
competencies, the specific task being addressed, and the situation in which these 
variables come together (Thelen & Bates, 2003). The system is nonlinear in that it is 
based upon the assumption that at any given time a set of factors can combine to create a 
number of options for action.   
Moreover, the theory is based upon other assumptions, to wit: 
x Dynamic interaction between factors has the potential to impact on the system, 
evoking change through either stabilization or destabilization. 
x When two or more factors interact, results may either be transformative or 
destabilizing as there is no guarantee of what outcome will emerge. 
x The theory does provide ways of thinking, actualizing, and forming such 
interactions and happenings via an understanding of time, the elements involved, 
and the procedures being employed. 
x The theory provides an opportunity to examine entire systems that are involved in 
a global problem and necessitates looking underneath the surface and moving 
from the immediate to the normative (Luenberger, 1979). 
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Clearly, Dynamical Systems Theory allows recognition of the fact that past 
behaviors shape and inform future choices. In the present case, many analysts are of the 
opinion that Vladimir Putin’s decision to use Russian military intervention in Syria was 
predictable in light not only of his earlier intervention in Crimea and Ukraine, but also in 
light of his determination to return Russia to a position of prominence in the geopolitical 
arena (Marten, 2015).   
Dynamical Systems Theory also proposes that any change in any element of a 
system will indefinitely affect other components of the system (Thelen & Bates, 2003). 
The entry of Russia as both a ground and air actor in Syria changes the situation 
substantially. Where the United States has been using air strikes and other forms of 
assistance (e.g., provision of equipment, training, intelligence) against the Assad regime 
and ISIS/ISI, Cohen (2015) maintains that Russia’s goal is in complete opposition to this 
policy; it seeks to counter support given to anti-Assad forces and to support Assad as he 
struggles to maintain control of even a relatively small portion of what was once Syria. 
Coalition Building Theory: A Conflict Resolution Strategy 
Any study of policy processes evokes a set of questions related to the behavior of 
actors who directly or indirectly attempt to influence policy processes. Many of these 
questions consider the role of coalitions defined by Spangler (2003) as “a temporary 
alliance or partnering of groups in order to achieve a common purpose or to engage in 
joint activity” (p. 1). Coalition building is the process by which individuals, 
organizations, or nations come together to form a coalition with other groups of similar 
interests, values, and goals (Yarn, 1991).  Coalition Building (CB) theory departs from 
conventional IR theory, which bases its paradigms primarily on “the role of the nation-
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state in international politics and the interactions between themselves as the only 
meaningful activities that should be take into consideration for theoretical analysis” 
(Cakmak, 2008, p. 2). 
This tendency is largely being abandoned in part because policymakers are 
increasingly cognizant of the growing role that is played by non-state actors on the global 
stage (Cakmak, 2007). Coalition Building emphasizes the reality that coalitions are 
essentially outcomes of a pragmatic approach and are not “built because it is good, moral, 
or nice to get everyone working together. The only reason to spend the time and energy 
building a coalition is to amass the power necessary to do something you cannot do 
through one organization” (Bobo, Kendall, & Max, 1991, p. 70). 
Coalition building matters because it is a basic skill for those who wish to attain 
and maintain power and influence (Watkins & Rosegrant, 2001). Coalition building is not 
only a useful tool for powerful nation-states, it is also “the primary mechanism through 
which disempowered parties can develop their party base and thereby better defend their 
interests” (Spangler, 2003, p. 1). The formation of a coalition is widely recognized as 
shifting, or potentially shifting, the balance of power in a conflict situation and altering 
the future course of the conflict. Coalition members acting in concert may be able to 
resist certain threats or begin to make counter threats. Building a successful coalition 
begins with recognizing compatible interests and similar goals. It is premised on 
recognition that working together will change members’ capacity for reaching their goals 
and that the benefits of coalescing will be greater than the costs.   
Spangler (2003, pp. 1-2) identified the benefits of coalitions as including the 
following: 
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x A coalition of organizations can win on more fronts than a single organization 
working alone and increase the potential for success. 
x A coalition can bring more expertise and resources to bear on complex issues, 
where the technical or personnel resources of any one organization would not be 
sufficient. 
x A coalition can develop new leaders. As experienced group leaders step forward 
to lead the coalition, openings are created for new leaders in the individual 
groups. The new, emerging leadership strengthens the groups and the coalition. 
x A coalition will increase the impact of each organization's effort. Involvement in a 
coalition means there are more people who have a better understanding of your 
issues and more people advocating for your side. 
x A coalition will increase available resources. Not only will physical and financial 
resources be increased, but each group will gain access to the contacts, 
connections, and relationships established by other groups. 
x A coalition may raise its members' public profiles by broadening the range of 
groups involved in a conflict. The activities of a coalition are likely to receive 
more media attention than those of any individual organization. 
x A coalition can build a lasting base for change. Once groups unite, each group's 
vision of change broadens and it becomes more difficult for opposition groups to 
disregard the coalition's efforts as dismissible or as special interests. 
x A successful coalition is made up of people who have never worked together 
before. Coming from diverse backgrounds and different viewpoints, they have to 
figure out how to respect each other's differences and get something big 
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accomplished. They have to figure out how each group and its representatives can 
make their different but valuable contributions to the overall strategy for change. 
This helps avoid duplication of efforts and improve communication among key 
players. 
Conversely, Spangler (2003) notes that coalitions are only as strong as their 
weakest link, and that to maintain a coalition, it is often essential to cater to one side 
more than another, particularly when negotiating tactics. Further, the “democratic 
principle of one group-one vote may not always be acceptable to members with a lot of 
power and resources. The coalition must carefully define the relationships between 
powerful and less powerful groups” (Spangler, 2003, p. 2). Despite these potential 
disadvantages, coalitions are viable when they are flexible, issue oriented, and the 
product of a strategy or strategic plan that targets an issue that must be addressed if 
desirable outcomes are to be forthcoming (Cakmak, 2007).   
Coalition Building, according to Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, and Sabatier 
(2014), has become a common feature within CR because of growing recognition that 
few geopolitical problems can be resolved by single actors. Coalition formation and 
maintenance has emerged as a means of developing frameworks for addressing complex 
problems – a characteristic that is certainly applicable to the Syrian case. Researchers, 
including Cloke, (2008) point out that it is impossible to achieve either “a sustainable 
peace or an integrated, equitable, and just social order that makes such peace possible 
unless opposing sides are able to listen, learn, and seek to understand each other” (p. 14). 
Collaborative action is necessary in conflict resolution because few if any problems are 
actually amenable to resolution by a single or even a limited group of actors. 
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Peacemaking as a strategy for resolving conflicts, according to Ramsbotham et al. (2012), 
necessitates coalition building because no one actor in the post-Cold War world is 
capable of imposing a resolution on actors in a conflict. 
Monteleone (2015, p. 46), stated that: 
Denied by realists and neglected by neoliberal institutionalists and constructivists, 
coalitions are crucial in global leadership and in hegemonic theories: it is the 
coalition that emerges as the winner after a global competition that gains the 
power of structural initiation, becoming the dominant coalition. 
This analyst takes the position that Coalition Building is, in the post-Cold War world, an 
absolute necessity. There are too many overlapping interests that could come into play to 
ignore the usefulness of coordinated action. Further, Monteleone (2015) stated that when 
a conflict such as that taking place in Syria is underway, there will invariably be 
competing needs and interests that must be resolved. A coalition is the mechanism that 
best addresses this complexity. 
Thus, Coalition Building is offered herein as the most appropriate strategy for 
bringing about a reconciliation of the Syrian conflict. Of course, building a coalition in 
and of itself does not identify or determine the policy approach that the coalition will 
undertake or address (Jenkins-Smith, et al., 2014). As will be discussed below, Coalition 
Building Theory can be employed in developing a response to the Syrian crisis that 
incorporates diplomatic interaction with Bashar Al Assad as a sovereign state leader or as 
a mechanism for developing a coordinated attack on either ISIS or the Assad regime 
itself.  
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Historical Background and Overview of the Syrian Conflict 
Introduction 
This section of the review of literature examines the historical background of the 
Syrian conflict, presents an overview of key events in the conflict, and assesses the level 
of engagement by multiple domestic and international parties in the conflict. A 
demographic description of Syria establishes a portrait of the state, while a discussion of 
the emergence of the Al Assad regime provides insight into the onset of opposition in the 
Syrian state. This section also includes a summary of the current status of the Syrian 
conflict and introduces issues regarding the roles played by external actors, including the 
United States, Russia, Iran, and ISIS.   
Demographic Profile of Syria 
With a total land mass of 185,180 square kilometers, Syria borders the states of 
Lebanon and Turkey and is geographically positioned in a region that is certainly no 
stranger to internecine violent conflict. Like its neighbors, Syria is populated primarily by 
followers of Islam, with Muslims accounting for 87 percent of the population. This figure 
includes a 74 percent Sunni majority which has nevertheless found itself marginalized by 
the dominant Alawite clan represented by the Al Assads (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2015). The Alawite, Shia, and Ismaili consists only 13 percent of the total population of 
Syria. An additional 10 percent of Syrians are members of some Christian faith 
community, while some three percent are Druze.   
Between 1980 and 2010, the population of Syria grew significantly from around 
nine million to slightly more than 21.5 million. Projections from the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Western ASIA (ESCWA) (2011) indicated that the 
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Syrian population would continue to grow and reach a peak of 36.7 million in 2050. 
However, given the enormous exodus of Syrians from the country, this seems unlikely at 
the present time. Interestingly, some 20 percent of all Syrians are under the age of 25 and 
many of these young people find it all but impossible to make a living in a country that is 
torn by warfare (United Nations ESCWA, 2011).   
Poverty has been recognized as a persistent characteristic of Syria, one that 
coupled with political oppression has given rise to conflict between the Al Assad regime 
and the Syrian people (United Nations ESCWA, 2011). The United Nations Development 
Programme (2014) indicated that approximately 6.4 percent of the Syrian population can 
be characterized as “multidimensionally” poor, while an additional 7.7 percent of Syrians 
experience poverty as a consequence of the conflict. The World Bank predicted that 
poverty rates in 2014 would be 82.5 percent of the population with this number of 
Syrians experiencing ongoing challenges with respect to meeting basic survival needs 
(i.e., food, shelter, medical care, and education.)   
Economically, the World Bank (2014) characterized Syria as a middle income 
developing country that is possessed of a diversified economy that included an expanding 
energy sector.   Nevertheless, a combination of a global economic recession in 2008 and 
the Syrian civil war have coalesced to undermine any economic advances the country 
may have in fact achieved.  The economy is slowed by a number of factors, including 
state intervention reflecting price, trade, and foreign exchange controls. The public sector 
is no longer investing in infrastructure and is, in fact, focused almost entirely upon 
shoring up the military resources of the Assad regime to the detriment of any other 
meaningful investment in infrastructure (World Bank, 2014). 
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Prior to the crisis, Syria’s economy was confronted with multiple challenges. Poor 
development of capital markets, a lack of access to international finance, and limited 
Syrian monetary policies are all problematic (U.S. Department of State, 2014). The war 
has brought about escalating unemployment rates and undermined government efforts in 
the pre-crisis era to improve the standard of living enjoyed by Syrians particularly as a 
consequence of oil exploration and exploitation.  
Politically, the U.S. Department of State (2014) says that Syria has the 
characteristics of a republican semi-presidential system, a characterization that does not 
take into account the long-term existence of an authoritarian presidential system wherein 
the Al Assad family has held the reins of power since 1970. Although there are elections 
for the presidency held every seven years, it would be patently absurd to suggest that 
there is a truly democratic system in place in Syria. The Syrian president enjoys virtually 
unlimited power and can appoint without the advice and consent of a single legislative 
assembly and key actors such as the vice president, prime minister, Council of Ministers, 
and top-ranking members of both the armed forces and the ruling Baath Party.   
Since March of 2011, antigovernment protests calling for the resignation of 
President Assad have transformed an opposition movement into a committed military 
force determined to bring down the Assad regime. Adding to the problems experienced in 
Syria was the expansion of economic sanctions against the Assad regime on the part of 
such external actors such as the Arab League, Turkey, the United States, and the 
European Union (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015).   The Syrian National Coalition has 
been recognized by more than 130 countries as the only legitimate representative of the 
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Syrian people. Peace negotiations between this coalition and the Syrian regime in Geneva 
in 2014 did not bring about any meaningful resolution to the conflict (CIA, 2015).   
Historical Evolution of the Conflict 
Some discussion of the background of the Syrian conflict was presented in 
Chapter One. With this background in mind, other comments are certainly relevant 
herein. Since March 2011, antigovernment protests demanding the resignation of 
President Assad have escalated and continue to escalate. These protests began in March 
2011 in the south of Syria in Dar’a when 15 young people between the ages of 10 and 15 
were arrested and tortured by Syrian secret police after they were found putting up 
antigovernment graffiti (Spindel, 2011). Protests in Dar’a focused on calls for the repeal 
of Assad’s emergency laws along with the legalization of a multi-party system and an end 
to corrupt government activity. Other reforms were demanded as were equal rights for 
Kurds. Spindel (2011) noted that protests expanded to other parts of the country with 
security forces employing lethal weapons against protesters as well as an attack on a 
mosque believed to be the center of protest mobilization. 
As March ended, the protests spread even farther throughout the country with 
demands of protesters in Damascus, Duma, and Banyas intensifying opposition to the Al 
Assad regime. The Syrian National Council was formed in October of 2011 and its 
leaders fled the country, seeking refuge in neighboring Persian Gulf nations as well as in 
Paris and London (International Crisis Group, 2011). While Assad did repeal the 
emergency laws and passed new laws permitting political parties and liberalizing 
elections, President Assad refused to step down and ordered the military to continue its 
progressively brutal response to the protesters. 
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According to the International Crisis Group (2011, p. 1), the repressive response 
of Assad’s security forces has been interpreted “as a consequence of their makeup; the 
praetorian military units (the Republican Guard) and the branches of the secret police 
(Amn Al-Dawla, Amn Siyasi, Amn Dakhili, Istikhbarat) known under the generic name 
of Mukhabarat are disproportionately composed of Alawites with no mercy in the efforts 
of containing the protest units.”  It is highly probable that the violence of the 
government’s response to the protests further inspired the emergence of opposition 
groups as well as the massive internal and external migration of Syrians seeking an 
escape from the war. 
Attached as Appendix A is a detailed chronology which identifies key acts and 
events in the Syrian crisis. This detailed chronology provides an opportunity for the 
reader to examine the activities of the Bashar Al Assad regime over a period of 16 years. 
The chronology demonstrates that while the regime early on attempted to reach out to 
segments of the population, this quickly came to an end. The Al Assads’ political reforms 
included efforts to gain the support of Iran (a key regional actor) and Russia (Branson, 
2000). Certainly, Branson (2000) suggests that in 2000, Syria wanted to position itself as 
a key player in the Middle East. In pursuit of this goal, the Assad regime positioned the 
country as a quasi-provocateur while also seeking to acquire extensive stockpiles of 
chemical and nuclear weapons. The relationships between Iran and Russia entered into by 
the Assads quickly eliminated any signs of outreach to the West (Branson, 2000).  
When Bashar Al Assad assumed the presidency in 2007, a number of political 
reforms were forthcoming. This included the emergence of some independent 
newspapers, civil society organizations, and intellectual forums. Though relatively brief 
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and narrowly focused, these particular efforts were indicative of the determination of 
many in Syria to force the Assad regime to loosen its grip on the political system and 
civic life (Wood, 2014). The ruling Baath party responded fairly quickly by banning any 
and all criticism of the president, his family, and the party itself. Blockage of social 
media followed swiftly, and when mass mobilizations emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya, Assad reacted quickly to prevent any manifestation of such protests in his country 
(BBC News, 2015).  
The end result of these repressive actions was the formation of a multifaceted 
Syrian opposition. BBC News (2015) pointed out that this opposition was in no way 
coordinated or cohesive and is in fact deeply divided and consisting of multiple “political 
groups, exiled dissidents, grassroots activists, and armed militants unable to agree on how 
to overthrow President Al Assad” (p. 1).  Attached as Appendices B and C are materials 
that first identify the key opposition groups in Syria and secondly depict their 
relationships in an organizational chart.  
The Free Syrian Army consists of defectors from the Syrian Army. The Southern 
Front of the Free Syrian Army is in a coalition with the Free Syrian Army. There are 
independent groups that are friendly to the Free Syrian Army such as the Syrian 
Democratic Forces, various coalitions, and transnational jihadi co-belligerents. A key 
feature of the opposition is that coalitions work together on an ad hoc bas is to funnel 
financial, military, and humanitarian aid to one another (BBC News, 2015). The 
coalition, headquartered in Doha, Qatar, also has members in Syria and presents itself as 
the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, calling on forces in the country to 
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overthrow the Assads, shut down the security and military forces of the regime, and 
create a democratic Syria. 
Included in the National Coalition are various Local Coordination Committees 
that are a grassroots arm of the Coalition as well as members of local revolutionary 
councils supported by the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army (BBC 
News, 2015). The National Coalition is currently recognized by the members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) along with France, the European Union, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom. In opposition to the National Coalition are China, Russia, and 
Iran – each of which support the Assad regime and have blocked action by the United 
Nations Security Council and refused to participate in the December 2012 Marrakesh 
Friends of the Syrian People Conference (BBC News, 2015). 
Unfortunately, the National Coalition is underfunded and has been challenged by 
the Syrian National Council for leadership roles. There is debate among members of the 
Syrian opposition as to whether violent or nonviolent opposition to the Assad regime is 
preferable. The Syrian National Council is dominated by Syria’s majority Sunni Muslim 
community (BBC News, 2015). This group has been challenged by the National 
Coordination Committee, an opposition bloc functioning in Syria today that rejects 
Islamists within the Syrian National Council, which is also not on good terms with the 
Free Syrian Army (BBC News, 2015). 
To further complicate the opposition, the National Coordination Committee for 
Democratic Change emerged as an alliance consisting of 14 to 16 leftist political parties, 
three Kurdish political parties, and some independent activists with no known affiliations. 
This group is on record as objecting not only to what is perceived as the Muslim 
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Brotherhood’s domination of the exiled Syrian National Council, but also to the support 
provided to rebel groups by Turkey and Gulf Arab states (BBC News, 2015). Add to this 
the Kurdish Supreme Committee, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdish 
National Council, and the Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG), and it becomes quite 
clear that the opposition in Syria is in no way a unified group.   
Sayigh (2016) commented that these groups operate under multiple 
disadvantages, not the least of which is their apparent inability to agree on key objectives 
and strategies. While they all may wish to remove Assad from power and create a new 
government that is inclusive of all groups within Syria, they are not in agreement as to 
the best way of achieving these goals and objectives. There are so many semi-
independent military units at work in Syria that it is extremely difficult for even the most 
knowledgeable analyst to determine which of these groups can be said to represent the 
majority of the Syria people (Sayigh, 2016). 
Actors in the region cannot determine which they should support, either. Iran, as 
noted above, is backing Assad. The Saudis are providing direct support to Salafist and 
Islamist groups in western Syria. Turkey and Qatar support nationalist Syrian rebels 
including some Salafists and Islamists. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which is now 
headquartered in Turkey, funnels money and weapons to opposition groups in the north 
of Syria (Cafarella & Casagrande, 2015).  Russia has joined with Iran in supporting 
Assad; the United States and its allies from the European Union and elsewhere have 
rejected Assad and have participated in limited use of aerial bombing and drones while 
focusing on ISIS.  
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The Rise of the Caliphate 
Wood (2014, p. 1) Stated: 
On June 29, 2014—or the first of Ramadan, 1435, for those who prefer the 
Islamic calendar to the Gregorian—the leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Sham (ISIS) publicly uttered for the first time a word that means little to the 
average Westerner, but everything to some pious Muslims. The word is “caliph.” 
ISIS’s proclamation that day formally hacked the last two letters from its acronym 
(it’s now just “The Islamic State”) and declared Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, born 
Ibrahim ibn Awwad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad al-Badri al-Samarrai, the 
Caliph of all Muslims and the Prince of the Believers. 
Further, Wood (2014, p. 1) noted that: 
The Islamic State has acted like a caliphate from the beginning, but they couldn’t 
announce themselves as one because they would have sounded ridiculous.” Now 
that they’ve controlled Raqqa for more than a year—and oversee as much 
territory as Abu Bakr, the first rightly guided caliph, himself—the claim looks far 
more credible. The mass executions and public crucifixions have also done much 
to erase any lingering aura of comedy. 
There is no doubt that ISIS/ISIL (or the Caliphate, as it prefers to be called) has become a 
force to be reckoned with in Syria and the surrounding region. Its very existence and 
influence create, for countries such as the United States, an even more challenging 
environment in which policy formation must occur. On the one hand, the Al Assad 
regime is no “friend” to the United States; on the other hand, there does not appear to be 
a single opposition group in Syria that the U.S. can either trust (as is the case with any 
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Islamist group) or which is capable of simultaneously confronting BOTH the Assad 
regime and the Caliphate.   
The new Russian engagement in Syria has further complicated the issues 
confronting the U.S. For decades, the relationship between the former Soviet Union and 
the successor state of Russia with Syria was that of patron and client, with the former 
providing financial, military, and political assistance to the Al Assad regime (La Franchi, 
2012). As the regime of Bashar Al Assad began to experience escalating internal conflict, 
Russia under President Vladimir Putin chose to inhibit United Nations’ efforts to take 
some sort of meaningful action against the Al Assad regime. The Arab League offered a 
Security Council resolution on Syria that Russia and China both vetoed in 2012. The 
result was that the UN General Assembly, responding to Human Rights Commissioner 
Navi Pillay’s report on humanitarian abuses by the Assad regime, called for appointing a 
special envoy and supporting the Arab League plan for a peaceful resolution to the Syrian 
crisis (Williams, 2012).   
The basic premise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was the 
underpinning ethos shaping the UN’s determination to provide some message that would 
help to convince Bashar Al Assad to come to terms with the opposition in his country and 
bring about an end to the ongoing conflict (Williams, 2012). Any casual observer of the 
Syrian crisis is certainly aware that the situation has become increasingly critical as the 
Islamic State in Iraq/ISIS, or, as it now calls itself, the Caliphate, has taken center stage in 
determining the course of conflict in Syria (Polonsky, 2015). Most recently, Vladimir 
Putin has chosen to undertake military intervention in Syria, sending troops, armor, 
aircraft, and other military equipment to Syria. Equally significant is the fact that Putin 
50 
 
has directed his military to target the opponents of Assad by bombing their strongholds 
instead of ISIS. However, Fred Weir (2015) has reported that Russian air strikes have not 
been directed at ISIS but against so called moderate rebels that have been fighting to 
overthrow the Bashar Al Assad dictatorship for over four years with assistance from the 
CIA, the Persian Gulf states, and Turkey. 
The issue that is now emerging with respect to Russia’s intervention in Syria is 
centered upon Putin’s motives for engaging in the internal affairs of the country. Weir 
(2015) suggests that Russia’s strategy is focused solely on bolstering Assad in an effort to 
turn the tide of the rebellion. Russia is disinterested, according to Kremlin sources, in 
fighting ISIS per se, but is concerned with ensuring that Damascus and Assad will not fall 
because the Russians believe that should this occur, the so-called moderates will not 
succeed in taking control of the country. 
Polonsky (2015) noted that Putin has ordered the United States to leave Syrian 
airspace and that Russia is targeting non-ISIS fighters. Others argue that Russia’s concern 
is based upon the belief that a failure to defeat the moderate rebels will simply result in 
an even greater influx of refugees into the European Union. Still others, said Snyder 
(2015), take the position that under Putin, Russian foreign policy, be it focused on 
Ukraine or Syria, is designed to position Russia once again as a contender for the title of 
global superpower.   
It is Putin’s desire not to merely back Assad and prevent his regime from 
crumbling.  What Putin seems to want is to increase the political influence of Russia in 
the Middle East and to challenge the notion that the United States and the West should be 
the dominant participants in any effort to restore peace to the region. As Marvin Kalb 
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(2015) has reported, Vladimir Putin is intent on restoring Russia’s reputation as a 
superpower that is capable of influencing events in multiple theaters of operation. To that 
end, Kalb (2015) said that “Putin has invested billions in modernizing Russia’s military 
industrial complex – power that he has used to achieve his political objectives” (p.11).   
Putin is, therefore, challenging the United States and playing what Mark Leonard 
(2015) calls the “great game” of power politics. By partnering to an extent not only with 
Syria but also with Iran and Hezbollah, Russia wishes to replace the United States and its 
allies as the dominant power broker in the region. Marginalizing the moderates is said by 
Leonard (2015) to be a direct assault on the United States and the Western desire to 
support these forces against Assad. 
Conflict theory is definitively relevant to the present case of Russia and Syria and 
airspace control. As Kalb (2015) points out, Russia has long agonized over the national 
humiliation caused by the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. It has sought, 
particularly since Vladimir Putin became the sole architect of Russian policy, a return to 
global recognition as a superpower. Looking at global conflict as a macro case, it is 
reasonable to conceptualize Russia’s decision to intervene in Syria as a move toward re-
establishing the country’s power and influence on the global stage.   
The conflict thus involved goes beyond the conflict on the ground and in the air 
over Syria.  It involves geopolitical competition between a former superpower, a current 
superpower and its allies, and a struggle for influence in a volatile region of the world 
(Marten, 2015).   
At the same time, one might argue with some legitimacy, as Polonsky (2015) 
does, that Putin’s Russia perceives the Assad regime as better equipped to return the 
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region to stability than either the “moderates” supported by the United States and the 
European Union or ISIS/ISIL.   Putin has said publicly, as have individuals such as 
Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, that Russia’s aim is to defeat ISIS in 
cooperation with other actors including Syria, Iran, and the United States if the United 
States is willing to participate. While one might certainly argue that Russia’s interests in 
the region go beyond defeating ISIS and may well include a determination to bolster 
Russia’s geopolitical image, it is patently apparent that Russia intends to be a permanent 
actor in Syria and the United States must come to terms with that intention (Cohen, 
2015). 
In the context of the current case of Russia’s decision to bomb the rebels in Syrian 
on behalf of the Al Assad regime, one is clearly confronted with decisions that were 
made by an authoritarian regime led by an individual who holds the reins of state power 
and who exercises what Martin (2015) characterized as corporatism in decision making. 
Vladimir Putin, even during the years in which Medvedev was president, was tacitly 
understood as the prime decisionmaker in Russia and therefore as the country’s “rational 
actor.” 
Decisions taken today with respect to Russia’s intervention in Syria are being 
undertaken by President Putin, who clearly has an agenda with respect to positioning 
Russia more favorably in the global geopolitical order (Snyder, 2015). Interestingly, 
Snyder (2015) argues that from the perspective of Vladimir Putin, there is not a great deal 
of difference between university students in Ukraine protesting in favor of closer ties 
with the EU and Islamist terrorists gaining ground in Syria. The rationale for Putin is that, 
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“if people can gather peacefully in Kiev, why not in Moscow? If Islamic terrorism can 
work in Syria, why not in southern Russia?” (Snyder, 2015, p. 1). 
Putin’s involvement in Syria thus emerges as more than providing help to a 
beleaguered client (Cohen, 2015).  It reflects the rational choice of action made by 
Vladimir Putin in response to his perception of what is in the best interests of Russia 
itself. Powell, Bennetts, and Parsons (2015) suggest that Russian engagement in Syria is 
very much an effort to send the message that Russia will not tolerate rebellion of any 
kind. Russia’s initial air strikes in Syria targeted, among others, CIA trained rebels 
located near the city of Homs. Interestingly, Russia is not targeting hard core ISIS/ISIL 
groups but instead is focusing on groups that the United States has identified as moderate 
rebels whose conflict with the Assad regime is based upon a desire to bring democracy to 
the country and not to re-establish a Caliphate that has not existed for centuries (Powell, 
et al, 2015). 
Rational choice theory can be applied to the present case quite directly. Vladimir 
Putin has chosen intervention in Syria because in his view, it allows Russia to once again 
take up a position as a global superpower or, at any rate, a major player in the global 
arena (Shuster & Calabresi, 2015). Economically, Russia is faltering. Billions have been 
invested in bolstering the Russian military apparatus and in what amounts to a land grab 
in Crimea and Ukraine. Russia’s intervention in Syria positions Russia as an ally not only 
of Syria but also of Iran, which is supporting the Assad regime. At a time when the 
Obama administration was working to fundamentally change the U.S.-Iran relationship, 
Putin’s move could be seen as a direct counter to American choices and the potential for 
increased U.S. influence in the region (Shuster & Calabresi, 2015).  
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The situation in Syria, as it now stands, is a situation complicated further by the 
outflow of thousands and thousands of refugees. Roughly one-half of Syria’s population 
has been displaced, moving to escape the violence either internally or leaving the country 
entirely (Bixler & Martinez, 2015). Some 10.5 million Syrians have now left the nation. 
This humanitarian crisis has necessitated a response from the European Union and the 
United States. The refugee crisis is but one of the issues that the Obama administration, 
now in its final 16 months of existence, must address as it reconsiders its policies toward 
Syria.  
Summary of the Section 
This section of the study examined the historical background of the crisis in Syria.  
It discussed the key actors and the opposition groups that have formed in response to the 
behaviors of the Assad regime. It explored the role of Russia as a relatively new entrant 
into the Syrian crisis along with other factors that have impacted on the situation. It 
serves as a general background for a discussion of the policy initiatives of American 
presidential administrations which will be addressed in the next three sections of this 
chapter.  
Three Administrations and Their Policies 
Introduction 
This section of the review of literature focuses on the U.S. presidential 
administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.  In each instance, 
U.S. policies toward Syria reflected (and continue to reflect) the world views of a seated 
president. Similarly, these policies are best understood in the context of the larger role of 
the United States in the global geopolitical arena. It is this role, and the perception of 
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what this role should consist of, that certainly influenced the decisions made by many 
American presidents and which is likely to continue influencing decisions that will made 
by the incoming administration of President Donald Trump after he took office in 
January 2017.  
This section is divided into three parts. First, it describes the policies of President 
Bill Clinton. It then moves to an overview of the policies of George W. Bush, who served 
at a time when the Syrian situation and that of the Middle East as a whole could be said 
to have taken center stage in Washington’s list of concerns (Colucci, 2013). Finally, the 
policies of Barack Obama are examined. Events in Syria as described in preceding 
sections of this study have changed the environment of American decision-making quite 
significantly in the period from 1992 when President Clinton took to 2016 as President 
Obama winds down his tenure in the Oval Office. 
The Clinton Administration  
The Clinton administration began at a time when the priorities of the United 
States on the global stage had shifted in response to the end of the Cold War, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and what essentially amounted to the collapse of the bipolar world 
(Miller, 1994). The inability of the Soviet Union to maintain its domestic economy 
rendered it equally unable to continue supporting its network of client states - a transition 
that certainly impacted upon Syria as well as other countries in the Soviet sphere of 
influence such as Cuba. President Bill Clinton took office as the United States and other 
countries were still coming to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise 
of the bipolar world order (Miller, 1994; Sodaro, 2004). Whereas the United States had 
previously shaped many of its policies in response to actual or perceived threats from the 
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Soviet Union, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s subsequent economic 
difficulties created new opportunities for the United States to influence relations with 
countries that were once under the Soviet sphere of influence. 
In discussing the policies of President Clinton, Miller (1994) suggests that what 
emerged was a set of policies that were driven by relief regarding the end of direct 
competition with the Soviets and new anxieties regarding emergent instability in a 
number of regions in the world.  With the Cold War over, countries that once depended 
upon the Soviets for economic and military support found themselves internally 
threatened by dissident groups whose opportunities for rebellion had been minimal in the 
past. Some of these countries, lacking authoritarian central governments and home to 
opposition groups that were long dissatisfied with their situation, erupted in civil war.   
Further, Miller (1994) takes the position that with the demise of the Soviet Union 
and retrenchment within its former core territories, President Bill Clinton developed a 
foreign policy posture that was driven by a complex mixture of anti-climactic relief and 
free floating anxiety.  The mere absence of the Cold War rivalry did not result in global 
peace. In fact, Miller (1994) makes the case that the end of the Cold War introduced a 
new type of anxiety into global affairs that in turn necessitated a new foreign policy 
approach for the United States.   
Similar comments were offered by Sodaro (2004), who noted that the Cold War 
ushered in an era that was characterized by genuine revolution from below; this consisted 
of a broad-based mass movement that shook the foundations of authoritarian rule in many 
different places and regions. In some instances, former Soviet satellite countries, said 
Sodaro (2004, p. 210), “decided to impose democratization from above,” something that 
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occurred even in the remnants of the Soviet Union itself. The Clinton administration 
confronted such challenges in hot spots such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Eretria/Ethiopia, and 
Somalia (Sodaro, 2004). Miller (1994) makes the case that the Clinton administration 
perceived an opportunity to create policies that would guarantee continued protection of 
American interests – a policy orientation that is congruent with Realism as described 
above.  For President Clinton, what mattered largely was the kind of policy initiative that 
would benefit the United States. 
The impact of the Soviet collapse with respect to the Balkans and other locales in 
Eastern Europe was, perhaps, more profound than it was in the Middle East. However, in 
both cases, Miller (1994) believes that the Clinton administration perceived that the 
United States had the opportunity to craft a foreign policy that would assure continual 
protection of American national interest. This is, quite clearly, the actions one would 
associate with a realist foreign policy.   
In the case of Syria, now bereft of its communist/Soviet support, the United States 
as the sole remaining superpower became a necessary ally. The Clinton Administration 
was approached by the Al Assads with the intent of creating a new alignment of interests. 
This did not occur for several reasons; the main reason was that Syrian support for groups 
such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – and ongoing animosity toward 
Israel – prohibited the development of a meaningful Damascus-Washington 
rapprochement throughout the 1990s and the presidency of Bill Clinton (Miller, 1994). 
During President Clinton’s tenure, Syria was under the rule of Hafiz Al Assad, 
who was characterized by Henry Siegman (2000) as both temperamental and 
unpredictable and as a “maddeningly clever negotiator” whose enigmatic behavior made 
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firm policy initiatives difficult to maintain (p. 2). Syria at that time played a significant 
role in the context of peace in the Middle East in part because of conflict between Syria 
and Israel. In January of 2000, President Clinton succeeded in bringing both Israel and 
Syria to the table to begin peace talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia and again in 
Geneva, Switzerland in March of 2000. Siegman (2000) pointed out that in both of these 
encounters, President Hafiz Al Assad played a double game: on the one hand he appeared 
to be willing to cooperate with respect to peace between his country and Israel, but on the 
other hand he continued to permit Hezbollah to operate in southern Lebanon with 
assistance from Syria itself. In fact, Syria was “the great holdout in the peace process and 
the leader of Arab hardliners who reject accommodation with the Jewish state” (Siegman, 
2000, p. 3). 
Clinton’s approach toward Syria was based in large measure on concern regarding 
the Arab-Israeli peace process – an issue that had preoccupied American foreign policy 
regimes since partition in 1948 (Sodaro, 2004). Ongoing American support for the state 
of Israel was then a key pillar of U.S. Middle Eastern policy. However, it should be noted 
that the Clinton administration believed that Syria had at least the potential to play a key 
role in achieving a permanent end to the Arab-Israeli conflict; this led to a new 
willingness on the part of the United States to enter relationships with the Syrian regime. 
Negotiations between Syria and Israel, brokered by the United States, began in 
earnest in 1994 at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in the aftermath of the Israeli-
Palestinian pact that was negotiated at Oslo in 1993. Israel broke off those talks in 1996 
after Syria refused to condemn a spree of terrorist assaults on Israelis buses by Hamas. 
With the election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister, expectations of a peace deal 
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gradually emerged with President Clinton calling for a deal in which Israel would swap 
the Golan Heights for peace. Indeed, President Clinton and President Al Assad (1994) 
jointly stated in Geneva in January of 1994 that they believed that they were moving 
toward a brokered agreement that would restore peace between Israel and Syria. 
Specifically, President Al Assad stated that: 
Historical evidence, both past and present, has proved that separate peace and 
partial solutions are not conducive to the establishment of real peace in the region. 
In this regard, I would like to express my satisfaction that President Clinton 
himself has committed to the objective of comprehensive peace. On this basis, we 
have agreed to work together for successful efforts aimed at putting an end to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and at reaching a genuine and comprehensive peace that 
enables the peoples of the region to focus on development, progress, and 
prosperity.  
This meeting has also provided us with the opportunity to exchange views on a 
number of issues, including those related to bilateral relations between our 
countries. We have agreed that the noble objective toward which we are working 
requires a qualitative move in these relations. We have also discussed questions 
related to the regional situation as well as all matters that might constructively 
contribute to the achievement of security and stability in the Middle East. Syria 
seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic choice that secures 
Arab rights; ends the Israeli occupation; and enables all peoples in the region to 
live in peace, security, and dignity. In honor we fought; in honor we negotiate; 
and in honor we shall make peace. We want an honorable peace for our people 
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and for the hundreds of thousands who paid their lives in defense of their 
countries and their rights (Clinton & Al Assad, 2000, p. 36). 
Responding to President Al Assad, President Clinton affirmed his country’s commitment 
to an enduring peace, noting that: 
Crucial decisions will have to be made by Syria and Israel if this common 
objective is to be achieved. That is why President Assad has called for a peace of 
the brave. And it is why I join him now in endorsing that appeal. Accordingly, we 
pledged today to work together in order to bring the negotiations that started in 
Madrid over two years ago to a prompt and successful conclusion.  
Critical issues remain to be resolved, especially the question of relating 
withdrawal to peace and security. But as a result of our conversation today, I am 
confident that we laid the foundations for real progress in the negotiations 
between heads of delegation that will begin again next week in Washington.  
President Assad and I also discussed the state of relations between the United 
States and Syria and agreed on the desirability of improving them. This requires 
honestly addressing the problems in our relationship. Accordingly, we've 
instructed the Secretary of State and the Syrian Foreign Minister to establish a 
mechanism to address these issues in detail and openly (Clinton & Al Assad, 
2000, p. 37). 
Some analysts have suggested that much of President Clinton’s efforts regarding 
Syria were a consequence of his determination to make a permanent contribution to 
defusing world tensions (Kiefer, 2000).  In fact, Kiefer (2000) argues that due to 
President Clinton’s efforts and those of Israel’s Ehud Barak, there was some reason to 
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believe in early 2000 that Syria and Israel would come to terms and that Israel would 
both withdraw its troops from Lebanon and put an end to 50 years of conflict with Syria.  
President Clinton, as early as 1994 (Clinton, 1994), had been working with President Al 
Assad to bring about a viable resolution to the Syria-Israel conflict.  Addressing the 
Knesset, President Clinton (1995) stated that “Syria has made a strategic choice for peace 
with Israel…. We have been urging President Assad to speak with you in a language of 
peace that you can understand... I believe something is changing in Syria” (p.32). 
This optimism was not reflected in the response of the U.S. Congress to President 
Clinton’s efforts. Miller (1994) states that despite a highly skeptical U.S. Congress, the 
Clinton administration chose to ignore concerns regarding negotiation with a state that 
had been accused of sponsoring terrorism and violating Lebanese sovereignty while 
seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. There was a sense that Syria might 
possibly be able to play a key role in facilitating a lasting Middle East peace agreement. 
Here, one sees a realist orientation in that the Clinton administration, like those that had 
gone before it, felt that it was in the interests of the United States to resolve the Arab-
Israeli conflict, to continue supporting Israel because of strong domestic support for 
Israel, and the need to maintain the flow of oil from the Middle East to the West. 
G. Robert Hillman (2000) stated that after the Geneva talks, there was no 
meaningful reason to assume that the differences between the two countries had in fact 
been resolved. While the talks were considered by their participants to have been useful 
and a mechanism for clarifying and articulating the needs of the parties, they were not 
necessarily a success. In fact, one analyst said that President Al Assad was actually 
immovable during the Geneva meeting with President Clinton and seemed to be laboring 
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under the belief that President Clinton would be able to give him what he wanted from 
Israel (Perlez, 2000).    
Initially, the United States appears to have hoped that the Geneva meeting would 
produce sufficient common ground for peace talks directly between Syria and Israel to be 
renewed.  However, Perlez (2000) states that “Mr. Assad was obstinate in his long-held 
view that there must be a full Israeli withdrawal to the Israeli-Syrian frontier that existed 
on June 4, 1967, before the Arab-Israeli war of that year” (p.1). Syria was determined 
then that the border issues had to be settled before security issues could be addressed, 
while Israel countered that it could not get its citizenry to agree to return the Golan 
Heights until security arrangements had been resolved. It was in this standoff that 
President Clinton inserted himself with the knowledge that this administration was 
“playing a high stakes poker game with Mr. Assad,” which was going to be influenced by 
the fact that President Clinton at the time was a lame duck and momentum for a peace 
agreement had stalled. Some analysts take the position that Hafez Al Assad had a 
“wholly tactical attitude toward peace (which) certainly advanced his cause in 
Washington” (Shed no tears, 2000, p. 9). 
President Clinton’s administration attempted to frame the policy toward Syria 
within the context of an argument that President Al Assad had made a “strategic choice 
for peace,” but failed to understand that President Al Assad’s choice “was to recover all 
of the Golan Heights and to rehabilitate his seriously crippled army”, which could only 
be accomplished under cover of the peace process (Shed no tears, 2000, p. 9). President 
Clinton received the news of the death of Hafez Al Assad somewhat wistfully because 
President Clinton remained convinced, despite evidence to the contrary, that President Al 
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Assad had been open and straightforward with him and that a strategic choice for peace 
drove the Syrian policy initiative (Shed no tears, 2000). 
In fact, as President Clinton was preparing to leave office, he was convinced that 
there was a distinct possibility that the ascension of Bashar Al Assad would usher in a 
modernizing turn in Syrian life and that the efforts of his own administration would 
ultimately bear fruit (Shed no tears, 2000). Despite the optimism of President Clinton, 
critics argued in 2000 that there was no reason to anticipate that Bashar Al Assad would 
in any way repeal the system of oppression instituted by his father, retreat from Syrian 
colonialism in Lebanon, or otherwise back down on the demand for a restoration of the 
1967 border with Israel (Shed no tears, 2000).  What Bashar Al Assad may in fact have 
wanted from the United States at that time, because Russia was in no position to provide 
assistance, was an extensive amount of help in modernizing and rehabilitating the Syrian 
armed forces. Bashar Al Assad was certainly aware that this country’s military was in 
desperate need of upgrading and that most of the “hardware used by Syria’s ground 
forces represents the technologies of the 1960s and 1970s, and much of the material has 
also been cannibalized, and most of Syria’s air force has been practically grounded for 
lack of spare parts” (Shed no tears, 2000, p. 10). 
In this situation, Nathan Jones (2000) reports that Israel was not in any way 
encouraged to believe that President Clinton’s efforts would succeed. Jones (2000) noted 
that: 
Israel's highly politicized media analysts don't agree on much, but in dealing with 
the "peace process" and "the Palestinian track" they start from a set of 
assumptions far removed from those of American editorial writers and 
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commentators. While the Americans seem mesmerized by the whirlwind of 
activity whipped up by President Bill Clinton's pressure on Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright and the State Department's Middle East peace team," the 
Israelis see unbridgeable gaps between themselves on the one hand and 
Palestinians and Syrians on the other. Israeli commentators also warn that in 
dealing with White House pressure for substantive concessions that would lead to 
a Middle East "legacy," for Clinton, Prime Minister Ehud Barak's government 
will fall if he tries to give away more than Israelis will accept (p.46). 
Furthermore, said Jones (2000), there is no doubt that in 2000, President Clinton 
was as focused on his own legacy as he was on bringing about genuine peace in the 
Middle East. It is quite possible that Hafez Al Assad contributed to a lessening of the 
hope of any substantive Middle East peace agreement during President Clinton’s 
remaining months in office. Israel’s Ehud Barak was troubled by the fact that he had to 
deal not only with a lame duck American president along with an ailing Yasser Arafat (at 
the time a serious influence over all decisions taking place in the Middle East), but also 
with a novice in the person of Bashar Al Assad who had never expected to take over the 
government of his country. 
Realist theory is applicable in identifying why the Clinton administration was 
willing, to a degree, to ignore authoritarianism and oppressive regime activity in Syria. 
Having been relatively negligible in terms of US foreign policy prior to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union because of its association with the Soviets, Syria in the early 1990s 
emerged as a potential source of support for US policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Israel was a priority then as now for the U.S. government.  
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Philip Wilcox, then the US Department of State’s coordinator of counterterrorism 
adviser, defended President Clinton’s willingness to reach out to Syria by stating: 
“diplomacy is not always a pleasant business and you don’t always deal with people of 
perfect virtue but the United States has interests and responsibilities in the world and we 
are willing to engage with many different kinds of states to protect our own interest 
(Miller, 1994, p. 271).” It is difficult to imagine a more succinct statement of realist 
theory than this. 
Former U.S. Department of State Coordinator of Counterterrorism advisor Philip 
Wilcox said of Clinton’s outreach to Syria that diplomacy can be unpleasant, that one is 
not always able to deal with virtuous counterparts, and the overarching goal of foreign 
policy is to serve the interests of the state (Miller, 1994). This is a clear reflection of the 
fundamental tenets of Realism.  President Clinton was willing to go to the table with 
Syria in order to secure support for U.S. policy toward Israel. As it happened, however, 
Hafez Al Assad rejected this overture, refusing to discuss the issue with President Clinton 
at a Geneva peace summit, and later publicly stating his refusal to participate in any 
further talks with Israel (Miller, 1994). 
Criticisms of the Clinton administration’s policies were forthcoming both during 
his time in office and after. Colucci (2013) stated that President Clinton proved unable to 
articulate and then implement a national security policy that represented America’s real 
role as the order maker and keeper in the global arena. This analyst said President Clinton 
to have been concerned with public response to the potential for excessive military 
casualties and to have feared that engagements leading to such casualties would be 
detrimental to the political fortunes of the Clinton administration itself.  
66 
 
Just as significantly, Colucci (2013) said that the Clintonian doctrine of 
engagement and enlargement generated poorly conceived policies that were ineffective in 
Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia. These policies complicated the American 
relationship with Russia and China and reflected Clinton’s conviction that the United 
States was unwilling to take decisive action when such action was in fact necessary. 
Colucci (2013) further contends that Clinton’s foreign policies signaled to terrorist 
groups, such as the emergent Al Qaeda, and to state actors like Syria that the United 
States would resist participation in conflict and generally lacked enough will to act 
decisively.   
While a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement was a priority of the Clinton 
administration, and while it may well have been in Syria’s own best interest to come to 
an accord with the United States over this issue, Miller (1994) states that it maintained a 
reluctance to respond to Washington brokered peace overtures. In fact, Assad refused to 
interact with President Clinton at a Geneva summit, flatly refusing to engage in further 
peace talks with Israel. This certainly led to an increase in tensions with Washington, and 
also served to underscore the failure of the Clinton policy of seeking a new relationship 
with Syria. 
In summarizing the entire thrust of the Clintonian foreign policy, Lamont Colucci 
(2013) stated: 
The Clinton team never succeeded in articulating a national security policy that 
meshed with America's role as the world's order-maker. It specifically feared any 
casualties among American military personnel and used this as an argument for 
inaction. It produced ill-conceived policies that led nowhere in Somalia and Haiti, 
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counter-productive ventures in Yugoslavia, non-serious blustering in Iraq and 
horrible miscalculations in North Korea. It caused confusion to America's allies, 
and delivered a tortured relationship with Russia and China (p.2). 
Moreover, Colucci (2013) stated that “The recent debates concerning Syria illustrate the 
desire to return to the perception held by the Clinton administration about foreign policy: 
a benign world governed by globalism, free markets, technology advances and soft 
liberalism” (p.1). Liberalism as a corollary of realism was, therefore, instrumental in 
forming the foundation of the Clinton administration’s approach to global issues. Colucci 
(2013) goes on to note that: 
During the Clinton presidency, al-Qaida changed from a petty Muslim extremist 
group wandering the deserts, on the margins of international relations, to a full 
blown terror network operating in 55 countries. The conduct of American foreign 
affairs took the path of least resistance. The Clinton years signaled to both 
transnational terrorist groups and state actors that the United States was 
unprepared to face conflict, and lacked the will to take decisive action (p.2).   
Such a posture, in the view of Colucci (2013), undermined any meaningful efforts to 
create a lasting Middle East peace deal and further exacerbated the tensions between the 
United States and countries such as Syria. 
After Clinton left office, Syria’s missteps continued and Damascus’ support for 
the Iraqi insurgency, in which thousands of U.S. soldiers have been killed, and its alliance 
with Iran illustrated the failure of the Clinton policy. Clinton did attempt, along with 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright, to broker a Syrian-Israeli deal that would resolve 
the conflict over the Golan Heights. For a brief period, it even appeared that such a deal 
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might be possible. President Clinton (2000) exhibited some optimism regarding the 
possibility that Al Assad and Syria would assist in brokering a bilateral peace treaty 
affecting the Golan Heights, which Israel had taken from Syria in the 1967 war. President 
Clinton (2000), speaking as a Realist, affirmed the fact that he fully expected the Al 
Assads to act in Syria’s best interest, but he also expressed a feeling that there was a 
genuine desire for peace in Syria which boded well for a resolution to the conflict over 
the Golan Heights. One suspects that there is a small strain of Liberalism and its 
inherently optimistic world view at work in this statement, which proved over time to be 
misplaced.  
President Clinton stated in March of 2000 that he was positive about such a 
possibility: 
There is more than one issue here. And if we're going to have a negotiation, I 
don't think it's enough to say, I don't like your position, come back and see me 
when I like your position. And I understand how strongly he feels about it, but if 
he disagrees with their territorial proposal, which is quite significant, then there 
should be some other proposal I think, coming from the Syrians about how their 
concerns could be handled. And that's what I meant by that. I did my best to try to 
just present what I thought the options were ideas - or three sides, in this case, if 
we are being asked to mediate it. 
He, obviously, has the perfect right to take whatever position he believes is in 
Syria's interests and whatever he thinks is right, but if there is a genuine desire for 
peace here on both sides, and I believe there is, and if both sides face certain 
significant political constraints within their countries, and I believe they do, then 
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they both need to come up with some ideas and start talking. I mean, the one thing 
there should be no doubt about is that there is a real effort being made here to 
resolve this. And I think it is clear that Prime Minister [Ehud] Barak would like to 
resolve it, and I think President Assad would like to resolve it. So once you know 
what the other side wants and you don't think you can do it, then you ought to 
come up with some alternative way of trying to respond to the underlying 
concerns that are behind the position. That's what I've suggested, and I hope that 
will happen (p. 1). 
This optimism – more suited perhaps to the liberal perspective than the realist perspective 
– proved premature. It would become necessary for the George W. Bush administration, 
faced with escalating global tensions and the fallout from the terrorist attack against the 
United States on September 11, 2001, to develop a new paradigm for U.S.-Syria 
relations.   
Under the Clinton administration, an opportunity to structure a new and more 
favorable relationship with Syria and the Al Assad regime was available and seemingly 
promising.  President Clinton, said Miller (1994), chose not to take advantage of this 
opportunity for a number of reasons. The key rationale for refusing to become more 
closely tied to Syria was its ongoing support for anti-Israel groups such as Hamas, 
Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. There is no doubt that political pressures 
from the powerful Israel lobby in the United States, coupled with longstanding Israel 
partnerships, underpinned the Clinton administration’s decision in this matter.   
The Arab-Israel peace process, as noted earlier, was also a concern on the part of 
the Clinton administration as it had been since the state of Israel was created in 1948. 
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Support for Israel and its right to exist has been, and continues to be, a major pillar of all 
American policies targeting the Middle East. While the Clinton administration did 
believe that Syria could be instrumental in assisting in brokering a permanent peace 
between the Arabs and the Israelis, the U.S. Congress was not particularly supportive of 
this belief (Miller, 1994). 
In floating the idea that engagement between the United States and Syria could 
facilitate a favorable outcome to the Arab-Israeli peace process, one must conclude that 
President Clinton had adopted a Realist posture that was underpinned by the notion that 
Syria (like the United States) would function as a rational actor. While the Clinton 
administration does not appear to have been convinced that Syria would in any way 
modify its authoritarianism or open up its domestic regime to opponents of the Al 
Assads, the Clinton strategy for engaging Syria was inherently Realist. It was then in the 
best interests of the United States to find supporters in the region for the state of Israel 
and in support of convincing groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) to enter into a permanent peace treaty with Israel. 
As Franks (2006) would suggest, this is based on the Realist theory that the state 
system is maintained by the existence of a political relationship between governing 
machinery and a governed population and an acceptance of these concepts in other 
sovereign states. While the Clinton administration did not consider the regime of Hafez 
Al Assad to be without flaws or even acceptable in terms of its authoritarianism, it was 
nevertheless willing to engage in diplomatic relationships in the interests of the Middle 
Eastern peace process.   
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President Clinton stated after meeting with Hafez Al Assad that he was a “ruthless 
but brilliant man who had once wiped out a whole village as a lesson to his opponents, 
and whose support of terrorist groups in the Middle East had isolated Syria from the 
United States” (Bill Clinton about President Hafez Al Assad, 2013, p. 1). Early in their 
relationship, President Clinton appeared to have been convinced that Assad was serious 
about making peace and establishing normal relationships with Israel and withdrawing 
Syrian forces from Lebanon. He seems to have based this belief on his personal 
impression of Hafez Al Assad after a few hours of personal interaction with him and his 
conviction that the collapse of the Soviet Union and Syria’s loss of that country’s support 
created a unique opportunity for a rapprochement with the United States. Quite simply, 
he was wrong.  
The George W. Bush Administration 
When presidential administrations change, and when this is also accompanied by 
a shift in political perspectives and beliefs, it is reasonable to assume that some type of 
ideological transformation in foreign policy will also occur. This is what took place when 
George W. Bush took control of the Oval Office after defeating Democratic presidential 
candidate (and former Clinton Vice President) Al Gore. The realism-with a dose-of-
liberalism ethos of the Clinton years was replaced in short order by neo-conservativism, 
or conservatism with compassion, as various analysts have characterized it 
(Krauthammer, 2005).    
Of course, one must acknowledge that the seminal event shaping the Bush foreign 
policy program was the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 – an 
event that illustrated the vulnerability of the world’s remaining superpower, the 
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increasing animosity of elements of the Islamic umma toward the West in general and the 
United States in particular, and the growing power of Al Qaeda.  Two years after the 
attack of 9/11, the Bush administration identified the existence of an “Axis of Evil” 
containing Iraq, Iran and North Korea – an alliance that contained Syria within its sphere 
of influence due to Syrian ties to Iran (Malici & Buckner, 2008).  
The shift toward neo-conservatism became readily apparent in short order. Malici 
and Buckner (2008) noted that the goal of the new policy initiative was to “increase U.S. 
power in a world order carrying with it the risk of an unconstrained superpower pursing 
foreign policy for narrowly defined domestic interests and of the development of a 
repressive order unsympathetic to calls for an end to inequality” (p.783). Realist 
pessimism is self-evident, as is realist emphasis on putting one’s domestic interests ahead 
of all others, including the liberal push for an end to inequality and oppression. 
Conservatism with a conscience, as articulated in the Bush administration, did not ignore 
the liberal call for putting an end to inhumane, brutal oppression in authoritarian regimes; 
in fact, such attributions in addition to a firm (if flawed and ultimately invalid) conviction 
that Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction shaped Bush policy.   
Though hardly a full-fledged member of the Bush identified Axis of Evil, the 
Bush administration did in fact lump Syria into this particular category. Malici and 
Buckner (2008) stated that “Washington sees Syria as routinely providing a safe haven, 
substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations, providing political and 
material support to a number of Palestinian groups and engaging in actions justifiably 
threatening to the USA” (p.783).   Additionally, Charles Krauthammer (2005), a leading 
neoconservative thinker, suggested that once the United States succeeded in establishing 
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a democratic regime in Iraq and Afghanistan, Lebanon and Syria should be then targeted 
for democratization or what could be considered nation building.   
Krauthammer (2005) described Syria at the time of the Bush presidency as “a 
critical island of recalcitrant in a liberalizing region stretching from the Mediterranean to 
the Iranian border” (p.25). Some 10-plus years later, it is difficult at best to find any 
evidence of liberalization (much less democratization) in this region. The principle of 
democratization was exemplified in the 2007 State of the Union address given by 
President Bush, who referenced Syria and its government as wanting “to kill Americans, 
kill democracy in the Middle East, and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific 
scale” (Bush, 2007, p. 1). 
Earlier in the Bush administration, Undersecretary of the Department of State 
John Bolton described Syria as a rogue state in a speech titled “Beyond the ‘Axis of 
Evil’: reflecting a shift from the moderate realist-liberal American foreign policy in the 
Middle East.” This shift was toward neoconservatism (Zunes, 2004). Stephen Zunes 
(2004) declared that “the neoconservative unilateralist world view now dominates the 
Middle East policies of both Republicans and Democrats” (p.52). Sanjay Gupta (2008) 
argued that “in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, a foreign policy doctrine of preemption 
was outlined as another major fundamental Middle Eastern policy” (p.181). A speech 
given at West Point affirmed the Bush administration’s contention that the type of threats 
posed by Iraq and other rogue nations provides the United States with a legal foundation 
for acting in self-defense as described in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
Gupta (2008) commented that it was this speech which formed the core of the 
Bush policy; it was then formalized in a document titled “The National Security Strategy 
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of the United States.” This strategy emphasized American rights to military preemption, 
unilateral action, and a commitment to the extension of democracy across the world. 
Democratization, though certainly a central pillar of the Bush Doctrine, was in many 
ways subordinate to such concerns as national security and maintaining the flow of oil to 
the West. 
The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, as 
described by President Bush (2003), was intended to strengthen the ability of the United 
States to conduct an effective foreign policy particularly with regard to both Syria and 
Lebanon. Integral to this Act was the threat to employ sanctions against Syria unless it 
ended its sponsorship of terrorist organizations, the development of weapons of mass 
destruction, and the occupation of neighboring Lebanon. Some critics argue that this 
particular Bush administration effort had the potential to obstruct diplomatic efforts to 
induce Syrian President Bashar Assad to voluntarily curb some of the activities of his 
regime. Stronger than the Syria Accountability Act proposed earlier and then tabled by 
the Bush administration, the new legislation proposed in 2003 sought to empower the 
president with the right to waive sanctions if he determined that this would be in the vital 
national security interest of the U.S. (Focus on: The Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act, 2003).   
The Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq was accompanied by 
accusations that Syria was actively undermining American efforts in Iraq. Anders 
Strindberg (2004) reported from Damascus that “Syria was charged with harboring 
members of Saddam Hussein’s leadership, helping foreign fighters travel to Iraq, hiding 
Iraq’s elusive weapons of mass destruction, and manufacturing their own” (p.53). Syria 
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was clearly identified as a threat to peace in the region, and the 2002 Syria Accountability 
Act, which introduced six sanctions against the country, was affirmed. These sanctions, 
said Strindberg (2004), included a ban on Syrian aircrafts in US airspace, the freezing of 
Syrian assets in the United States, a ban on US exports to, and investment in, Syria, 
downgrading the US diplomatic representation in Damascus, and restricting the 
movement of Syrian diplomats in the US to either the Washington, D.C. or New York 
City areas. 
As Killgore (2004) reported, when President George W. Bush imposed sanctions 
on Syria on May 11, 2004, he was to some extent acting in response to concerns by 
American Zionists who were convinced that Syria’s activities in the Middle East were 
antithetical to the security of the state of Israel. Certainly, there was reason to believe that 
Syria was continuing to provide aid to Hezbollah, but at the same time Killgore (2004) 
states that Damascus under Bashar Al Assad was continuing to provide the United States 
with intelligence and also tried to limit the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq. 
However, Syria barely avoided being designated by President as being a member of the 
axis of evil, something that was indicative of legitimate concerns regarding Syria’s 
reliability as a friend to American interests in the Middle East.   
President Bush (2004), in a “Statement on Syria Sanctions,” identified the 
rationale for these sanctions:   
Since 1979, the United States has designated Syria a State Sponsor of Terrorism 
due to its support for groups such as Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist 
organizations. In 2003, Congress passed the SAA because of Syria's continued 
support for terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, occupation of 
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Lebanon, and actions undermining U.S. and international efforts with respect to 
Iraq. Based on Syria's failure to take significant, concrete steps to address the 
concerns we have raised, I have determined that further economic sanctions be 
imposed.  
The Syrian government must understand that its conduct alone will determine the 
duration of the sanctions, and the extent to which additional sanctions may be 
imposed should the Syrian government fail to adopt a more constructive approach 
to relations with its neighbors, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism.  
If the Syrian government demonstrates a genuine intention to seek true peace by 
confronting terror and violence, ending its pursuit and development of weapons of 
mass destruction, and respecting the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, 
the United States will respond positively (p.1). 
Thus, while the doctrine of preemption was not applied by the Bush 
administration to Syria, the notion of engagement that had been integral to the Clinton 
policy was no longer present. The success or failure of the Bush administration was 
discussed by former Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams, who argued that 
the Bush administration temporarily isolated Syria but gained nothing strategic for the 
US. The conduct of the Al Assad regime did not in any way change (Petrou, 2009). 
McArthur (2004), commenting on the Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act, noted that this Act prohibited the export of any dual-use 
goods to Syria and permitted the president to impose any two of six different sanctions 
unless it could be certified that Syria had cut its ties to Palestinian resistance groups. The 
Act included full presidential waiver authority and allowed President Bush to also invoke 
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sanctions if it was revealed that Syria had not withdrawn its troops from Lebanon and 
stopped the development of medium and long range ballistic missiles and weapons of 
mass destruction.   
Equally important for President Bush’s foreign policy was the Act’s focus on the 
presidential right to use sanctions in cases where Syria was suspected of facilitating 
terrorist activities inside Iraq (McArthur, 2004). It is worth noting that when he signed 
the Act into law, President Bush reserved presidential authority to employ a core 
constitutional power with respect to conducting the nation’s foreign affairs and 
functioning as commander in chief. Additionally, President Bush stated that he would 
maintain the right to refrain from reporting certain matters to Congress relating to Syria 
and terrorism if in his view such reports would impair foreign relations, national security, 
or the performance of the Executive’s duties. In essence, while approving the basic tenets 
of the Act, President Bush was determined to reserve to the office of the president of the 
United States sufficient powers to conduct foreign policy without first obtaining, in all 
instances, the support or approval of Congress.  
Driven by a neoconservative agenda, the Bush administration’s policy 
emphasized nation building and preemption. It reflected a departure from realism and 
liberalism and embodied a moralistic stance that emphasized the efficacy of military 
force. As Muravchik (2007) points out, even though they employed economic and other 
sanctions, actors in the Bush administration were not convinced that either such sanctions 
or UN intervention would result in an elimination of activity by rogue or evil states or 
any determined adversary. Similarly, the neoconservatism of George W. Bush reflected a 
commitment to the idea that democracy at home and abroad was the most crucial 
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requirement for global peace and domestic security. However, this should not be 
confused with democratic peace theories. 
On October 21, 2005, President Bush called on the United Nations to convene a 
session on a report that named relatives of President Bashar Al Assad as likely suspects 
in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Pisik, 2005). At that 
time, President Bush instructed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to call on the United 
Nations to convene a session as quickly as possible to deal with this issue. A central 
concern for President Bush was the fact that Syrian occupation which began during 
Lebanon’s civil war had only ended in the spring of 2005 after the UN Security Council 
passed a resolution calling for Syria’s withdrawal. Although that withdrawal had taken 
place, the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, and the intelligence indicating that 
members of the Al Assad family and the Syrian government and military were involved, 
galvanized opposition to Syria.   
The threat of additional sanctions and new political pressures was certainly 
integral to President Bush’s agenda at this time (Pisik, 2005). Syria was in a difficult 
position in light of the fact that it could no longer depend upon support from the Soviet 
Union and in essence needed to become more accommodating with the West 
(Hinnebusch, Kabilan, Kodmani, & Lesch, 2010). The animosity and enmity that had 
characterized Bashar Al Assad’s early years in office were at odds with his initial West-
centric reform agenda. Under President Clinton, according to Hinnebusch et al. (2010), 
Syria had viewed the United States, despite its role as the primary backer of Israel, as a 
necessary broker in a regional peace settlement. It would appear that Syria was more 
responsive to the Clinton administration than it was to that of President Bush, under 
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whom disagreements between Syria and the United States escalated in tandem with the 
influence of neoconservatives. 
Hinnebsuch et al. (2010) contend that rather than Israel, it was Iraq that led to 
worsening Syrian-U.S. relations.  In 2001, Bashar Al Assad had attempted to become 
more engaged with Iraq, which coincided with the Bush administration’s efforts to 
prevent Iraq from inching out of the isolation the U.S. had tried to maintain for Iraq since 
1990. In fact, President Bush was of the opinion that Syria’s efforts to withhold 
legitimation from the U.S. led invasion of Iraq positioned it in opposition to American 
security needs. Though Syria did little to actually oppose the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it did 
permit the movement across the Iraqi border of thousands of Arab resistance fighters. 
Many of these fighters were Muslim militants who would later emerge as key actors in 
the region. The Bush administration was also quite displeased with the fact that once the 
Saddam Hussein regime fell, Syria gave refuge to some Iraqi Ba’ath officials seeking 
asylum.   
Thus, Bush, upon taking office, moved dramatically away from the Clintonian 
enlargement and engagement posture into Neoconservatism. Often conceptualized as 
conservatism with compassion, the Bush approach was shaped, as noted above, in large 
part by the terrorist attacks against the U.S. which occurred on September 11, 2001. The 
attack on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon convinced the 
Bush administration that the United States had become terrifyingly vulnerable to 
terrorism and that all policies targeting countries and actors known or suspected to be 
involved in terrorism needed to be rethought.  
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This movement, according to Hinnebusch et al. (2010), was reflected in the fact 
that many neoconservatives in Washington “were keen for the U.S. to make an object 
lesson of Syria to convey the message that Arab nationalism was very costly and clear the 
way for a pro-Israeli Pax Americana in the region” (p.17). Unrelenting pressure was 
placed by the Bush administration on Syria, which made some incremental but significant 
concessions to appease Washington. Its borders with Iraq were tightened, Syrian forces 
were withdrawn from Lebanon, as noted above, and Bashar Al Assad proposed to restart 
the peace negotiations with Israel. Nevertheless, since President Bush had developed a 
policy not to offer inducements to rogue states, the concessions offered by Bashar Al 
Assad only served to encourage American hardliners to demand more. 
The 2006 Baker Commission recommended that the U.S. should engage with 
Syria and Iran. However, President Bush rejected this advice and continued to insist on a 
rigorous response to what the administration perceived as ongoing recalcitrance on the 
part of Syria (Hinnebusch et al., 2010). President Bush’s policies ultimately succeeded in 
depriving Syria of some of its capacity for exercising political leverage in regional 
politics and particularly towards Israel.  Further, according to Hinnebusch et al. (2010), 
“Equally important the Bush administration’s devaluation of the traditional goals of U.S. 
Middle East policy, regional stability (for which the neo-cons substituted ‘creative 
destruction’) and the peace process, correspondingly devalued the cards by which Syria 
could promise to deliver or obstruct these goals” (p.18).  
Franks (2006) pointed out that the terrorist discourse of Al Qaeda and the terrorist 
attack on the United States gave rise to the doctrine of the preemptive strike. Two years 
after the 9/11 terrorist attack, President Bush identified Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an 
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axis of evil that needed to be brought down in order to protect the security of the United 
States and to prevent further attacks like September 11, 2001 (Malici & Buckner, 2008). 
Certainly, one would have to acknowledge that the use of preemptive strikes is an 
integral element of tools that are available to Realists as well as Neoconservatives.   
Additionally, President Bush firmly positioned Syria as hostile to American 
interests and as a rogue state. President Bush outlined the doctrine of preemption in the 
months prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and made this doctrine a central pillar in 
American Middle Eastern policy (Gupta, 2008; Zunes, 2004). The National Security 
Strategy of the United States identified the Bush administration’s conviction as one 
arguing that America had the right to employ military preemption, to undertake unilateral 
action, and to implement policies with the goal of extending democracy. While one sees 
that democratization and democratic peacebuilding are elements of the Bush Doctrine, 
these elements are subordinate to the doctrine of preemption in support of American 
interests.   
When President Bush decided to use a preemptive strike in the invasion of Iraq, 
the argument was advanced that Syria had been actively engaged in supporting terrorist 
and other activities targeting the United States and in harboring members of Saddam 
Hussain’s inner circle (Strindberg, 2004). The Syria Accountability Act of 2002 extended 
American sanctions against Syria and included a ban on the entry of Syrian aircraft in 
U.S. airspace. This Act froze Syrian assets in the United States and banned U.S. exports 
to Syria. It also reduced American diplomatic presence in Syria and restricted the 
movement of Syrian diplomats entering the United States to either Washington, D.C. or 
New York City (Strindberg, 2004).   
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President Bush (2004) vehemently defended his administration’s decisions in this 
regard and called upon Syria to take concrete steps to reform its behavior in a number of 
areas.  Certainly, President Bush (2004) viewed Syria as an undemocratic, authoritarian, 
and tyrannical state.  Bush’s neoconservative ideology shaped his world view, as did his 
belief in the necessity of democracy as the foundation of peacebuilding in the Middle 
East and elsewhere. At the same time, President Bush did not appear to be fully 
convinced that sanctions or a United Nations’ intervention would have the desired effect 
of stopping Syria from supporting anti-American or anti-Israeli movements (Muravchik, 
2007).   
President Bush (2007) did not call at any point for U.S. military engagement in 
Syria, although he did consistently characterize Syria as a rogue state giving substantial 
support to states that were antithetical to the United States and the terrorist groups that 
perpetuated the 9/11 attacks. Perhaps because of the extent of American involvement on 
two fronts – in Iraq and Afghanistan - President Bush did not elect to employ a 
preemptive strike against Syria.  Nevertheless, the extensive use of sanctions is ample 
evidence of President Bush’s Neoconservatism and his conviction that Syria represented 
a threat to the United States that had to be addressed, at least to some extent.    
Gareau (2004) said that the road map to the War on Terror reflected a 
combination of Realist and Neoconservative conviction that the world is a dangerous 
place in which the U.S. must, at times, operate unilaterally and preemptively. Gareau 
(2004) stated that the Bush administration was convinced that whatever “its form, 
whether the bearing the legitimacy of government or existing underground, the enemy 
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must be destroyed.  To do this, we must sometimes act alone, unilaterally. Other times we 
can act with our allies” (p.191). 
Samuel Huntington (1996) described what he saw as two broadly different 
processes that precede foreign policy decisions. He labeled these processes executive and 
legislative and stated that a legislative policymaking process is defined by the facts that 
the units participating in the process are relatively equal and must bargain with each 
other, important disagreements exist concerning the goals of the policy, and there are 
many possible alternatives. Conversely, Huntington (1996) described a process as 
executive in character to the extent that the participating units differ in power, 
fundamental goals and values are not at issue, and the range of possible choices is 
limited. These two processes to some extent overlap with the characterization of foreign 
policy development as either driven by a crisis or functioning as an extension of domestic 
interests and needs during periods of relative geopolitical stability. In the latter instance, 
one could clearly argue that despite very real differentials in the power of the United 
States and many of the nations with whom it interacts, there are many possible 
alternatives for policy formation.   
The situation changes dramatically when one considers the formation of 
American foreign policy in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. At that 
time, as Kissinger (1974) would argue, the domestic structure became less significant in 
terms of creating a foreign policy initiative than the crisis itself.  The crisis was of 
enormous significance in leading both President George W. Bush and a generally unified 
U.S. Congress to transform policy to incorporate leading a coalition to invade Iraq, hunt 
down Al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan and otherwise modify policies impacting on 
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countries that President Bush identified as comprising an Axis of Evil (Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea) 
Hook and Spanier (2010) contend that President Bush declared that the task 
confronting the nation “went far beyond capturing Osama bin Laden and putting Al-
Qaeda out of business. A global fight against terrorism and the evil it represented had to 
be mounted on all fronts” (p.286). This is clearly an example of a crisis driving a 
dramatic shift in foreign policy based on two new pillars consisting of the virtues of 
American primacy and the right of the country to wage preemptive war against perceived 
threats. This essentially constituted the Bush Doctrine, which moved quickly away from 
the Clinton Doctrine of enlargement and engagement and had led President Clinton to 
adopt the carrot rather the stick in his dealings with China.   
These two different approaches to forming foreign policy are certainly influenced 
by public opinion, by the personal beliefs and values of decision-makers at all levels of 
government, by the bureaucracies that implement policies, by bankers and industrialists, 
and by the military.  There are many who would even argue that the decision taken by 
President George W. Bush to invade Iraq and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein was 
as much motivated by a desire to maintain a vital flow of oil to the United States as it was 
by any true conviction that Iraq had played a role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks or that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction (Hook & Spanier, 2010). Nevertheless, the crisis 
of the terrorist attack was the seminal event which precipitated the deployment of 
American troops to Afghanistan and, later, to Iraq, along with American involvement in 
the internal affairs of Pakistan. 
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It is therefore important to recognize that while many variables shape the 
American economy, a small handful of variables do tend to predominate this process. Oil 
matters and it matters more to America than most Americans are willing to admit. Power 
politics, as understood by Dahl (1999), also matters, as countries seek a degree of 
hegemony or influence in shaping relationships in the geopolitical arena. As significantly, 
under the leadership of President George W. Bush, democratization and nation building 
have taken on enormous significance in developing America’s policies (Birth of a Bush 
Doctrine, 2003; Jervis, 2003).   
One can certainly argue that America’s policies in a country such as Iraq have a 
strong humanitarian thrust and that there are other important economic trade 
considerations that influence policies in the entire region. Furthermore, it has often been 
suggested that a dominant influence over America’s Middle Eastern policies is its 
commitment to survival (Night turns into day, 2005). No casual observer of the past half 
century of Middle Eastern U.S. policymaking can deny that Israel occupies a place near 
center stage on the American agenda. However, 9/11 was perhaps the seminal event in 
America’s most recent history and one which made this country’s citizens and leaders 
conscious of the growing influence not only of terrorism, but also militant Islam. 
Robert Jervis (2003) said that President Bush’s policies vis-à-vis the Middle East 
represented a sharp break from the president’s pre-9/11 views that saw American 
leadership restricted to defending narrow and traditional vital interests. Describing the 
Bush Doctrine, Jervis (2003) stated that it had four elements:   
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1. a strong belief in the importance of a state’s domestic regime in determining its 
foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform 
international politics;  
2. the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous 
policies, including preventive war;  
3. a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, 
4. an overriding sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its 
primacy in world politics.   
Critical to this doctrine is the American belief in democracy, understood as the 
sole system of government ideology consistent with guarantees of human rights, support 
for human freedom, and other universal values that will ultimately lead to an eradiation 
of terrorism and greater geopolitical stability. 
The foreign policy of the United States under President Bush, according to Gary 
Rosen (2005), moved into an era in which realism was somewhat repudiated in favor of a 
more assertive posture for the sole remaining global hegemon (the United States). This 
represents what Rosen (2005) sees as a movement away from traditional realist 
approaches to foreign policy such what is evident in the Cold War doctrine of 
containment. The Bush administration argued for promoting the national interest by 
unilateral and preemptive action if necessary, while simultaneously building institutions 
of democratic governance in states where democratization has largely been unknown. 
These are the elements that were seen by many analysts, including Edmund O’Sullivan 
(2005), as shaping foreign policy on the Middle East for eight years.   
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Walter LaFeber (2002) commented that months before the September 11 attacks, 
some observers in the Washington D.C. beltway argued that the United States was an 
empire and that its people were the fortunate “Chosen” selected to spread an imperialism 
beneficial to all.  Imperialism in this context has less to do with controlling territory than 
it does with global expansion of American ideas based on capitalism and democracy. 
Within this general framework, the United States emerged as the only nation possessed 
with the various capabilities needed to ensure that globalization proceeds appropriately 
and to promote the ethnocentric and inherently nationalistic idea that American culture is 
inherently superior to that of other nations. This was significant in the Bush years as well.  
Similarly, Godfrey Hodgson (2005) argued that the oil issue was central in 
driving the development of both domestic and foreign policy under the Bush 
administration. On the domestic front, this administration called for drilling in the vast, 
virgin Alaskan Wildlife Reserve and for energy deregulation. In terms of foreign policy, 
imperialist ambitions linked to oil control were also at work. Hodgson (2005) is one of 
the analysts arguing that simply examining the major players and influences in the Bush 
administration leads one to the inescapable conclusion that oil interests are at work. 
These actors included Vice President Dick Cheney (former chief executive of 
Halliburton), former Secretary of State James A. Baker III (a Texas energy industry super 
lawyer), and until his fall, Kenneth Lay of Enron, along with Robert Zoellick. While the 
administration consistently claimed that the invasion of Iraq and sanctions against Syria 
were not about oil, Hodgson (2005) stated that oil predominated many of the decisions 
made by the Bush administration in this entire region. 
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The second theory offered by geopolitical power strategists who are members of 
the Realist school of American foreign policy suggests that national interests were at 
work in shaping the Bush policy. A related theory is that democracy promotion as a 
neoconservative ideological underpinning of foreign policy is most highly influential. 
With respect to these two approaches, John Mearsheimer (2005) suggests that “the 
dispute about whether to go to war in Iraq was between two competing theories of 
international politics: Realism and the Neoconservatism that underpins the Bush 
Doctrine” (p.1). On the one hand, neoconservative theory is filled with an idealist strand 
and a competing power strand. It is idealistic, for example, to take the neoconservative 
position that democracy promotion is the special purview of the United States. 
Mearsheimer (2005, p.1) calls this “Wilsonianism with teeth.” From the ideals of 
Woodrow Wilson, the neoconservatives have acquired the idealistic view that democracy 
is, to paraphrase Voltaire’s “Candide,” “the best of all possible governments” and 
consequently should be advanced throughout the world regardless of whether or not a 
particular country wishes to become a democracy.   
Michael J. Mazarr (2003) states that there are many ways to understand the 
complexion of George W. Bush’s foreign policy and the group that ran it. One lens that is 
useful is the lens of realism. Virtually every Bush foreign policy appointee identified 
himself or herself as a realist during the administration’s first year. For example, Mazarr 
(2003, p. 503) points out that national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said both “I am 
a realist” and “power matters.” Donald Rumsfeld identified himself as an old-fashioned 
realist while Bush said during his candidacy that a president must be a clear-eyed realist. 
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Realists who practice power politics are, according to Mazarr (2003), individuals 
fully able to understand that military power is a tool to be used in the pursuit of national 
interests and in order to reshape the world. Such a perspective tends to elevate military 
power over diplomacy and to emphasize the viability of unilateral rather than multilateral 
actions. Certainly, no casual observer of American policy in the wake of 9/11 would fail 
to recognize that military power has been and still is being used to achieve American 
ends, in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq and, to some extent, today in Syria.    
In terms of foreign policy initiatives, the Bush posture presupposes that the 
American systems of governance and the American culture is superior to that of other 
countries. It further assumes that the cultures and countries of the Middle East are in an 
early, immature stage of development; because this is the case, the foreign policy 
initiatives of the United States, whatever their theoretical foundations, should assist such 
target countries in advancing developmentally. As Mearsheimer (2005) notes, this set of 
assumptions leads almost invariably to the neo-conservative perspective and even 
operates subtly in both the imperial and realist perspectives. 
Influencing President Bush in his policymaking efforts regarding Syria and the 
larger region was a need to overcome the bifurcation between those who propose a 
foreign policy in the region that is built on the pursuit of the national interest and those 
who believe that the promotion of democracy should take precedence. Regardless of 
which set of interests tend to dominate U.S. policy, the fact of the matter is, according to 
Kahwaji (2004), that the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are important targets of U.S. 
policy.   
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Kahwaji (2004) suggests that instead of simply deterring regional aggressors on 
behalf of status quo states, the U.S. under President Bush actively engaged in an effort to 
transform political practices throughout the Gulf via the promotion of democratic 
institutions and the elimination of terrorist threats. The states of the GCC, stated Kahwaji 
(2004), “joined the American alliance in the war on terrorism” (p.55). This certainly 
suggests, to some degree, that the GCC and the states considered in this study have found 
common cause with the U.S. on some crucial issues. 
If oil matters – and of course it does – then the Middle East matters for other 
reasons as well. Lincoln Bloomfield (1997) suggests that beyond oil, the strategic 
location of the region is significant. It includes a major sea route between East and West, 
as well as a growing population with economic resources that are a desirable market for 
multinational firms and financial investors. As a locus for Islamic political activism –and 
for the resurgence of a conservative, politically radical Islamist revival – it is a “fault 
line” as understood by Huntington (1996/2001). Israel’s position and the resolution of the 
plight of the Palestinians remains a vital element in the international political arena. 
Terrorism, as has been shown in recent years, has also flourished in the region, which 
serves as a cauldron for stirring up antagonisms toward the U.S. and the West (Korb, 
2005). These were clearly issues that were significant to President Bush as he considered 
responding to the issues emerging in the region.     
Nevertheless, as Joseph Moynihan (1997) points out, the target states (including 
Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of that country) share many security 
interests. These interests also encompass economic matters that are related to oil and 
trade, which should not be underestimated in terms of their significance in shaping 
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foreign policy in Washington (Moynihan, 1997). Korb (2005) commented that for many 
decades, under presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt through George W. Bush, American 
security interests in the Middle East primarily required maintaining the unhindered flow 
of oil from the Gulf to world markets at stable prices while preventing the Soviet Union 
from gaining support in the region.    
George W. Bush will also be remembered as the president who secured the 
support of Congress in obtaining overwhelming consent to the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Under the terms of this legislation, the federal government has acquired the legal standing 
to use its technological and other resources to investigate the lives and behaviors of 
citizens and non-citizens alike in this country. Coupled with the doctrine of preemption, 
George W. Bush succeeded in concentrating enormous power in the executive branch and 
broadening the scope of intelligence gathering activities to a degree that no previous 
president contemplated (Kamp, 2005).  
In summarizing the Bush Doctrine, Jones (2016) affirms that it grew out of 
neoconservative dissatisfaction with President Clinton’s handling of the Saddam Hussein 
regime in the 1990s. Many neoconservatives were angry that the U.S. did not depose 
Saddam Hussein after the successful conclusion of the 1990 Iraq War. Even before 
President Bush took office, in January of 1998, a group of neoconservative political 
figures, including Donald Rumsfeld (who became President Bush’s first Secretary of 
Defense) and Paul Wolfowitz (who became Undersecretary of Defense), sent a letter to 
President Clinton calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein and arguing that the Iraqi 
refusal to permit UN weapons inspections made it impossible to gain any concrete 
intelligence about the Iraqi weapons programs. The attitude underpinning this letter, 
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argues Jones (2016), became an integral element in President Bush’s doctrine, which had 
an element of “America First” unilateralism that revealed itself before the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. 
By January of 2002, President Bush’s foreign policy had moved toward one 
emphasizing preemptive war, which would become a central element in his policies 
regarding the entire Middle East.  The Bush Doctrine appears, however, to have 
essentially died in 2006, at which time the U.S. army in Iraq was focused on damage 
report and pacification and the military preoccupation with Iraq had allowed the Taliban 
in Afghanistan to reverse American successes there (Jones, 2016). American 
dissatisfaction with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq enabled Congressional Democrats 
to reclaim control of Congress and ultimately forced President Bush to eliminate Donald 
Rumsfeld and other neo-cons from his cabinet.  
The Obama Administration   
The election of Barack Obama to the US presidency in 2008 resulted in yet 
another ideological paradigm shift in US foreign policy. This constituted a shift away 
from neoconservatism toward a liberal institutional approach which came under intense 
fire as ISIS/ISIL emerged as a destabilizing force throughout not only Syria but 
neighboring Iraq also.  Initially, observers believed that the election of President Obama 
had the potential to create a new set of relationships between the United States and 
Muslim nations – a relationship that would be mutually respectful and beneficial (Judis, 
2014).    
Liberal institutionalism, as practiced by the Obama administration, sought to use 
global institutions such as the United Nations and other nongovernmental organizations 
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(NGOs) as alternatives to military intervention to bring about changes in a particular 
country or region.  There was a sense of a return, at least in part, to the Clintonian 
doctrine of “enlargement and engagement in the early years of the Obama administration 
(Abdul-Aziz, 2014). However, critics of President Obama have stated that “when it 
comes to the Syrian conflict or any conflict of Syrian proportions, no American 
government has been marked by such a state of confusion as that of Barack Obama’s 
administration today” (Abdul-Aziz, 2014, p. 1).  
When Robert Ford, the US Ambassador to Syria, testified before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in October of 2013, he characterized the conflict in Syria as 
“a grinding war of attrition” and stated that “the regime is suffering serious manpower 
shortages” and the moderate opposition supported by the United States was “fighting on 
two fronts, both against the regime and against militants, extremists directly linked to Al 
Qaeda in Iraq” (Ford, 2013, p. 1). 
In the summer of 2012, a conference at Geneva had, in the view of Michael 
Hirsch (2013), the potential to generate a workable plan to end the violence in Syria 
which had erupted into a full blown civil war. President Obama did not take advantage of 
the opportunity to broker a peace deal, as he was engaged in a political campaign for re-
election in which GOP candidate Mitt Romney accused him of being soft on Syria.   
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov had jointly signed a June 2012 communique calling for a political transition in 
Syria that had been drafted by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. At that time, 
the US and Great Britain jointly issued public calls for removing Assad from office, and 
Obama’s UN ambassador Susan Rice offered up a Chapter 7 resolution opening the door 
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to using force against Assad at a time when President Obama was dealing with fallout 
from his failure to maintain the red line in the sand that he had previously drawn (Hirsch, 
2013). 
Such a line, if crossed, was at least in theory supposed to reflect the set of 
conditions which would lead President Obama to authorize some type of meaningful 
intervention against Syria if it was proven that the Syrian government was using chemical 
weapons against its own people.  Judis (2014) reported that President Obama in August 
2013 was informed that there was no doubt that Assad had used chemical weapons in 
northern Syria and elsewhere and against rebels in the Damascus suburbs.  President 
Obama “insisted that retaliation be limited to Assad’s chemical weapons facilities and, 
after Britain balked at joining the American attack, said he would not bomb without 
Congressional approval” (Judis, 2014, p. 2). 
At that juncture, Russia convinced Basher Al Assad to give up his chemical 
arsenal, which put an end to the American threat but also served to demoralize rebel 
forces in Syria and led to a split between the Obama-backed Syrian National Coalition 
and the Islamic Front and other Islamic groups. The Obama administration then turned 
once again to negotiation via the United Nations and in Geneva in June 2012, it joined 
with Russia, the European Union, Turkey, and various Arab countries in calling for a 
coalition government in Syria to end the conflict. Many in the Obama administration, 
including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CIA Chief David Petraeus, and Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta, proposed to the White House that it arm the rebels, but Obama 
refused (Judis, 2014). 
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In discussing the Obama foreign policy, Berman (2014) positions President 
Obama’s policy in a global context and says that it has become “characterized by 
strategic drift, with serious consequences for American interests abroad. The list of 
failures is legion, from a lack of leadership on Russia to faulty assumptions about the 
feasibility of détente with Iran to a rudderless pivot toward Asia – but it is Syria that is 
perhaps President Obama’s greatest foreign policy failure to date” (p.1). 
Inaction, rather than action, characterizes what could be called a combination of 
the liberal and democratic peace theory perspective that seem to be typical of President 
Obama’s ideological orientation. Berman (2014) reported that “what was once an internal 
conflict has become an incubator for global jihad. The past three years have seen a steady 
Islamization of Syria’s fractious opposition, complete with the rise of a constellation of 
radical religious forces and the birth of a local Al Qaeda affiliate” (p.1). Further, they 
have also seen an influx of hundreds of foreign fighters from abroad. The latter trend has 
become such a problem that Western governments have begun collaborating with the 
Assad regime to get an accurate handle on just how many of their own nationals are 
fighting on Syria's killing fields. Berman (2014) goes on to note that the contradictions in 
the Obama policy toward Syria were among the reasons why ISIS/ISIL has emerged as a 
major actor in the region. Essentially, one could argue that the failure of the U.S. and her 
allies in Europe to adequately assist moderate rebel forces struggling to topple the Assad 
regime created a situation in which a determined Islamist group could seize the day and 
control over the Syrian conflict. Berman (2014) concluded that “All this has diluted 
international support for comparatively moderate political forces within the Syrian 
opposition. It also bolsters the legitimacy of the Syrian regime — which, once 
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discredited, is now increasingly seen as the only viable political option by the West, 
despite its brutality” (p.2). 
George Friedman (2013), commenting on Obama’s policies, said: 
When he took office, Obama did not want to engage in any war. His goal was to 
raise the threshold for military action much higher than it had been since the end 
of the Cold War, when Desert Storm, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq and 
other lesser interventions formed an ongoing pattern in U.S. foreign policy (p.2). 
Whatever the justifications for any of these policies, Obama saw the United States as 
being overextended by the tempo of war. He intended to disengage from war and to play 
a lesser role in general in managing the international system. At most, he intended to be 
part of the coalition of nations, not the leader and certainly not the lone actor.  
President Obama was definitively opposed to the Doctrine of Pre-emption favored 
by the Bush Administration, and while not as committed to nation-building or 
democratization, was convinced that diplomacy was preferable to military intervention in 
most cases (and specifically in the case of Syria, where determining which of the rebel 
forces was the ‘right’ partner was all but impossible).   
Friedman (2013, p. 1) also suggests that:  
Obama tried to find a balance where there was none between his strategy that 
dictated non-intervention and his ideology that demanded something be done. His 
solution was to loudly threaten military action that he and his secretary of state 
both indicated would be minimal. The threatened action aroused little concern 
from the Syrian regime, which has fought a bloody two-year war. Meanwhile, the 
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Russians, who were seeking to gain standing by resisting the United States, could 
paint Washington as reckless and unilateral….  
The alignment of moral principles with national strategy is not easy under the best of 
circumstances. Ideologies tend to be more seductive in generalized terms, but not so 
coherent in specific cases. This is true throughout the political spectrum, but it is 
particularly intense in the Obama administration, where the ideas of humanitarian 
intervention, absolutism in human rights, and opposition to weapons of mass destruction 
collide with a strategy of limiting U.S. involvement — particularly military involvement 
— in the world. The ideologies wind up demanding judgments and actions that the 
strategy rejects. This has created a tension in current U.S. foreign policy, which itself was 
exacerbated by the emergence of ISIS/ISIL as a tremendously destabilizing force in the 
region, and the use of U.S. drones to attack ISIS/ISIL positions in Syria, Iraq and 
elsewhere. 
Facing the Obama Administration was not merely the question of how to deal 
with the Assad regime; the more significant issue, perhaps, was what can and should be 
done to contain (and ideally eliminate) ISIS/ISIL. President Obama (2014) made the 
following statement, underscoring the significance of this issue: 
So, ISIL poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle 
East -- including American citizens, personnel and facilities. If left unchecked, 
these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region -- including to the 
United States. While we have not yet detected specific plotting against our 
homeland, ISIL leaders have threatened America and our allies. Our intelligence 
community believes that thousands of foreigners -- including Europeans and some 
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Americans -- have joined them in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, 
these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly 
attacks (p.1). 
The notion that ISIS/ISIL had been “contained,” let alone “eliminated” or “controlled,” is 
itself controversial in light of the ongoing acts of terrorism claimed by ISIS/ISIL. They 
are, as President Obama (2014) rightly commented,  
ISIL is certainly not a state. It was formerly al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq, and has 
taken advantage of sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both 
sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It is recognized by no government, nor the people 
it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has no 
vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way. 
In a region that has known so much bloodshed, these terrorists are unique in their 
brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, 
and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious minority with 
genocide. In acts of barbarism, they took the lives of two American journalists -- 
Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff (p.1). 
That said, the question of whether or not limited military engagement or 
intervention (largely in the form of unmanned drones and a small contingent of military 
“advisors” with “boots on the ground” in the region) represents a movement away from 
the Obama policy of liberalism bolstered by a touch of realism remains unanswered even 
today. Certainly, President Obama (2014) has made it quite clear that he does not favor 
American military intervention and as the Obama Administration is ending, President 
Obama, as he has throughout his tenue in office, refused to countenance unilateral 
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American action in Syria or elsewhere; he called repeatedly for building coalitions and 
involving local actors in any and all efforts to end this crisis.    
He has stated that “Moreover, I have made it clear that we will hunt down 
terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. That means I will not hesitate to 
take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my 
presidency: if you threaten America, you will find no safe haven” (Obama, 2014, p. 1). 
Such a statement is somewhat at odds with the actual policies he put in place. One might 
be tempted to argue that ISIS/ISIL itself did not threatened the “country” governed by 
President Obama, even though it declared its intent to do so and takes American lives as 
casually as it has taken the lives of Coptic Christians from Egypt, Yazidis, Kurds, Shi’as, 
and aid workers as well as journalists from England and Japan.  
The various theoretical lenses applied herein are useful in both academic and 
practical settings because they assist analysts in determining the underlying rationale for 
specific foreign policy decisions and other actions by nation-states (Buchan, 2002). The 
case of Syria, considered over a period of time from 1993 to 2015, is particularly useful 
in comparing how each of these policy orientations can impact the decisions of an 
American president. There has clearly been at times, as this report demonstrates, dramatic 
transformation in US policy. Currently, Hussein Abdul-Aziz (2014) believes that the 
constant shifts in American attitudes toward Syria have undermined the capacity of any 
seated president to undertake definitive action. At the same time, this analyst is 
convinced that President Obama’s antipathy toward military action and his belief in the 
power of negotiation represents the liberal view of foreign policy as a mechanism for 
building peace. 
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The problem, of course, is that peacebuilding requires willingness on the part of 
all involved in a conflict. There has been no indication that the Assad regime has any 
intention at all of ceding power, or even a reasonable share of power, to any of its 
opponents. There is also no reason to believe that ISIS/ISIL has any intent of backing 
down from its stated goal of establishing first a regional and then a global Islamic 
Caliphate that will introduce Shari’a law into new territories. Despite its loss of territory 
in recent months, it remains committed to its goals and objectives. 
The use of American drones to weaken, if not eliminate, ISIS/ISIL was part of 
President Obama’s overarching strategy which now appears to have accepted the idea of 
keeping Assad in power. Whereas the neoconservative policy of George W. Bush sought 
to eliminate Assad as part of the Axis of Evil and the policies of both George H.W. Bush 
and Bill Clinton emphasized engagement with Syria, the Obama administration did not 
succeed in articulating a consistent policy. While consistency may well be the hobgoblin 
of little minds, the fragmented and constantly evolving policies of the past several 
American presidential administrations have not served the country well.   
Guiora (2011) pointed out that identifying the underpinning ideology shaping the 
activities of any presidential administration is challenging in part because most presidents 
are likely to combine more than one ideological approach to the creation of foreign 
policies. There is no doubt that President Barack Obama represented a significant shift in 
terms of a fundamental worldview when compared to his predecessor, George W. Bush. 
In no sense a Neoconservative, Obama has nevertheless continued throughout his 
presidency to maintain many of the sanctions that were initiated in the Bush 
101 
 
administration, and in a number of instances has extended and increased those sanctions 
against Syria (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2015). 
Sanctions have been, therefore, a key foreign policy tool employed by Presidents 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2015). Presidents and Bush and 
Obama have been, if anything, more aggressive than President Clinton in terms of the use 
of sanctions as a tool for bringing about desired outcomes in the case of Syria and its 
ongoing civil war. Interestingly, Guiora (2011) pointed out that the foreign policy of 
President Obama “has been particularly problematic on two distinct fronts: inconsistency 
in determining under what conditions intervention is justified and a sharp dissonance 
between suggested expectations and actual delivery” (p. 253).  
President Obama has in the view of this analyst called for intervention and 
executed it in Libya but not in Syria. Attempting to determine what differentiated the 
Libyan and Syrian crises, Guiora (2011) argues, is difficult at best. Both regimes were 
brutal and both were antagonistic to the United States and its interests in the region. 
Guiora (2011) stated that “in both Libya and Syria a brutal regime was deliberate 
torturing, imprisoning, and killing its own citizens” (p.267). The United States and 
NATO directly engaged the Gaddafi regime in Libya with the intent of forcing the leader 
to either step down or leave Libya. President Obama employed American resources to the 
conflict in Libya but did not introduce American troops into the country. 
In 2011, President Obama called for President Bashar Al Assad to step aside and 
increased sanctions against Syria, but he also specified that he and the U.S. would not 
impose force upon Assad to remove him from office. President Obama (2011) stated that 
“it is up to the Syrian people to choose their own leaders and we have heard their strong 
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desire that there not be foreign intervention in their movement. What the United States 
will support is an effort to bring about a Syria that is democratic, just, and inclusive for 
all Syrians” (p.21). 
Critics of the Obama policies toward Syria include Hussein Abdul-Aziz (2014), 
who said that “Obama’s policy toward the Syrian crisis has been marked by weakness 
and a lack of vision, both of which have informed two principal approaches thus far” 
(p.1). The first approach supported by the Obama administration was allowing the 
international system to play a greater role in the conflict while the second focused on 
placing political and economic pressure on Al Assad from a distance. Abdul-Aziz (2014) 
argued that the Obama administration exhibited at least four notable shifts in its Syria 
policy as of 2014, including supporting the opposition in Syria rather than using 
sanctions, withdrawing support from the opposition, alienating the regime’s allies, and 
finally, acknowledging that none of these efforts had succeeded. 
A red line drawn in the sand, according to Bryant (2013), was largely ignored by 
Assad and many American partners have expressed disappointment that Washington 
delayed action in favor of engaging Russia to convince Syria to place its chemical 
weapons under international control. With hundreds of thousands of Syrians killed, 
millions more living as refugees, and the emergence of ISIS/ISIL, many critics, including 
Bryant (2013), believed the Obama policies have failed.   
At one point, while considering military intervention in Syria, Obama sought to 
obtain Congressional authorization for a military attack against Syria (Mayer, 2014). 
While democratization was not specifically the goal of such a move, Mayer (2014) 
asserts that the frequency of drone attacks undertaken by the American government under 
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the terms of the War Powers Act represent a unilateral approach to resolving the Syrian 
crisis. Congressional approval was not forthcoming.  
Realists, as has been noted above, acknowledge the necessity of unilateral actions 
(Mayer, 2014). This does not necessarily mean that it would be appropriate to identify 
Barack Obama as a Realist. President Obama was hesitant with respect to expanding U.S. 
activities in Syria beyond the drone bomb program (Mayer, 2014).  Whether or not a true 
“Obama Doctrine” emerged is difficult to determine. Murray (2013) suggested that 
President Obama prefers a calibrated, multilateral response to egregious humanitarian 
crises. Such a doctrine represents an attempt to clarify and institutionalize responses to 
human rights violations. It seeks to pursue reform, then commitment to stability and 
attempts to emphasize diplomatic engagement as opposed to military intervention 
(Murray, 2013). 
The problem is that the Obama policy has not been as comprehensive as either the 
Bush policies in Iraq and Afghanistan or as removed as the Clinton engagement and 
enlargement effort. Whether one chooses to criticize the Bush administration’s penchant 
for military intervention or not, one must conclude, as does Glass (2015), that this policy 
was at least consistent. In sharp contrast, the Obama policy did not succeed in 
crystallizing around a particular ideological approach.   
Hirsch (2013) argued that President Obama had the opportunity to broker a Syrian 
peace deal in 2012 but failed to do so even though then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had reached an accord on a political 
transition in Syria that would have eliminated Bashar Assad from power. Unfortunately, 
though the United Nations had supported such a move, as was evident in the attitude of 
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the Special UN Syria envoy, Kofi Annan, the United States, and Great Britain 
prematurely issued public calls for Assad’s ouster. This undermined any potential for a 
peace deal at that time (Hirsch, 2013). 
President Obama acknowledged the rise of ISIS/ISIL and the necessity of 
addressing the problems that this poses for the stability of the Middle East and for the 
United States. U.S. drones originating at the U.S. Air Force’s Turkish base in Incirlik 
have targeted ISIS/ISIL in north Syria since August 2015 (Tattersall, 2015). The U.S. and 
Turkey worked together to provide air cover for those groups that have been identified by 
the Obama administration as moderate. The overarching goal of the U.S.-Turkish alliance 
has been to decimate the ISIS/ISIL forces and to flush them from a rectangle of border 
territory near Turkey where many Syrian refugees have taken residence.  
Tattersall (2015) reported that Turkey joined the fight in support of the United 
States and because of its own fears regarding the long-term effect of regional instability. 
That said, as Yeginsu and Cooper (2015) contend, the United States behaved under 
President Obama somewhat pragmatically in light of the fact that Turkey’s record of 
dealing with its own Kurdish population is not substantially better than that of Bashar Al 
Assad. There is something of the Realist ideology underpinning the U.S.-Turkey 
agreement on using manned and unmanned American war planes to carry out aerial 
attacks on ISIS/ISIL. The United States had clearly chosen to be pragmatic with respect 
to its Turkish partnership. 
Overall, Berman (2014) assessed the Obama Syrian policy as characterized by 
strategic drift and a list of failures that ranges from a lack of leadership on the question of 
Russia to faulty assumptions about the feasibility of détente with Iran and the failure to 
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act in a timely manner with respect to Syria. President Obama emerges as more generally 
oriented towards liberalism and a belief that with diplomacy, it is possible to engage in 
peacebuilding. Certainly, it is quite clear that President Obama, from the outset of his 
tenure in the White House, did not want to engage in any new wars, saw the United 
States as overextended as with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan, and was even anxious for 
the United States to disengage from war and assume a lesser role in managing the 
international system (Friedman, 2013). 
President Obama sought to find a balance in a situation that was increasingly 
incoherent.  His strategy, with respect to Syria, was the direct opposite of the Bush 
doctrine of preemption. He was convinced that diplomacy was almost always preferable 
to military intervention and that nation-building and democratization were best achieved 
by modeling such activities rather than imposing them on others (Friedman, 2013). 
Friedman (2013) says that in the Obama administration, “ideas of humanitarian 
intervention, absolutism, in human rights, and opposition to weapons of mass destruction 
collide with a strategy of limiting U.S. involvement – particularly military involvement – 
in the world” (p. 1).  
The end result of President Obama’s policy was the view of some – but not all - 
analysts that there was no clearly defined “doctrine” or policy orientation that can be said 
to represent U.S. attitudes and actions vis-à-vis Syria from 2008 to 2016 (Friedman, 
2013). Certainly, President Obama made it clear that the military “boots on the ground” 
option for intervention in Syria – even with the rise of ISIS/ISIL – was not viable from 
his perspective. This was due to several reasons: fear of further regional destabilization; 
increased antipathy toward America and the West among Muslims; a lack of perceived 
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will on the part of the American people to support such an intervention; a conviction that 
it is in the best interest of the United States to “lead from behind” by supporting 
concerted efforts on the global stage rather than through unilateral action; and a genuine 
sense that Syria’s destiny should be in the hands of Syrians and not external actors 
(Friedman, 2013). 
This has inevitably led to the emergence of a certain tension in American policy 
toward Syria. ISIS/ISIL and the dangers posed by a determined Islamist movement 
notwithstanding, President Obama (2014) chose to severely limit the options he would 
employ in developing and implementing policy toward Syria. He acknowledged the 
threat posed by ISIS/ISIL, admitted that if left unchecked it would undoubtedly continue 
to wreak havoc on the region (and potentially affect U.S. national security), and 
nevertheless was willing only to employ air strikes against this threat.  
President Obama (2014) has spoken harshly and critically about ISIS/ISIL and the 
dangers it poses. His efforts in tandem with Turkey – and his tacit acceptance of Iran’s 
support for the Al-Assad regime – did not signal a change in policy orientation. Russia 
entered the fray in support of the Al Assad regime and, in so doing, called on the United 
States to remove itself from Syrian airspace. This represented a new political issue in an 
already complex situation, and one that calls for negotiation.   
Globally, as Ramsbotham et al. (2012) would undoubtedly agree, there is a 
fundamental ideological divide between Syria under Bashar Al Assad and the United 
States on the one hand and between Russia and the United States on the other hand. This 
is a division that Marten (2015) identifies as integral to any understanding of the Syrian 
situation which must, out of necessity, include references to the case of Iran and its 
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hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East. Similarly, regional conflict is involved with 
cross-border conflict exacerbated by the emergence of ISIS/ISIL and a diaspora of 
Syrians and Iraqis leaving a war-torn region. Inter-state conflict is also endemic in Syria 
itself, where a highly authoritarian state under a regime that has been at the very least 
dismissive of opposition and at the worst brutally repressive with respect to its opponents 
is now under attack (Marten, 2015).   
Perhaps the most comprehensive effort to identify the specific nature of an Obama 
Doctrine was undertaken by Jeffrey Goldberg (2016) in a lengthy article appearing in the 
April 2016 edition of The Atlantic. Goldberg (2016) notes that Obama saw Syria as 
representing a slope potentially as slippery as Iraq and convinced that only a handful of 
threats in the Middle East warranted direct U.S. military intervention. These threats 
included that posed by Al Qaeda, threats to the continued existence of Israel, and the 
threat posed by a nuclear armed Iran. Until the summer of 2012, noted Goldberg (2016), 
when President Obama drew the red line in the sand after the Assad regime used 
chemical weapons against its own citizens, the evidence that President Obama was 
reticent at best to intervene in Syria because of his conviction that the threat posed by the 
Assad regime to the United States was not sufficient.   
Obama was convinced that there was no reason to doubt that Assad would fall 
without American intervention and equally convinced that it was important for the United 
States to conclude its military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan before becoming 
involved in Syria.  Further, Obama did not embrace the doctrine known as responsibility 
to protect and in fact, Goldberg (2016) states, “unlike liberal interventionists, [Obama] is 
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an admirer of the foreign policy realism of President George H.W. Bush and, in 
particular, of Bush’s national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft” (p.6). 
Many believed that when the red line in the sand was drawn, President Obama 
was ready to authorize military intervention in Syria. In fact, he had authorized the 
Pentagon to develop target lists and called for the deployment of five Arleigh Burke-
Class destroyers in the Mediterranean (Goldberg, 2016). However, President Obama then 
developed doubts as to whether or not a strike was called for and expressed concern 
regarding whether or not he should undertake military action without the consent of 
Congress. He was willing, Goldberg (2016) said, to upset America’s allies, including 
France and Saudi Arabia and to antagonize those in the U.S. Congress who were in favor 
of intervention in Syria. When he asked Congress to authorize the use of force and 
received an ambivalent response, President Obama quickly backed down with respect to 
the violation of the red line that he had drawn himself. 
Goldberg (2016) stated that history may record August 30, 2013 “as the day 
Obama prevented the U.S. from entering yet another disastrous Muslim civil war... or it 
could be remembered as the day he let the Middle East slip from America’s grasp, into 
the hands of Russia, Iran, and ISIS” (p.19). Later, President Obama would argue that 
even ISIS, unlike climate change, was not an existential threat to the United States and 
that at all costs, the United States needed to avoid being caught up in tribal conflicts. In 
fact, President Obama does appear, in the view of Goldberg (2016), to view tribalism as a 
fundamental problem confronting the world. Obama sees American foreign policy as 
focused either on isolation, realism, liberal interventionism, and internationalism, and 
describes himself as both a realist and an internationalist with idealistic tendencies. The 
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Obama Doctrine, therefore, may very well be a combination of multiple theoretical 
perspectives involving off-loading some of America’s foreign policies to her allies.   
Goldberg (2016) says that President Obama is thoroughly cognizant of the forces 
that drive apocalyptic violence among radical Muslims and has “a tragic realist’s 
understanding of sin, cowardice, and corruption, and a Hobbesian appreciation of how 
fear shapes human behavior” (p.26). Simultaneously, he often expresses optimism that 
change is possible and a willingness to question the conventional wisdom regarding if 
some countries identified as allies are actually allies and all those identified as enemies 
are actually enemies.   
Further, it is quite possible that the American experience in Libya influenced 
President Obama’s decisions regarding Syria. Goldberg (2016) suggests that regardless of 
how successful the Libyan experience may have been, President Obama saw it as a 
failure and essentially as having not worked as planned due in part to tribalism and also 
the fact that the Middle East represents a potential quagmire for the United States.  
Obama is also said to be extremely resistant to refracting radical Islam through 
Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilization prism. He sees terrorism as a threat, but not as 
the kind of threat that should engender the level of fear that has emerged in the United 
States. Obama told Goldberg (2016) that “a group like ISIL is the distillation of every 
worst impulse” (p. 47). His approach to fighting terrorism, with respect to the Syrian 
situation as a whole, has included a drone air force, Special Forces raids, and a 
clandestine CIA aided army of 10,000 rebels battling in Syria. Obama has steadfastly 
refused to move beyond a foreign policy posture that focuses on deliberate, 
nonthreatening, diplomacy-centered approaches to foreign policies.   
110 
 
Overall, Goldberg (2016) says that President Obama has insisted that 
overextension in the Middle East will harm the American economy, inhibit national 
capacity for finding other opportunities and dealing with other challenges, and would 
endanger the lives of American service members for reasons that are, in his view, 
inadequate. The Obama Doctrine, therefore, is a doctrine in which interventionism is not 
considered to be in the best interests of the country and its peoples simply because a 
possible threat exists.   
A word at this juncture regarding the situation in Syria is necessary. Hubbard and 
MacFarquhar (2016) reported that as December of 2016 ended, a ceasefire between the 
Syrian government and significantly weakened rebel forces took effect. Brokered in large 
measure by Russia, the United States welcomed this truce. The rebels’ loss of Aleppo 
was a major blow to their movement. Excluded from the ceasefire, however, were the 
jihadists including the Islamic State, the Syrian affiliate of Al Qaeda and groups linked to 
them. As of this writing, there was no indication that the ceasefire would hold or that 
hostilities would not break out, nor was there was any determination as to whether or not 
the Assad regime would step down, become more inclusive, or change its policies. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Obama administration played no role of any substance 
in obtaining this ceasefire.   
Chemical Weapon Use and Two Cases: Iraq and Syria 
While there are any number of similarities and dissimilarities that can be 
introduced in a discussion of American foreign policy toward Middle Eastern countries 
from the administrations of President Bill Clinton through President Barack Obama, no 
study of these policies would be complete without some discussion of how a regime’s use 
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of chemical weapons played into U.S. policy formation. Beginning with President George 
H.W. Bush and the first Persian Gulf War, a cornerstone of American foreign policy for a 
prolonged period of time derived from the acknowledgement that Saddam Hussein not 
only possessed chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction but also had a 
history of using those weapons against his enemies domestically as well as externally 
(Tracey, 2007). There is evidence that from the 1960s to the 1980s, Saddam Hussein 
undertook an aggressive program of developing multiple weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear weapons, in which Iraq received assistance from companies in 
Germany and France as well as Russia (Chivers & Schmitt, 2015). 
As part of what is now known as Project 922, German companies, including Karl 
Kobe, facilitated the development of Iraqi chemical weapons facilities and further 
assisted the country in developing mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and tear gases.  As reported 
by Timmerman (1991), Iraq produced 150 tons of mustard gas agent and 60 tons of tabun 
in 1983 and 1984, respectively, drawing in large measure on assistance from German 
companies. Under the aegis of the State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP), 
Saddam Hussein’s factories turned out mass quantities of chemical weapons that the 
regime deployed in its war with Iran beginning in 1980.   
Timmerman (1991) pointed out that Iraq employed chemical weapons against 
Iranian forces throughout 1984 and 1985 and also used such weapons against domestic 
dissidents from the Kurdish minority population. It is estimated that more than 100,000 
Iranians were affected by Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons during the eight-year war 
and that internally, some 7,000 Kurds were killed by chemical weapons in Iraq while 
20,000 Kurds were wounded at the town of Halabja. The event at Halabja was not an 
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isolated incident. Hirst (1988) reported that in response to growing evidence that Saddam 
Hussein was using chemical weapons against his own people, and particularly as a 
consequence of the Halabja poison gas attack, the U.S. Senate proposed the Prevention of 
Genocide Act of 1988 while also cutting off all American assistance to Iraq and 
eliminating U.S. imports of Iraqi oil, despite objections from the Reagan administration.   
One of the key factors leading to the Persian Gulf War, at least in terms of 
providing a moral foundation for American intervention, was knowledge of Saddam 
Hussein’s ongoing use of chemical weapons and his determination to continue 
developing nuclear and other weapons despite sanctions from the United Nations 
(Timmerman, 1991). Even the success of the first Persian Gulf War, in which Saddam 
Hussein was forced to retreat from his invasion of Kuwait, did not bring about an end to 
Iraq’s efforts to continue developing its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).   
Moving forward several years, inspections by the United Nations Special 
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) proceeded with difficulty. Tracey (2007) notes that 
there was a substantial body of evidence indicating that Iraq was intent on continuing 
research related to the use of such toxins as anthrax, botulinum, ricin, and aflatoxin. 
British educated Iraqi biologist Rihab Rashid Taha ultimately admitted to UNSCOM 
inspectors that under orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi researchers had been conducting 
research into smallpox, cholera, salmonella, and camel pox. As Tracey (2007) states, 
Iraqi opposition groups contended that scientists used political prisoners, including some 
who were transferred to Iraq from Abu Ghraib, as human guinea pigs when anthrax 
treated shells were exploded.   
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Additionally, in response to UNSCOM pressure, Saddam Hussein’s government 
willingly and knowingly lied about its chemical weapons program, generally 
underestimating and minimizing its investment in such weapons and research. For 
President George W. Bush, ongoing concerns regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons 
programming were instrumental in the decision to go to war against Iraq in what would 
become Gulf War II (Tracey, 2007).  Essentially, while no nuclear WMD were ultimately 
located in Iraq by the invading Coalition forces that overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, 
there was a substantial body of evidence supporting the conclusion that Iraq had used, 
and would continue to develop, chemical weapons.   
According to Tracey (2007), it is probable that Saddam Hussein did not destroy 
all, or perhaps even most, of the chemical weapons that he had developed, some of which 
he had in fact used both domestically against Kurds and in the Iran-Iraq War. Similarly, 
the National Ground Intelligence Center reported to the U.S. House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence that since 2003, coalition forces recovered approximately 500 
weapons which contained degraded mustard or sarin gas nerve agents (Shrader, 2006). 
These chemical weapons were identified as constituting weapons of mass destruction, 
and though they may not have been as potent or viable several years after their 
development as initially planned, they were nevertheless evidence of an Iraqi effort to 
develop and to use such weapons.  
President George W. Bush certainly based his policies vis-à-vis Iraq on a 
conviction that chemical and other WMD required a response from the United States of a 
military nature because such weapons represented a very real threat to the security not 
only of the Middle East, but also of the United States (Tracey, 2007). Whether one agrees 
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or not with the justification used by President Bush to invade Iraq, the fact of the matter 
is that Iraq did have a history of using chemical weapons and that it did have a substantial 
investment in chemical weapons research.  President Bush (2003) called upon Saddam 
Hussein in May of 2003 to give up power and leave the country and told the world that if 
Saddam Hussein did not comply with this demand, the U.S. would have no choice but to 
pursue him as a war criminal.   
It is clear that in this instance chemical weapons as a reality and as a potential 
threat were instrumental in shaping American foreign policy toward an autonomous 
nation-state. While no nuclear weapons were identified as present in Iraq, in contradiction 
to the intelligence given to President Bush, chemical weapons are weapons of mass 
destruction and offer legitimate support for his decision to invade Iraq. That said, of 
course, there is still the question of whether or not Saddam Hussein’s regime itself 
presented a clear and present threat to the United States something which William R. Pitt 
(2002) suggests is far more difficult to demonstrate. Coupled with the actual and verified 
use of chemical weapons, Iraq’s dogged resistance to compliance with UN sanctions 
made the Bush Administration view this as sufficient to justify a military “boots on the 
ground” pre-emptive strike. 
Customary international law, until relatively recently, has upheld the right of a 
nation-state to use force and go to war in order to obtain redress for wrongs or to gain 
political or other advantages over another state, particularly in cases where such acts 
would be a form of self-defense (Ackerman, 2003). The law of nations, beginning with 
statements from Hugo Grotius, continuing in the writing of Emmerich de Vattel, and 
former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, affirms the use of preemptive force in 
115 
 
anticipation of an attack and in the interest of preservation of the security of a state. Thus, 
necessity along with Webster’s concept of proportionality are essential in legitimizing 
preemptive force (Ackerman, 2003).   
Under the Charter of the United Nations, specifically Article 51, this right to wage 
war in the pursuit of individual or collective self-defense is affirmed with the caveat that 
this right emerges when an armed attack occurs. However, many legal scholars, including 
David Ackerman (2003), point out that moving away from a literal construction of 
Article 51 has occurred in recognition of the fact that a preemptive strike that is defensive 
in nature can be legitimate if there is reason to believe that an attack is pending or 
probable. In the case of Iraq, the conclusion drawn by the Bush administration, based on 
best available intelligence at the time, was that Iraq may have possessed weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), did have and had used chemical weapons, and may have had ties to 
terrorist groups that sought to use such weapons against the U.S.; consequently, the Bush 
policy reflected the belief that traditional law of preemption should apply.   
The United Nations has failed to provide definitive guidance on Article 51 
applicability in such a situation (Ackerman, 2003).  Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the United Nations has at times supported preemptive strikes – something that was 
apparently sufficient for the Bush Administration. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was, 
according to Bush, justified under the customary law requirement of necessity but not 
under the requirement of proportionality in that there was no evidence directly linking 
Iraq to a readily apparent immediate threat to the United States or any of its 
extraterritorial holdings. Anticipatory self-defense as a matter of national survival must 
be justified based on necessity and proportionality. 
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Like Iraq, Syria also had a chemical weapons program that it began in the 1970s 
with the assistance of both Egypt and the Soviet Union. Production of chemical weapons 
in Syria did not officially begin until the mid-1980s. According to the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) (2013), Western intelligence services were convinced for over 
two decades that Syria possessed and was stockpiling chemical weapons with the intent 
to use such weapons on an as needed basis.  Hinnebusch et al. (2010) pointed out that 
unlike Iraq, which was subject to UN and other sanctions based on the actual validated 
use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, Syria was able to invest in stockpiling 
chemical weapons with relative ease.   
By September of 2013, reports from French intelligence agencies indicated that 
Syria had a stockpile of some 1,000 tons of such weapons including sarin, Yperite, and 
VX. In September of 2013, Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 
agreed to destroy these weapons under the supervision of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Prior to joining the CWC, Syria was one of 
only five states failing to sign and even refusing to ratify the Convention, although in 
1968, Syria had agreed to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous of Other Gases (Willsher, 2013).    
Syria, it is argued, adopted a chemical weapons development initiative for several 
reasons, including a perceived need to develop a deterrent against Israel and her capacity 
to deploy nuclear weapons against Syria, to improve its domestic security after losing 
Egypt as a military ally, to act as a deterrent against neighboring Turkey in the event this 
would be necessary, and in recognition of the vulnerability of Syria’s military forces with 
respect to those of Israel (Diab, 1997). That said, Syria’s participation in CWC required it 
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to not only cease its chemical weapons program but also to disarm and to destroy its 
existing stockpiles. At the end of 2013, Syria was revealed as having stockpiled some 
1,300 metric tons of different chemical weapons that were stored at various sites 
throughout the country. 
Acting jointly, the United States and Russia announced on September 14, 2013 
that they would undertake responsibility for overseeing a disarmament effort to eliminate 
Syria’s chemical weapons programs and stockpiles (Gordon, 2013). A joint mission 
between the United Nations and OPCW was established to oversee the process and many 
of the weapons were in fact destroyed. Nevertheless, there was a substantial body of 
evidence supporting the assertion that the Bashar Al Assad regime and that of his father 
had deployed chemical weapons against dissidents and rebels in such cities as Homs, 
Khan al-Asal, and Jobar as well as Saraqib. These attacks were seen as the work of the 
Syrian government, although Al Assad claimed that his government was not responsible 
and that any chemical weapons that were deployed in Syria were deployed by opposition 
forces (Mazzetti & Gordon, 2013).   
President Barack Obama, responding on August 20, 2012, made the following 
statement: “we have been very clear to the Assad government, but also to other players 
on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons 
moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my 
equation” (Baker, 2013, p.  A1). Problematically, one year later, the Syrian government 
used chemical weapons at Ghouta, leading President Obama to claim that he had not in 
fact set a red line but that this was a line set by many governments in response to the use 
of chemical weapons (Goldberg, 2016).   
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The reaction to President Obama’s apparent retreat from a firm stance on the use 
of chemical weapons was highly negative. As Goldberg (2016) points out, many 
international leaders and domestic American opposition politicians believed that 
President Obama had failed to act as he clearly intended to act a year earlier. There was a 
perception that by refusing to mount a focused military response to Assad’s use of 
chemical weapons, the United States was backing down from its oft-stated commitment 
to bringing about an end to the conflict in Syria.   
Certainly, the Obama reaction to definitive proof that Syria had used chemical 
weapons against its own people is vastly different from the reaction of President George 
W. Bush when confronted with similar issues in the case of Iraq. According to Goldberg 
(2016), President Obama did not categorize Syria’s civil war as a top tier security threat. 
George W. Bush did adopt such a posture with respect to Iraq, although one must 
acknowledge that President Bush had been provided with intelligence indicating that in 
addition to chemical weapons, the Saddam Hussein regime also possessed other WMDs, 
including nuclear weapons.   
Goldberg (2016) questioned President Obama and asked whether or not he 
perceived himself as having been too cautious in the case of Syria. President Obama said 
that he did not see himself as overcautious and speculated that he did not know whether 
or not he would have ordered military action in Syria had the U.S. not invaded Iraq and 
still been deeply invested in Afghanistan. Critics of President Obama contend that he is 
naive and that he was bluffing and posturing when he made the famous “red line” 
statement. Goldberg (2016) concludes that “in the matter of the Syrian regime and its 
Iranian and Russian sponsors, Obama has bet, and seems prepared to continue betting, 
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that the price of direct U.S. action would be higher than the price of inaction. And he is 
sanguine enough to live with the perilous ambiguities of his decisions” (p.58). 
This brief discussion demonstrates that there are some critical differences between 
the decisions made by President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama with 
respect to military intervention when there is evidence that a regime has used and/or is 
developing chemical weapons. The difference seems to rest on the question of how one 
specifically defines a threat to the security of the United States. One can at least 
tentatively conclude that President Obama does not, or did not, see the Syrian civil war in 
and of itself as presenting a major threat to the United States and that consequently he did 
not believe that there was any reason for the United States to move to enhance its 
engagement in Syria because of the use of chemical weapons. President Bush took a 
different position when he chose to become engaged in Iraq. This case highlights the very 
real differences between the foreign policy orientations of the two presidents and their 
attitudes toward U.S. military involvement in foreign countries.  
Summary of the Chapter 
The purpose of this chapter of the study was to provide a thorough analysis of the 
relevant literature that depicts the theoretical environment in which the study is 
positioned, the political and military situation in Syria, the actions of three separate 
American presidential administrations, and a generalized comparison of two cases in 
which chemical weapons have been deployed and the response by the United States to 
this event. A literature review, as described by Babbie (2004), provides the foundation on 
which a qualitative study generally proceeds. The more complex the case under 
investigation, the more detailed and complex the literature review itself must be.  
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Given that two discrete sets of theory are employed herein, this chapter describes 
theories of International Relations as well as theories of Conflict Resolution. It is 
generally true, as Cloke (2008), suggests that resolving conflict is a central activity within 
the larger field of international relations and one of the goals of foreign policy initiatives 
which may alternatively seek to prevent rather than to resolve conflicts.   
The theory of Coalition Building, as described by Spangler (2003), was identified 
in the foregoing review as the most appropriate theory for developing a meaningful 
solution to the Syrian issue. It is certainly worth noting that there are three or more broad 
sets of coalitions currently operating in Syria. The United States and her allies represent 
one such coalition whereas the partnership between the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, and 
Hezbollah represent another. Added to this, one must include the various rebel groups in 
Syria (depicted in the attached Appendices as well as the remaining elements of 
ISIS/ISIL or the Caliphate). One should recognize that alliances in these latter groups are 
often in flux and that this has been a characteristic of the Syrian situation for quite some 
time, going back to the presidency of Bill Clinton (Kiefer, 2000).   
Coalition Building, as described by Spangler (2003), is a particularly useful tool 
in analyzing a situation such as that of Syria because it is recognized as the primary 
mechanism through which both powerful and disempowered parties can extend or 
develop a power base and in the process better defend their interests. Generally speaking, 
groups with lower power acquire enhanced capacity to protect their own interests when 
they participate in coalitions and powerful groups are able to expand their own sphere of 
interest through this process. Coalition building is one of the fundamental tools that is 
employed by actors in the field of conflict resolution.   
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The difficult in constructing a comprehensive review of literature in this research 
effort centers upon the fact that the Syrian situation is a situation in which change occurs 
on a virtually daily basis and that interactions between coalition members or partners tend 
to be dictated by conditions that cannot, in fact, be predicted and which are not in any 
way held constant. The result is that any description of the Syrian conflict written on a 
Monday in January of one year will be out of date by February of that same year and will 
be history by January of the following year.   
These are considerations that certainly complicate the creation of a literature 
review that will stand up to scrutiny. The challenge for the researcher, therefore, centers 
upon identifying a point at which one will elect to cut off analysis of the literature and 
develop a discussion based on what may ultimately prove to be an inaccurate scenario. 
That said, this chapter of the study has been focused on events occurring in Syria up to 
January of 2017.   
This covers three presidential administrations – those of Bill Clinton, George W. 
Bush, and Barack Obama. At the discretion of the researcher, no effort was made to 
include any presidential policies which may have been developed or implemented in the 
initial months of the Trump administration. As noted above, the situation is still evolving 
in Syria and as of this writing, no significant policy initiatives had been introduced, let 
alone implemented, by the Trump administration with respect to U.S. military 
involvement in Syria itself. The only presidential initiatives under President Donald 
Trump related to Syria, as of this writing, have focused on the Syrian refugee and 
immigrant situation, neither of which are germane to the overarching research questions 
posed herein. 
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The bulk of the chapter was focused on a description of the Syrian policies of 
three very different American presidential administrations and the theoretical or 
ideological orientation of those administrations. As Goldberg (2016) pointed out in his 
quite extensive analysis of the Obama policy orientation, while all three of these 
presidents have employed aspects of Realism as a fundamental theory of policy 
development, their perception of the proper role of a U.S. policy differed.   
Where we see President Clinton exhibiting a somewhat optimistic belief in the 
capacity of Syria under Hafez Al Assad to play the role of peace broker in the Middle 
East, no such perspective is identified in the views of either President Bush or President 
Obama. Clintonian engagement and enlargement gave way to preemption and democracy 
promotion and nation building under President Bush. In turn, President Bush’s interest in 
these policy concerns was not central to the decisions made by President Obama, whom 
Goldberg (2016) says resisted calls for action because he assumed, based on intelligence 
given to him, that Assad would fall without U.S. involvement.   
Of course, this did not occur and President Obama departed from liberal 
interventionists and refused to escalate U.S. military participation in Syria beyond the use 
of drones and military advice. In fact, as Goldberg (2016) says, Obama did not believe 
that the U.S. could succeed militarily and that any effort to do so would be disastrous. 
This dovetails with his conviction that President George W. Bush acted without adequate 
forethought in the case of Iraq, something that President Obama refused to contemplate in 
the case of Syria. These issues will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4. 
Included in this chapter was a brief case comparison of two seminal events in 
which a sovereign nation-state employed chemical weapons against its own people and/or 
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against an acknowledged enemy. This case was included to illustrate how a particularly 
troubling, devastating, and admittedly inhumane use of weaponry influenced the 
formation of American foreign policy. The case demonstrates that when Saddam Hussein 
used chemical weapons against rival Iran in the Iran-Iraq war and against dissident Kurds 
and others in Iraq itself, the United States instituted a no-fly zone over Iraq that prevented 
Saddam Hussein from using chemical weapons or bombs against his own people.  
President Obama, having drawn a red line in the sand, nevertheless did not 
intervene on the ground in Syria or established a no-fly zone when it became apparent 
that Basher Al Assad was using chemical weapons against his people (Goldberg, 2016). 
What this suggests, perhaps, is that as heinous as the use of chemical weapons may be, it 
in and of itself is not something that is likely to generate a change in Obama’s foreign 
policy. 
In sum, this chapter of the study serves as the foundation for the forthcoming 
analysis; Chapter 4 will describe the critical differences between the three presidential 
administrations with respect to the Syrian issue. It also offers a foundation on which a 
detailed description of the potentials for coalition building can be presented; this will 
occur in Chapter 5. The study will conclude in Chapter 4 with answers to the research 
questions posed herein and recommendations for using Coalition Building to bring about 
a peaceful end to the Syrian crisis. That chapter will also include recommendations for 
further research. Before the analysis, however, a discussion of the methodology is 
necessary; this will occur in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Research Questions and Sub-questions 
As noted in Chapter 1, the purpose of this study was to employ a qualitative 
research method (i.e., the unique case study) to develop an answer to the following 
overarching research question: 
What are the likely effects of a transformation in American policy towards Syria 
that would include “boots on the ground” military intervention designed to stabilize a 
country that is torn apart by war and the insurgence of military Islam seeking to establish 
a new Caliphate? 
The research sub-questions explored in the dissertation are:  
1. What specific theoretical perspectives have been employed by the Clinton, Bush, 
and Obama presidential administrations in the design and implementation of 
foreign policy toward Syria? 
2. What are the situational elements that have contributed, over time and in the 
present, to the development of American foreign policy toward Syria?  
What a theory-based study of this type does is to offer a unique opportunity to examine 
real world applications of theoretical constructs and to assess their viability and their 
capacity for long-term use. As Babbie (2004) pointed out, case studies allow for 
investigation of relevant materials and the development of a comprehensive 
understanding of those materials.   
Research Design 
A unique case study design is the research methodology employed. The 
qualitative method known as the case study is described by Reissman (2008) as a 
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narrative research strategy that produces context dependent knowledge. Rather than 
operating from rules, experts operate on the basis of detailed case knowledge. While 
rules-based knowledge and predictive theories are also used in the social sciences, they 
are relatively rare in this particular discipline. What the case study provides is the 
opportunity to focus attention on narrative details because, as Reissman (2008) put it, 
“important insights can unfold from the many sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting 
stories of actors in the field” (p.194). 
The six steps involved in the case study are: 
x Determine and define the research questions  
x Select the cases and determine data gathering and analysis techniques  
x Prepare to collect the data  
x Collect data in the field  
x Evaluate and analyze the data  
x Prepare the report  
The steps are followed sequentially. 
Levy (2008) examined the use of case studies in international relations and argued 
that the unique case study can fall under the aegis of theoretical, interpretive, hypothesis 
generating, theory confirming, theory informing, and/or deviant cases. Such typologies, 
including the unique case study, combine research objectives and case selection 
techniques. Inductive case studies include plausibility probes and are particularly useful, 
according to Levy (2008), when one is dealing with autonomous nation states with 
potentially conflicting goals and objectives. An example given by Levy (2008) is the 
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Cuban missile crisis, which can be approached as a single case or as an assortment of 
cases.   
Bennett and Elman (2007) reviewed the key role that case study methods have 
played in the study of international relations in the United States. These researchers 
referred to a variety of case study strategies and also noted that such studies include 
comparisons of different national revolutions such as those of the United States, Russia, 
France, Iran, China, and Mexico as well as most similar case comparisons of the Fashoda 
Crisis (a diplomatic crisis between Britain and France at the end of the nineteenth 
century) and the Spanish-American War (a conflict between a democracy and an 
autocratic state). In other words, even in a unique case study, it is possible to introduce 
comparative cases or examples to garner additional understanding of the primary case 
itself.  
Deviant cases, which may well be unique cases (such as the present case), are 
seen by Bennett and Elman (2007) as offering an opportunity to consider theory via a 
small N study.  Finland’s war with Great Britain during World War II is one example of 
such a case. Qualitative international relations scholars, described by Bennett and Elman 
(2007) as mainly political realists, use case study to examine issues such as the national 
use of military power, the rise of the United States as an expansionist state, and the 
formation of the Chinese empire. The unique case study can also compare and contrast 
positions of two rival parties with respect to the situation of a third party, as is the focus 
herein. 
The “unique case” is that of the Syrian conflict itself. The conflict and the 
necessity of developing a viable and effective set of foreign policy initiatives that would 
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serve the interests of the United States has been an issue for some time. This includes the 
presidential administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. As the 
BBC (2013) pointed out, over time, the conflict in Syria has expanded to include what 
appears to be an ever-larger group of actors on the ground. Equally affected are actors 
outside of Syria, including, but not limited to, neighboring countries such as Lebanon, 
Turkey, and Jordan as well as countries in the European Union which have become the 
destination of many Syrians fleeing the war.   
Other regional actors such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have a vested 
interest in the outcome of the conflict (BBC, 2013). The entry of the coalition led by the 
United States and the subsequent entry of Russia into the conflict further complicates the 
process of creating a viable policy framework for the United States. For this reason, the 
unique case of the Syrian conflict was viewed herein under the general umbrella of Small 
N research described as “an inquiry investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Dooley, 2002, p. 338). 
The methodology, therefore, can encompass an historical analysis strategy, as is 
the case here (Lange, 2013). While Syria’s conflict is the case, the comparative elements 
consist of the policy initiatives of three separate American presidential administrations. 
As the preceding review of literature demonstrated, it is clear that Presidents Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama employed substantially different doctrinal foundations in selecting 
their responses to the Syrian conflict as well as other critical geopolitical crises and 
events. Because this is the case, the use of a comparative-historical Small N strategy has 
facilitated the process of contrasting initiatives that have both similar and dissimilar 
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characteristics. It is this feature of Small N comparative-historical research that allows 
one to draw meaningful conclusions about a complex case and a case that can be seen as 
changing over time (Lieberson, 1991).  
Such case studies have been characterized by Ragin (1989) as inherently 
interpretive and oriented toward the task of accounting for “specific historical outcomes 
or sets of comparable outcomes or processes” (p. 3). The rigor of a Small N study rests 
upon a systematic assessment of these similarities and differences. Where Small N case 
studies diverge from the characteristics and techniques commonly employed in 
quantitative analysis is in terms of the emphasis on descriptive analytic strategies rather 
than one dependent on inferential statistical analysis tools.  
Small N studies have a fundamentally deterministic, as opposed to a probabilistic, 
approach. These studies seek to answer questions of why, how, and/or when certain 
events occur or certain policies were developed, as is the case herein. As a case study 
strategy, such an approach is useful when it is impossible to manipulate the behavior of 
actors whose actions are the focus of the study and when it is essential to examine 
contextual conditions assumed to be relevant to the phenomena being examined (Baxter 
& Jack, 2008). 
The methodological logic of the unique and Small N case study is consistent with 
an effort to derive observational implications while simultaneously considering the 
observations in light of empirical observations. The approach requires the exercise of 
reason and care in selecting the case, determining variables, examining relationships, and 
considering the case in the context of one or more theoretical lenses. Such a strategy, said 
129 
 
Lange (2013), further permits a researcher to optimize insights and to address the 
challenge of balancing the very general and the very particular. 
It is possible to consider the Syrian conflict as a single case while acknowledging 
that U.S. foreign policies impacting on Syria are not a single entity and that these policies 
have, in fact, changed over time. Each of the three American presidential administrations 
can be said to have some similarities. Each has lasted, or will last, for eight years or two 
full presidential terms.  Each administration has faced the necessity of periodically 
reevaluating existing policies vis-à-vis Syria in particular and the Middle East and North 
Africa in general. Each of the three presidents (Clinton, Bush, and Obama) have had to 
deal with multiple foreign crises over the course of their time in office. Each of these 
presidents has been forced to modify policies over time. 
That said, the analysis also reveals that, as the literature suggests, there are 
significant differences among these U.S. presidents. Therefore, the goal of this research 
methodology is to explore the possible causal antecedents of policy shifts in the target 
timeframe. This is to some extent an example of what is known as policy process tracing, 
itself a case based approach to causal inference. Causal inferences, as identified by Lange 
(2013), include various types. Often, there are many causes for a single effect or causes 
may be dependent on time variables. Identical causes may generate different outcomes; 
they themselves may be the product of multiple causes that are interdependent or 
examples of circular causality. Process tracing allows for examining how different causal 
mechanisms create opportunities for policy changes or transformations.  These are the 
essential elements of the case study methodology that was employed in this research 
effort.   
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In sum, the case study may not offer insights and rigor that are comparable to 
other methods from the quantitative realm (Babbie, 2004). Nevertheless, qualitative case 
studies allow a researcher to embrace both quantitative data and multiple research 
paradigms. As described by Baxter and Jack (2008), this method allows one to examine 
multiple studies, to explore issues of mass mobilization and strategy via a variety of data 
sources, and to provide a detailed examination of concepts and theories that allow for the 
development and testing of historical explanations that may be generalized to other 
events.   
Independent and Dependent Variables 
The independent variable in this study was identified as the presidential 
administration.  Thus, the three independent variables consist of the eight-year-long 
administrations of U.S. Presidents Bill, Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama.   
The dependent variable consists of foreign policy initiatives specific to Syria. This 
variable is many-faceted, consisting of such initiatives as sanctions (economic and 
otherwise), military interventions (e.g. military advisors, equipment/weapons supplies, 
physical presence of troops in the theater of war, use of drones or air assaults, etc.), 
humanitarian aid (direct and indirect), and/or sole vs. coalition engagement.     
Data Collection and Analysis 
The study employed a highly focused literature review and thematic analysis that 
was based upon am assortment of relevant primary and secondary source materials. This 
included government documents, presidential statements, United Nations resolutions, 
scholarly analyses, mainstream press reports, and theoretical texts. It proceeded as a form 
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of content analysis over the course of several months during which research materials 
were assembled, analyzed, compared, and contrasted.  
Any study employing a literature review as the research design and method, as 
described by Babbie (2004), is exploratory rather than explanatory in nature. It is based 
on an assessment of published literature, observations, theory, and case analyses. It may 
generate new data by reinterpreting previously generated data sets, but for the most part, 
qualitative research is narrative rather than statistical.  
Similarly, the central and dominant goal of any research study is to explain 
systematically and predict discipline-specific phenomena (Babbie, 2004). In the case of a 
literature review, explanation rather than prediction is predominant. According to Babbie 
(2004), explanation can be achieved via qualitative or quantitative research 
methodologies. Babbie further noted that before any quantitative study of an educational, 
religious, sociopolitical, or purely political phenomena is undertaken, a qualitative 
research effort is a fundamental necessity. Such an approach enables the researcher to 
identify relevant variables affecting a specific situation and narrowly define the area to be 
quantitatively investigated.  
A literature review is distinct from quantitative research, and serves one or more 
of four purposes:   
x Description, to reveal the nature of a phenomenon; 
x Interpretation, to gain insights about the nature of a phenomenon, develop new 
concepts or theoretical perspectives about the phenomenon, or discover problems 
within the phenomenon; 
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x Verification of certain assumptions, theories, or generalizations within real world 
contexts; and 
x Evaluation to judge the effectiveness of particular policies, practices, or 
innovations (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). 
As a qualitative study, sampling strategy herein refers solely to obtaining 
appropriate materials for analysis. Using a variety of published materials – speeches, 
policy statements, press releases, scholarly commentary, executive orders, and so on – the 
study analyzed these materials and provided a foundation for identifying key themes and 
issues. The analysis also included secondary materials, such as commentary by scholarly 
analysts, and reports from the popular press. When and where possible, statistical data are 
included in the analysis, which would seek to answer the questions of why and how 
rather than what.   
Access to data is not an issue of any significance. The Internet provides near 
instantaneous access to a wide range and variety of popular and scholarly materials. It 
also contains public statements and policy documents published by governments and 
international organizations. Consequently, there was a wealth of information available for 
the research process. The resulting challenge for the researcher centered on selection of 
appropriate materials for inclusion.    
Using targeted Boolean keyword and phrase searches on a variety of scholarly 
Internet databases, the aforementioned narrative materials were assembled over time. The 
challenge was not finding relevant materials, but rather limiting selection of such 
materials. Nexus/Lexus, ProQuest, and EBSCO Host as well as a general Google search 
provided near instantaneous access to a wide variety of relevant sources.  
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The data were analyzed through what amounts to content analysis. This is, as 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) noted, a strategy for finding key themes expressed as terms or 
phrases in a set of documents. The strategy is clearly a narrative method that looks at 
what is said and finds meaning in what is said and what is written. It allows for what 
Reissman (2008) described as understanding of unity and coherence over time, 
generating knowledge that is useful in understanding and comparing experiences and 
situations in historical contexts. Therefore, as a form of narrative analysis, this particular 
strategy provides a unique opportunity to explore an event that is timely and of vital 
significance in determining the overall safety and security of an entire region. In 
qualitative research studies, data may be analyzed using descriptive or inferential 
statistics or through narrative methods (Reissman, 2008). These processes tend to be 
sequential with the research question preceding a determination of what data will be 
collected, who will participate, instrument development, ethical concerns, and instrument 
administration. 
Data were analyzed using the basic steps of content analysis. These are: 
1. Copy and read the texts - make brief notes in the margin when interesting or 
relevant information is found; 
2. Go through the notes made in the margins and list the different types of 
information found; 
3. Read through the list and categorize each item in a way that offers a description of 
what it is about; 
4. Identify whether or not the categories can be linked any way and list them as 
major categories (or themes) and/or minor categories (or themes); 
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5. Compare and contrast the various major and minor categories; 
6. If there is more than one text, repeat the first five stages again for each transcript; 
7. When you have done the above with all of the texts, collect all of the categories or 
themes and examine each in detail and consider if it fits and its relevance; 
8. Once all the data is categorized into minor and major categories/themes, review in 
order to ensure that the information is categorized as it should be; 
9. Review all of the categories and ascertain whether some categories can be merged 
or if some need to them be sub-categorized; and 
10. Return to the original transcripts and ensure that all the information that needs to 
be categorized has been so (The ten steps to content analysis, 2013, p. 1). 
Based on these steps, the data were summarized and presented as indicated in a narrative 
format in Chapter Four.   
Ethical Considerations 
A note about ethics is necessary at this point.  As Babbie (2004) suggests, case 
studies do not involve any sort of manipulation of individuals. No interventions are 
required.  Confidentiality and anonymity for sources is not an issue in light of the fact 
that all materials have already entered the public domain via publication.    
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
The present study was limited due to the research design. Literature reviews have 
limitations that quantitative research does not due to the nature of the design. It limits the 
ability to generalize the results to the larger population, in this case, other U.S. 
presidential administrations or, for that matter, the leadership and policies of other 
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countries. Because the study is a narrative, literature-based review, it does not develop 
new primary data, nor does it test any hypothesis or intervention with human subjects.   
While this study was a synthesis of literature, and not a meta-analysis (which 
directly compares the findings of studies that are selected in accordance with specific 
inclusion criteria), the present study provided a foundation on which professionals in the 
field of foreign policy development can compare and contrast the efficacy of different 
approaches to a specific geopolitical relationship.   
The study is delimited to the initiatives of three U.S. Presidents, one of whom 
recently left office, ushering in a new U.S. presidential administration. Further, the 
situation in Syria has proven in recent years and months to be exceptionally fluid and 
volatile.  New actors – ISIS/ISIL, Russia, and Iran – have entered into the conflict and 
reshaped it and its effects. Constructing the assortment of narrative texts (i.e., elements of 
the literature review) was further complicated by the evolving nature of the Syrian 
conflict.   
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Chapter 4: Comparison of Three Presidential Administrations 
Introduction 
From the time that President Bill Clinton took office to the recent inauguration of 
President Donald J. Trump, the Middle East has been a central focus of American foreign 
policy development and strategy. Throughout this period, as various analysts have noted, 
a number of regional crises impacting upon the nations of the Middle East and the allies 
of those countries have occupied the attention of American presidents (Jones, 2016). To 
argue that U.S. policy in the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama eras has been 
an activist policy is to understate the case (Goldberg, 2016). Each of these American 
presidents has been called upon one or more times to develop a coordinated policy 
response to Middle Eastern crises that have gone well beyond the endemic conflict 
between Israel and her Arab neighbors. As Sodaro (2004) noted over a decade ago, the 
Middle East has been a hotbed of both internal conflict and cross-border conflict, often 
experiencing multiple conflicts simultaneously and thereby challenging outside actors to 
implement policies that are able to assist in crisis resolution while also protecting 
domestic interests. 
In Chapter 2, Review of Literature, a lengthy discussion of the policies toward 
Syria under Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama was presented. In each case, efforts 
were undertaken to determine which particular theory of international relations was most 
applicable. In general, James Mann (2014) may very well be correct in his assertion that 
regardless of the specific elements that an American president in the post-World War II 
era chooses to incorporate in foreign policy, all of the serving presidents since that time 
have been to some extent or another Realists. As discussed earlier, Realism is a theory of 
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international relations that pursues a balance of power, works to protect the interests of 
the nation-state, and perceives the state as the primary actor in the global political 
environment (Gilpin, 1984; Murray, 1997; Owens, 2007). 
With some critical differences, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama can be 
viewed as Realists whose individual “doctrines” reflect the conviction that the world is 
characterized by conditions of ambiguity (Zahariadis, 2014) that give rise to instability, 
which must be managed in order to provide for acceptable levels of growth and domestic 
security (McGraw, 2001). Of course, that said, none of the three presidents can be 
characterized as “pure” or classical Realists, because each brought to their presidency 
both a unique approach to geopolitics and the necessity of adapting U.S. policies in 
response to the exigencies of volatile external situations. 
This chapter of the study seeks to directly compare and contrast Clintonian, Bush, 
and Obama Realism approaches vis-à-vis the single case of Syria. It will demonstrate that 
for each of these post-Cold War presidents, Realism was the foundation on which 
alternate ideological postures such as Clinton’s Liberalism, Bush’s Neoconservatism, and 
Obama’s Idealism were grafted. It is these grafts or individual contributions that most 
clearly delineate the policy differences of the three target administrations. One must also 
add that of the three presidents, it was President Bush whose policies in the Middle East 
contained elements of boots on the ground military engagement (Jones, 2016). While it is 
true that President Obama took office while the U.S. military was actively engaged on the 
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan as a consequence of decisions by President Bush and 
equally true that President Obama’s administration continued to deploy military force in 
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both Iraq and Syria, there are critical differences between the Bush military strategy in 
the region and that of Obama (Goldberg, 2016). 
Three Doctrines 
President Bill Clinton (2000) stated that fundamental to his foreign policy 
orientation was determining an answer to the question of what are the consequences to 
American security of allowing conflicts to fester and spread. The Clinton Doctrine 
centered on concepts of enlargement and engagement. Clinton (2000b) described 
enlargement and engagement in “A National Security Strategy for a New Century” as 
based on differentiating between national and humanitarian interests. The former he 
characterized as those matters that do not affect national survival but which do affect 
national well-being and the character of the global environment in which the country is 
positioned.   
In his Doctrine, national interests included, but were not limited to, interests in 
regions where the country had a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies as well 
as a moral imperative to protect the global environment from severe harm. Humanitarian 
interests, in contrast, were seen by Clinton as the obligation to respond to natural and 
manmade disasters or cases where human rights are being violated or democratization 
efforts are underway.  Humanitarian interests in this perspective reflected an 
understanding of what American values, separate from American interests, demanded. 
Both the notions of enlargement and engagement reflect these perspectives, which were 
evident in Clinton’s response to events taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo on the one 
hand and the ongoing Arab-Israeli crisis on the other hand.   
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The Clinton approach to Realism was also based on the notion that the United 
States was an indispensable nation – a nation that, because of its unique history and its 
philosophical orientation, had a role to play in ensuring that American privileges were 
extended to other countries (Mann, 2014). Engagement and enlargement embraced 
protection of the American national interest (Miller, 1994), but Syria in and of itself did 
not play a major role in Clinton’s policy efforts. What mattered to Clinton, with respect 
to Syria, was the role played by Syria with respect to conflict between Israel and groups 
such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  
As a Realist, Clinton (2000; Clinton & Assad, 1994) was thoroughly cognizant of 
the potential usefulness of Syria as a mediator in the Middle East and also as a direct 
supporter of those non-state actors seeking the destruction of the Israeli state. Clinton is 
said to have wanted to facilitate the emergence of a world in which the United States, 
though indispensable, was not the only super power capable of bringing combatants to 
the table and brokering a resolution to conflict. Certainly, Clinton was pragmatic in his 
willingness to work with Syria and President Hafiz Al Assad, who was viewed by many 
in the U.S. Congress as a terrorist or at least a sponsor of terrorism and as a key obstacle 
to any peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Hillman, 2000; Miller, 1994). 
Realist theory can help to explain to some extent Clinton’s willingness to work 
with the Al Assad regime despite the fact that this regime was authoritarian and 
oppressive with respect to its own people and its neighbors. Colucci (2013) takes the 
position that in addition to being a Realist, Clinton himself was a soft liberal – an 
individual who perceived the potential for a benign world that was governed by 
globalism, free markets, and cultural transfer. Such an attitude is optimistic rather than 
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pessimistic, and pessimism, of course, is a key feature of Realism. Despite this caveat, 
one can conclude that the Clinton approach to foreign policy in general and to Syria in 
particular represents a Realist effort to engage a country in an ongoing dialogue giving 
rise to a relationship that could benefit all concerned.    
As Franks (2006) has suggested, the concepts of enlargement and engagement as 
promoted by President Clinton directly evolve from the Realist conviction that the global 
state system functions because of political relationships between governing institutions. 
These political relationships are critical if the global political order is to survive and if 
any progress is to be made with respect to resolving conflicts.   
It is worth noting, as Collucci (2013) did, that President Clinton was, at best, a 
reluctant commander in chief when it came to deploying American military forces. The 
entire boots on the ground strategy of military engagement was exercised by Clinton only 
a few times during his presidency to any great extent. Twenty-one individual military 
engagements occurred on President Clinton’s watch, but of those engagements, only a 
few involved any significant number of military forces. Colucci (2013) identified the use 
of 20,000 or so military troops in Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. 
President Clinton also used air strikes, including in the case of raids against suspected 
training terrorist camps in Afghanistan, and a suspected chemical weapons manufacturer 
in Sudan.   
A limited number of initiatives undertaken by President Clinton deployed 
American military forces to increase security forces at U.S. embassies, assist in the 
evacuation of American citizens from hot spots, or to participate in NATO and/or United 
Nations activities such as that in Macedonia in 1993 and 1994. President Clinton did 
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increase the number of American troops in Somalia from 5,300 to 7,000 in what is very 
likely to have been his most substantive use of military force as part of his foreign policy 
(Colucci, 2013).  
As has been suggested elsewhere herein, President George W. Bush took office at 
a time when many in the United States were dissatisfied with Clintonian policies both 
foreign and domestic (Krauthammer, 2005). The Realism tempered by the Liberal 
posture of President Clinton did not resonate particularly well with many of the more 
conservative Realists who supported President George W. Bush, or, for that matter, with 
President Bush himself. Even before the terrorist attack on 9/11 that became the dominant 
determinant of the Bush Doctrine, the Bush White House had moved away from 
Liberalism and embraced the notion that democratization and democracy building were 
in the best interests of the United States. Krauthammer (2005) said the Bush Doctrine 
incorporated elements that were not found in the Clinton Doctrine of enlargement and 
engagement. These elements were unilateralism, the use of pre-emptive strikes against 
enemies, support for democratic regime change, and direct attacks, both economic and 
military in nature, on countries that harbor terrorists (Malici & Buckner, 2008). 
Bush (2007) also saw the United States as an indispensable nation, particularly 
after 9/11, when there was no doubt that American interests and the American homeland 
had been directly attacked by a determined enemy who happened to be a non-state actor, 
albeit one supported by state actors (Malici & Buckner, 2008). The Clintonian optimism 
left the building, so to speak, after 9/11, when pessimism based on actual experience of 
revealing America’s vulnerability entered that building. Certainly, President George W. 
Bush had no problem positioning American boots on the ground in the Middle East, 
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where two of the countries contained in the Axis of Evil (Iraq and Iran) enjoyed some 
support (tacit or otherwise) from Syria. While Syria per se was not a central focus of 
President Bush’s preemption program in the Middle East, the country was well within the 
orbit of those countries that were attacked.   
Additionally, Realism can be seen as instrumental in leading President Bush to 
view Syria with skepticism and to take steps such as those embedded in the Syria 
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. Bush (2003) 
introduced the use of sanctions against Syria and clearly linked these sanctions to other 
actions that he was undertaking in the invasion of Iraq. Sanctions such as those presented 
by President Bush (2003; 2004) were a direct move away from enlargement and 
engagement and a reflection of President Bush’s conviction that the security environment 
that he confronted, and which threatened the United States, was radically different from 
the environment in which President Clinton functioned.   
While Clintonian policies vis-a-vis Syria sought to engage Syria as a partner in 
resolving the larger Arab-Israeli crisis, it is clear that President Bush did not in any way 
see Syria as a potential partner in this process. Further, whereas Clinton approached the 
entire Middle East issue through the lens of the Arab-Israeli conflict (at least for the most 
part), President Bush had other concerns in the region. Not only did President Bush want 
to eliminate the putative threat posed by Iraq’s supposed possession of weapons of mass 
destruction and the support given by Iraq and Syria to terrorists, he also wanted to foster 
democratization in Iraq (McArthur, 2004).  
Neoconservatism in general is hostile toward authoritarianism and communism 
while extremely supportive of democratization and the belief that only through the 
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actions of democracies will global stability be achieved and then maintained (Muravchik, 
2007). This is a description that certainly fits the Bush Doctrine, which was used not only 
to justify a military boots-on-the ground invasion of both Iraq and Afghanistan, but also 
to explicitly lend support to sanctions against Syria as yet another rogue state 
destabilizing the Middle East. President Bush (2007) was convinced that bringing 
democracy to the Middle East in states that had previously been run by actual or virtual 
dictators was necessary for the United States. President Bush believed as a matter of faith 
that only by promoting democracy would peace be achieved and that only through 
unfortunate, but sometimes necessary, unilateral action would the United States achieve 
its goals with respect to security and stability. 
One should certainly point out, as does Sodaro (2004), that the world in which 
President George W. Bush functioned as president of the United States was a very 
different world than the one in which President Clinton functioned. While it is true that a 
terrorist attack on the United States in New York City had occurred on Clinton’s watch 
(the first attack on the World Trade Center), the scope of 9/11 was much more extensive 
and the impact more devastating (Sodaro, 2004). Putting an end to the threat was the goal 
of President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, employing preemption in this particular case 
because he saw it as a necessary exercise of the country’s inherent right of self-defense 
(Bush, 2007). 
Thus, one can see a dramatic shift in the Realist trajectories of the policies of 
Presidents Clinton and Bush. Liberalism, to the extent that it was present in the Clinton 
Doctrine, disappeared from President Bush’s National Security Strategy, which called for 
confronting threats before they materialized and advancing liberty and democracy as very 
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real and achievable alternatives to ideologies of repression and fear. Parenthetically, one 
should note that President Bush (2007) supported a general political platform that called 
for supporting NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and 
Central Asia. While willing to act unilaterally if needed, President Bush also saw the 
value of building coalitions, which Cakmak (2007) contends is also elemental within the 
Realist approach to international relationships. This is because few countries, including 
an indispensable superpower, are ultimately able to go it alone.    
In describing President Bush’s use of military intervention, Chivers and Schmidt 
(2015) make the case that the Bush Doctrine incorporated a collection of strategy 
principles, practical policy decisions, and a set of rationales designed to guide and inform 
U.S. foreign policy.  
Involving the military was integral to this Doctrine because President Bush and 
his administration were convinced that the United States was locked in a global war of 
clashing ideologies. It would appear that President Bush accepted many of the ideas 
advanced by Huntington (1996). Jervis (2003) suggested that President Bush perceived 
the U.S. as under attack by a combination of failing states and nongovernmental or non-
state actors who were hostile toward the United States and her interests.   
Realists tend to view the world with a highly pessimistic viewpoint and to 
perceive their country as challenged by multiple threats, demanding a response. It is from 
this basic posture that President Bush authorized extensive use of U.S. military assets in 
the Middle East and in Afghanistan. His position was also influenced by a fundamental 
conviction that democratic regime change was necessary not only for the United States, 
but also for the countries that it would most immediately impact. We must therefore 
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conclude that whereas President Clinton was a Realist with a strong tendency towards 
Liberalism, President Bush was a Realist who was influenced by the desire to spread 
democracy throughout the world.  
When President Barack Obama took office after the election of 2008, his election 
signaled the likelihood of a shift from President Bush’s emphasis on military intervention 
to foreign policies that would rely on other strategies. Judis (2014) also points out that it 
is unlikely that President Obama considered that it was possible to structure a new and 
more productive and mutually supportive relationship between the Muslim world and the 
West. He clearly did not believe, as did President Bush, that the Huntington (1996) thesis 
regarding clashes of civilizations was valid or that conflict between disparate civilizations 
was inevitable.  
It is necessary to understand that President Obama took office as a former senator 
who had opposed American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and as a presidential 
candidate who was committed to reducing American involvement in foreign wars. 
Moreover, President Obama did not believe that it was the obligation of the United States 
to participate in nation building or democratization (Hinnebusch et al., 2010).   
The Obama Doctrine was, as noted above, described extensively by Goldberg 
(2016). It included a number of elements that were drawn from a diverse set of 
ideological and philosophical postures. Obama was a Realist, but he was also 
simultaneously a moral Utilitarian (Mann, 2014). Unlike President Bush, President 
Obama did not see the United States as in any way obligated to facilitate democratization 
through the use of military force. Like President Bush, President Obama did see that there 
were some occasions for the unilateral deployment of American military forces, but he 
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was equally convinced that such actions should be undertaken only when national core 
interests require such actions. He did not believe that indirect causes or humanitarian 
crises were sufficient (Murray, 2013). 
Interventionism was not a central tenet of the Obama Doctrine, as it was in the 
Bush Doctrine. Here, one is tempted to argue that President Obama shared some of the 
views of President Clinton, particularly with regard to the use of American military in 
support of an intervention undertaken by coalitions such as those of NATO and the 
United Nations. Certainly, there was a much more idealistic and optimistic thread running 
through the Obama Doctrine than that of President Bush.  President Obama was at best 
reluctant to use such Bush era phrases as “radical Islamic terrorism” or “global war on 
terrorism.” President Obama also called for engagement with the Muslim world, which 
seems to speak more to Clintonian ideas than those of President Bush. 
President Obama felt that the United States was a necessary leader on the global 
stage but did not believe that U.S. military action should be the only, or even the primary, 
mechanism for putting American leadership into play (Monteleone, 2015). President 
Obama also felt that partnerships rather than preemption should be fundamental elements 
in foreign policy and that putting American military forces on the ground or in a theater 
of war should be undertaken as a last resort.   
This is not to say that President Obama was unwilling to use certain kinds of 
military activity to achieve policy initiatives, as was the case in Syria. He did send some 
3,500 special operations forces into Syria to help fight ISIS but his primary strategy 
against ISIS in Syria was the use of drone attacks. Sanctions and other economic tools 
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played a more significant role in Obama’s foreign policy initiatives than they did in those 
of either Clinton or Bush.   
Abdul-Aziz (2014) has commented that in the early years of the first Obama 
administration there were some signs of a return to concepts of enlargement and 
engagement but these aspects of Obama’s foreign policy were thwarted to a large extent 
by the refusal of a number of Muslim states to accept engagement on American terms. In 
Syria, the infamous red line is said to have highlighted President Obama’s extreme 
reluctance to use military engagement as a major foreign policy tool (Judis, 2014).   
After the Iraq war, liberals, according to Mann (2014), regarded Realism as a 
reflection of anti-interventionist policies. President Obama began his term in office as a 
fairly classic Realist who did not want to act in a way that would be in any detrimental to 
the fundamental interests of the United States. However, while President Obama 
distanced himself from a number of Middle Eastern hot spots, he did appear to become 
convinced, as a consequence of the Arab Spring, that a new wave of democratic change 
was in fact emerging in the Middle East. Consequently, the president chose to abandon 
American ties to Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and to authorize the use of force 
against Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi with the intent of forcing him out of office.  He 
justified these strategies by stating that the U.S. supported a set of universal rights and 
opposed those authoritarian regimes that denied fundamental freedoms to their people 
(Mann, 2014). 
He refused consistently to commit American troops to Syria and oversaw the 
withdrawal of American troops en masse from Iraq. Goldberg (2016) takes the position 
that President Obama favored diplomacy over military involvement and engagement via 
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non-military strategies and actions. To the extent that he was an idealist, President 
Obama felt that it was certainly possible for the United States to pursue the protection of 
its own interests while assuming a leadership position in the world that emphasized 
humanitarian responses over military ones. During President Obama’s time in office, 
humanitarian intervention was supported over military intervention.   
Friedman (2013) suggested that President Obama was certainly cognizant of the 
threat posed by ISIS/ISIL and was aware of the ways in which Russia was assuming a 
dominant role in Syria. That said, critics of President Obama and his policy on Syria have 
argued that he lacked both vision and adequate strength with respect to pursuing 
necessary actions that would have prevented many of the atrocities that took place in 
Syria (Friedman, 2013). 
With these comments in mind, some fairly broad conclusions can be advanced as 
to the ideological orientation of the three presidents discussed herein. These conclusions 
are reflected in the following table, which was constructed by the researcher based upon 
the foregoing narrative.   
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Table 1 
Policy Ideology of Three Presidents 
Clinton Bush Obama 
Realist: Realist: Realist: 
World is hostile World is very hostile World is sometimes hostile 
x Non-military 
engagement is 
needed 
x Support global 
organizations  
x Sanctions 
x Diplomacy 
 
x Boots on ground 
x Pre-emption 
x Sanctions 
x Coalitions 
x Diplomacy 
x Military engagement 
rarely needed/useful 
x Peacebuilding 
x Sanctions 
x Coalitions 
x “Leading from 
behind” 
x Diplomacy 
x Limited use of 
ground 
troops/emphasis on 
drone warfare 
Humanitarian intervention Humanitarian intervention Humanitarian Intervention 
Coalitions/Partnerships 
valued 
Unilateralism 
Acceptable/Necessary 
Coalitions/Partnerships 
Essential  
Other influences: Liberalism Other influences: 
Neoconservatism, 
Democratization 
Other influences:  
Idealism 
Engagement & Enlargement Military Solutions when 
under attack 
Engagement and Non-
interventionism 
The foregoing summary highlights the conclusion that all three of the presidents 
discussed in this study were essentially Realists who incorporated other theoretical or 
ideological positions into their policy decisions. One could argue, as does Zahariadis 
(2014), that each of these political actors reflect the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), 
in that they exercised their authority in situations that were ambiguous, chaotic at times, 
and subject to varying degrees of volatility. As a consequence, each of these Realists 
have acknowledged that the state is first and foremost committed to protecting its own 
interests, and, secondly, committed to addressing a number of goals and objectives that 
do not directly speak to national security or core interests. Because this is the case, one 
would expect, as has proven to be the case, that each of the presidents who have served 
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the United States in the past 24 years have at times retreated from a classically Realist 
position to a somewhat more modified position in which other interests become 
paramount. Certainly, Presidents Bush and Obama illustrate the reality of a necessity of 
responding to changing geopolitical circumstances, as is readily apparent in the case of 
Syria. 
Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter brought together elements of the foreign policies of Presidents 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama with a view toward answering the research sub-question of 
what specific theoretical perspectives have been used by these three U.S. presidents to 
design and implement foreign policies toward Syria. First, it should be acknowledged that 
President Clinton’s involvement with the Syrian question was much more limited than 
that of President Bush, whose own concerns regarding Syria were significantly less than 
those of President Obama due to President Bush’s focus on Iraq and the Iraq war. That 
said, it is important to recognize that each of these three presidents continued to function 
in the Realist tradition that has permeated American foreign policy since World War II 
(Murray, 1987; Patapan, 2012).    
Whereas Presidents Clinton and Obama appear to have taken many steps to avoid 
unilateral American activity, President Bush not only embraced unilateralism but made it 
a fundamental element in his foreign policy doctrine. At the same time, President Bush 
was more committed both practically and theoretically to using American power (both 
hard and soft) to facilitate democratization in those countries where authoritarianism had 
ruled. Both Presidents Clinton and Obama emphasized, albeit to varying degrees, the 
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importance of engaging with one’s rivals or putative foes to a greater extent than did 
President Bush.   
The next chapter of this study will take up the question of which approach to 
conflict resolution appears to be most beneficial in resolving the Syrian crisis. The final 
chapter of the study will present answers to each of the primary and secondary research 
questions posed herein. It will identify possible American policy shifts under the new 
presidential administration of Donald Trump. It will offer recommendations for both 
conflict resolution and for further research on a topic that remains critical today. 
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Chapter 5: Conflict Resolution Strategy 
Introduction 
Integral to the present study is a hypothetical analysis of how Coalition Building 
Theory can be employed in bringing about a resolution to the ongoing Syrian conflict. 
Cakmak (2007) pointed out that this particular theory, though rarely employed in the 
literature on International Relations to any great extent, is particularly applicable in cases 
where there are multiple participants in a conflict with conflicting agendas, needs, and 
interests. Spangler (2003) suggests that coalitions can be temporary rather than 
permanent, but they are designed to bring about consistency in any effort to resolve a 
conflict by linking those actors with mutual goals and objectives. Similarity of interests, 
values, and goals, as Yarn (1991) suggests, makes for cohesion at the negotiating table 
and empowers individual actors far more than they would be empowered if they did not 
join forces with those with whom they share some fundamental characteristics. 
It should be noted that the purpose of this study was not to focus on creating 
either a coalition for resolving the Syrian conflict or even identifying a conflict resolution 
strategy for this conflict. The overarching goal was to compare and contrast three 
different American presidential policies relevant to Syria and, ideally, to offer an answer 
to the question of whether or not there was any likelihood that the United States would 
respond to the crisis with an enhanced military presence in the Syrian theater of war and 
conflict. This question and the secondary research questions identified in earlier chapters 
of this study will be answered in Chapter 6.   
In presenting a tentative descriptive of a coalition driven strategy for resolving the 
Syrian conflict, the study enters into new and largely hypothetical territory. No longer is 
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the United States led by President Barack Obama. The 2016 U.S. presidential election 
placed Republican Donald Trump in the White House and President Trump has as yet to 
articulate (much less implement) anything resembling a comprehensive policy vis-à-vis 
Syria. Thus, speculation as to the likely goals and objectives of a U.S. participant in any 
coalition negotiating on the Syrian question must be viewed as hypothetical. 
That said, this chapter of the study considers how both state and non-state actors 
engaged to some extent in Syria today can be brought to the negotiating table in Geneva 
or elsewhere.  The proposed strategies discussed herein acknowledge that coalition 
building is a pragmatic strategy that embodies the pursuit of power and influence and 
which functions as what Spangler (2003) characterized as a means for disempowered 
parties to develop greater influence and defend their interests. There is no doubt that 
coalitions are beneficial (Spangler, 2003). 
Coalition building is crucial in global leadership and facilitates coordinated action 
on behalf of multiple actors (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). This chapter describes the likely 
parings or partnerships that would come into being in a coalition building exercise in 
Syria. The strategy assumes that all actors (both state and non-state) will be committed to 
bringing about a permanent ceasefire and peace which would allow life in Syria to 
eventually return to something resembling normalcy. This was a point made by Kenneth 
Roth (2016), who argued that while peace talks which resumed in Geneva in January of 
2016 are now in abeyance, many of the key actors among the foreign players in Syria’s 
civil war have agreed to some basic principles. Since then, a number of talks have been 
held with various domestic and international actors participating. The next section of this 
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chapter describes the coalitions and conflict resolution processes that have thus far been 
put in place since 2011.   
History of Conflict Resolution Efforts 
Magnus Lundgren (2016) described mediation in Syria from 2011 to 2016, 
depicting a process that has moved not only in terms of its physical location but also in 
terms of the composition of the participants. According to Lundgren (2016), the process 
began with efforts by the Arab League from November 2011 through January 2012 to 
convince the Al Assad regime and the Syria opposition to begin speaking to one another; 
despite these efforts, the Arab League found it necessary to end its engagement in the 
mission to monitor the conflict.   
In 2012, the Russian Foreign Minister called for informal negotiations to take 
place in Moscow, but the Syrian National Council objected to any dialogue with the Al 
Assad regime.  Throughout 2012 and 2013, various groups, including the United Nations 
Security Council, Russia, and selected European countries attempted to broker a peace; 
however, most Western participants were determined to see the end of the Al Assad 
regime. The so-called Friends of Syria group, including France, sought to create an 
international contact group to find a solution while Joint Special Envoy for the United 
Nations and the Arab League Kofi Annan attempted to convince the opposition and the 
Syrian government to commit to a ceasefire and negotiations in March of 2012 
(Lundgren, 2016). 
Other early efforts at resolving the conflict were described by Lundgren (2016) as 
including the following: 
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x The Geneva I Conference on Syria in June of 2012 took place in Switzerland and 
was attended by the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and Kofi Annan. 
x In Tehran in August of 2012, 120 members of the Non-Aligned Movement failed 
to reach consensus on a peace resolution, while efforts in September of 2012 by 
the United Nations also failed as fighting briefly stopped and was renewed. 
x The United Nations, U.S., and Russia met at Geneva II in 2014 but failed to reach 
any agreement on bringing parties to the negotiating table and forming a transition 
government. 
x In Astana, Kazakhstan in 2015, Syrian Opposition groups convened for peace 
talks and in September of 2015, Hezbollah announced a six-month truce in 
portions of Syria held by rebels and Shiah forces.  
x Ongoing talks in Vienna involving the U.S., Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, 
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and others addressed the peace 
process with anti-government Syrian groups participating at various times but 
without any resolution regarding the role of President Bashar Al Assad. 
x In December of 2015, Syrian opposition groups, not including Kurds and Al 
Nusra, met in Riyadh with the goal of forming an opposition delegation for 
negotiating with the Syrian government but Russia rejected this group.  
x In February of 2016, the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), under the 
auspices of the United Nations and with the support of Russia and the United 
States, established a temporary ceasefire between the Syrian government and an 
American backed coalition of putatively mainstream Syrian opposition groups. 
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x In December of 2016, Turkey and Russia met in Astana, Kazakhstan to broker a 
Syrian nationwide ceasefire. The Syrian Democratic Council, ISIS, Al Nusra, and 
the Kurds were excluded from the agreement. 
x In January 2017 and February 2017, talks respectively at Astana and Geneva were 
held with the Astana Process supporting a peace framework in accord with United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (Lundgren, 2016; Astana talks 
become…, 2017). 
Beginning in January 2017, efforts have continued at both Astana and in Geneva.  
Representatives of the Syrian opposition met in Astana, representing a shift in which 
Syria opposition groups actively engaged in military operations took part in the talks, as 
opposed to Syrians with political influence alone (Astana talks become…, 2017). Under 
the title International Meeting on Syrian Settlement, the Astana talks in January 2017 
sought to support the United Nations framework for brokering peace. Iran, Russia, and 
Turkey – the three major external actors participating in the talks – formed a monitoring 
body tasked with enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and its ceasefire 
components. 
At the same time, Russia (which has emerged in the absence of the United States 
as the major player in the Syrian conflict) offered a draft of a possible constitution for the 
Republic of Syria in which elements of federalism, decentralization of authority, new 
powers for parliament, reduced presidential authority, and the elimination of Islamic 
jurisprudence as the foundation of legislation were all proposed (Kazakhstan welcomes 
results…, 2017).   
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Simultaneously, at Geneva IV, the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition, 
represented by the High Negotiations Committee, met in late February and early March 
2017 with limited progress.  At those talks, the Assad regime representative was focused 
primarily on counterterrorism. Alternatively, the opposition group was more concerned 
with political transition away from the Assad regime (Syria peace talks…, 2017). 
In March of 2017, yet another round of talks in Astana took place. Russia, Iran, 
and Turkey dominated the talks, emphasizing the urgent need to improve conditions on 
the ground through stronger enforcement of the existing ceasefire regime (Kazakhstan 
welcomes results…, 2017). It would appear that Russia, Iran, and Turkey-and not the Al 
Assad regime-are the key actors in attempting to bring about a final resolution to the 
Syrian conflict. Absent from all of these talks is the United States. Russia has apparently 
expressed a desire for others to join in these talks.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov indicated that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, and Jordan would be welcome at 
the Astana negotiating table. He also expressed hope that the Trump administration 
would join in the negotiations, but thus far there is no indication that this will actually 
occur (Astana talks end…, 2017).   
The breakthrough occurring at Astana should not, however, be considered as 
either permanent or as likely leading to an end to hostilities. Several important groups are 
not participating in these talks, including many of the Syrian opposition groups, Al 
Nusra, or ISIS/ISIL. Further, while Russia and Iran appear to be functioning with the tacit 
approval of the Al Assad regime, President Al Assad himself has not committed to any of 
the recommended restructuring activities that are inherent in the Russian peace plan. 
There is also no clear indication, as of this writing, that the opposition groups discussed 
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in previous sections of this study would also be willing to accept a settlement in which 
President Assad remains in power.   
One can conclude that as promising as the Astana talks are, renewed hostilities on 
the ground in Syria suggest that no clear resolution has emerged. In fact, in Geneva in 
March of 2017, Miles and Nebehay (2017) reported that Syrian government and 
opposition negotiators are once again trading insults as the Al Assad regime has refused 
to discuss any political transition.   The government claims instead that the future of the 
country will be settled by Syrians and not by the United States or any other external 
actor.   
There are ongoing military activities taking place on the ground. While the 
ceasefire remains in effect, at least in theory, fighting in Damascus and the Hama 
countryside has resumed. Opposition groups led by Nasr Hariri of the High Negotiations 
Committee have charged that the Assad regime killed 15 civilians and wounded 70 more 
in the last week of April, 2017 (Nabehay, 2017). The Syrian Network for Human Rights 
reported at Geneva that it had documented 948 civilians who were killed at the hands of 
the Syrian regime and Russia since the Geneva IV talks ended on March 3 of 2017 
(Nabehay, 2017).   
These developments suggest that the much-touted ceasefire brokered in large 
measure by Russia, Turkey, and Iran has failed. It is this kind of volatility that 
definitively complicates the development of a conflict resolution strategy derived from 
the principles of coalition building. Nevertheless, this is precisely the task that will be 
undertaken in the next section of this chapter of the study. 
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Building a Coalition: Resolving the Conflict 
First, it is essential to acknowledge that any successful CR effort in the case of 
Syria will, of necessity, include both state and non-state participants on the one hand, and 
domestic (i.e., Syrian) parties and external actors on the other hand. Second, given the 
presence in Syria and neighboring Iraq of the forces of the shrinking but still deadly 
ISIS/ISIL caliphate, the al-Nusra Front, and Jaysh al-Muhajirin Wa al-Ansar (Army of 
the Emigrants and Helpers; a group comprising hundreds of mostly foreign fighters, 
many of them from the North Caucasus, that was formed in March 2013), any agreement 
reached by the negotiating parties will most likely not include all parties to various 
aspects of the conflict.   
As Roth (2016) pointed out, there is no willingness on the part of either the Al 
Assad regime or the non-Jihadi Syrian opposition groups to include the self-identified 
Jihadi forces.  These groups have not been present either in the various Geneva or Astana 
negotiations. In essence, what this means is that any solution to the Syrian conflict will 
leave forces on the ground that are determined on continuing to disrupt Syrian society 
and to directly confront the Syrian government (Astana talks end..., 2017). With this in 
mind, any comprehensive effort at resolving the conflict must bring together the 
following groups.   
First, the Al Assad regime is a key participant in the resolution process. It is 
already engaged in a coalition with Russia and Iran, both of which are backing the 
established Syrian government and would undoubtedly require that any negotiations 
include ongoing acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the Al Assad regime, even if 
concessions must be made with respect to power sharing. This coalition of three states 
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will be a key element in any negotiation and its basic negotiating point will revolve 
around the maintenance of the Al Assad government in power. 
Turkey has emerged as a major external actor that is focused on resolving the 
conflict. Turkish Foreign Minister Deputy Undersecretary Sedat Onal is likely to be a key 
participant in the negotiation (Astana talks end…, 2017). Supporting Turkey at the 
negotiations, one can expect to find the UN Syria Envoy (currently Staffan de Mistura) as 
well as probable representatives of key countries in the region as well as representatives 
of the West. The United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other 
European actors may signify a coalition supporting Turkey.   
For these groups, conflicting primary goals are likely. The overarching goal of 
these state actors is to restore peace and to facilitate the rebuilding of civil society. A 
related goal will undoubtedly focus on securing some concessions from the Al Assad 
regime in order to accommodate concerns expressed by the main rebel coalitions now 
functioning in Syria. As the BBC (2013) has noted, there are as many as 1,000 armed 
opposition groups in Syria commanding as many as 100,000 fighters. While many of 
these groups are small and tend to function on a local level, some are quite powerful and 
must be participants in any negotiations.  What this means is that the main rebel 
coalitions will need to present a united front and to arrive at the negotiating table with a 
cohesive agenda for change. 
The main rebel coalitions include the Supreme Military Council of the Free 
Syrian Army and its affiliate brigades (Martyrs of Syria brigades, Northern Storm 
brigade, and the Ahar Souria/Free Men of Syria brigades). There is also the Islamic 
Front, Harak Ahar Al-Sham al-Islamiyya, Jaysh al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-
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Tawhid, Liwa al-Haqq, Kataib Ansar al-Sham, and the Kurdish Islamic Front. These 
groups are all affiliated with the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army. 
According to the BBC (2013), a number of these affiliates are either Salafists or 
otherwise in pursuit of the establishment of an Islamic state. 
The Syrian Islamic Liberation Front contains about 20 rebel groups ranging from 
moderate Islamist to ultra conservative Salafist in outlook (BBC News, 2013). There are 
independent groups (brigades and fronts). There are also Kurdish groups, including the 
YPG or the Popular Protection Units, which function as the armed wing of the Kurdish 
Political Party (the Democratic Unity Party and the Kurdistan Workers Party). The Kurds 
are seeking either an autonomous Kurdish territory that is separate from the Syrian 
government or, at the very least, the establishment of a Kurdish administrative district 
functioning within Syrian society as a semi-independent territorial unit. 
If the goal of the Al Assad regime and its key supporters of Russian and Iran is 
the maintenance of the regime with minimal sharing of power, all of the rebel groups are 
seeking opportunities to participate in the government, limits placed on the power of 
Bashar Al Assad at a minimum, and an end to the use of military or police force against 
the Syrian opposition. The sticking point in any negotiation is clearly going to be the 
issue of whether or not Bashar Al Assad and his regime will remain in control of Syria 
and/or the extent to which this government is willing to reduce its own authority and 
permit opposition groups to play a meaningful role in government decision-making.  
For Russia and Iran, the maintenance of the Al Assad regime is critical because 
these two countries tend to see Syria as something of a client state (Astana talks 
become…, 2017). Turkey backs the rebel groups and wants to see an end to the conflict 
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because it is being overburdened by the ongoing flow of displaced Syrians. Similarly, EU 
countries also have a personal stake in halting the flow of refugees as do Syria’s 
neighbors, such as Lebanon and Jordan. 
Roth (2016) reported that one of the most difficult issues that has emerged, and 
will continue to emerge in the peace negotiations, focuses on the future of Bashar Al 
Assad and his closest supporters. Many of the opposition groups insist that Al Assad 
relinquish power; but, at the present time, it seems unlikely that he will agree even 
though Russia and Iran have hinted “that they could accept his departure if he steps down 
through negotiations” (Roth, 2016, p. 2).  Realistically, it is likely that any condition or 
set of conditions for such a withdrawal from power would include amnesty for Bashar Al 
Assad and his inner circle. Negotiators on all sides may be willing to accept limitations 
placed on presidential power by a new Syrian constitution that is supported at the present 
time by Russia and Iran (Astana talks end…, 2017). 
If the negotiations can be structured in a way to permit the development of a new 
Syrian constitution that would include new open elections overseen by the United 
Nations with the understanding that Al Assad could run for office again, it is possible that 
opposition groups would accede to such a plan. The constitution would need to include 
protection for opposition parties and establish a multi-party political system in Syria.   
Offering other concessions to opposition groups could include the following: 
x Greater autonomy for administrative units, including the Kurdish region of the 
country. 
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x Devolution of power from the central government to administrative units in which 
free and open elections occur, allowing opposition groups such as the Syrian 
Islamic Front and the Free Syrian Army to mount campaigns for elected office. 
x Limitations on the power of the Executive Branch with respect to the use of 
military and police force. 
x New legislative authority that is vested in the national parliament or majlis. 
x The establishment of a United Nations-backed presence of external observers to 
ensure the integrity of new open, free elections. 
x Identification of ISIS/ISIL and Al Nusra as unacceptable opposition groups and 
the only focus of government military activity. 
x The elimination of economic and other sanctions against Syria pending 
substantive changes in the national government. 
The development of a new advisory council supporting the executive branch of 
the Syrian government is also recommended as an agenda item which should be included 
in any negotiations. Russia, Turkey, and Iran are the guarantor states for the Astana talks 
and as such must come to the negotiating table willing to achieve the following: 
x A reduction in, or elimination of, the power exercised by the Al Assad regime. 
x A resolution to the refugee crisis. 
x Maintenance of the ceasefire. 
x Oversight of a military effort to corner Al Nusra and ISIS/ISIL, taking back 
Raqqa and the northwestern province of Idlib where Al Nusra holds power. 
x The use of Russian, Iranian, Turkish, and other countries’ military in continuing 
to target Al Nusra and ISIS/ISIL 
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What, if any, role exists for the United States, which is not now a party to the 
Astana negotiations? It is likely that the United States would work with Turkey on any 
further negotiations and would support the development of a new constitution for Syria, 
free and open elections, and limits to the authority and power of Bashar Al Assad. Turkey 
has clearly called for American participation in future Astana talks and Russia has 
apparently been willing to consider some reduced role for the United States in future 
negotiations (Astana talks become…, 2017). (Incidentally, one should note that a number 
of the opposition groups have publicly stated that they will not accept anything less than 
the removal of Al-Assad from power. This may be a sticking point in ongoing 
negotiations.)   
As nearly as can be determined at the present time, the new American presidential 
administration is likely to be focused on putting an end to ISIS/ISIL and Al Nusra 
(Astana talks become…, 2017). Were this item entered into the negotiations, it is likely 
that other actors from the region would also be supportive of the outcome. It is clear that 
as long as the jihadi movements function in Syria and elsewhere in the region, there will 
be some form of violent conflict. Refocusing efforts in a post-negotiation era on defeating 
ISIS/ISIL and al-Nusra would be a desirable outcome for all parties.  
Presented below is a figure depicting the conflicting goals and objectives ascribed 
variously to the US, Russia and Iran with respect to the ongoing Geneva and Astana 
negotiations. The figure depicts areas of mutual accord as well as goals that are unique to 
each party.   
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Figure 1. Competing and Common Goals in the Syrian Conflict. Note.(Russian air force 
destroys, 2015, p. 3) 
The foregoing figure may be somewhat outdated, but it is essentially correct with 
respect to the primary motives of Iran, the United States, and Russia. Including a 
commitment from various state actors to fighting the Islamic State would be beneficial at 
the negotiating table because it is an area that three major actors consider to be equally 
vital.   
At the same time, the biggest challenge for negotiators will be overcoming the 
determination of selected opposition groups to remove Bashar Al Assad from office. It is 
perhaps in the interest of Iran and Russia as Al Assad’s major backers to broker a deal in 
which he agrees to step down in return for a general amnesty for himself and selected 
officials whom he might wish to protect. A guarantee of amnesty with respect to possible 
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war crime charges may be instrumental in convincing this particular leader that it is in his 
best interest to stand down.   
If the suggestions presented herein can be implemented at Astana and/or Geneva, 
it may very well be possible to bring about an end to Syria’s civil war. This in turn could 
result in the establishment of a more effective coalition of state and non-state actors who 
are able to mount a comprehensive assault on ISIS/ISIL and Al Nusra. Restoring stability 
to the region will inevitably necessitate the elimination of these threats. As Syria moves 
forward, and as external actors join in common cause, eliminating what appears to be a 
major threat to regional peace and stability can take center stage.   
Conclusion to the Chapter 
This chapter of the study offers an admittedly tentative and hypothetical analysis 
of what could occur in a conflict resolution strategy that is designed to put an end to 
Syria’s crisis with respect to opposition to Bashar Al Assad. Creating coalitions of 
internal and external actors will be needed if the negotiations are to succeed. The Astana 
talks have proven to be relatively beneficial thus far. Expanding them to include the 
United States and other state actors would strengthen a coalition capable of convincing 
Bashar Al Assad to stand down. 
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Chapter 6: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This final chapter of the study summarizes its key findings, answers the research 
questions posed at the outset, and presents conclusions regarding both the likely direction 
of American policy toward Syria and the viability of coalition building as a conflict 
resolution strategy. It offers recommendations for ongoing research, which is particularly 
necessary in light of the fact that a new presidential administration is in office in the 
United States and the crisis in Syria remains a critical determinant of stability in the 
Middle East. As Roth (2016) pointed out, resolving the Syrian crisis is an issue that is of 
significance not only to Syrians and their neighbors in the Middle East, but also to nation-
states in Europe and the West. With the engagement of Russia and Iran and Hezbollah in 
the crisis as guarantors for Syria, new geopolitical questions have certainly emerged, not 
the least of which for the United States is the question of its role in the Middle East (Syria 
peace talks..., 2017). 
Summary 
The overarching research question posed in this study is: what are the likely 
effects of a transformation in American policy towards Syria that would include “boots 
on the ground” military intervention designed to stabilize a country that is torn by war 
and the insurgence of militant Islam seeking to establish a new Caliphate?  This is a 
complex question which can be answered only hypothetically in light of the fact that the 
United States has a fairly minimal position in the Syrian conflict compared to the position 
of Russia and Iran.   
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With the departure of President Barack Obama from the White House, it became 
quite clear that there would be no significant change in U.S. policy towards Syria that 
would involve an enhanced military presence (Obama, 2014). During the political 
campaign of 2016, candidate Donald Trump focused less on the Syrian conflict itself and 
more on mounting a response to ISIS. Goldberg (2016) noted that in his “doctrine”, 
President Obama positioned military intervention almost as a policy of last resort. Were 
the United States to contemplate a policy involving an enhanced military presence 
physically in Syria, various researchers, including Snyder (2015) as well as Shuster and 
Calabresi (2015), suggest that there would need to be a new level of cooperation between 
the United States and both Iran and Russia.  At the present time, this does not appear to 
be high on the policy list of President Trump. 
Theoretically, one could argue that an increased American military presence in 
Syria would change the dynamics of the conflict significantly. Depending on the focus of 
such American military action, the “moderate” Syrian opposition forces might feel newly 
empowered to continue their assault on the Al Assad regime. If the U.S. military targeted 
the Caliphate, and if Russia and Iran joined in such an effort, it is quite possible that the 
Caliphate would be significantly reduced in terms of its territorial presence or, ideally, 
eliminated entirely. Again, it is speculative at this juncture to advance any finding with 
respect to American policy changes, because no changes have been offered by the new 
administration. 
Two sub-questions were included in this study’s design. The first was: what 
specific theoretical perspectives have been employed by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama 
presidential administrations in the design and implementation of foreign policy toward 
169 
 
Syria? The research presented herein supports the finding that each of these three 
American presidents were to some extent or another Realists in terms of their policy 
orientation.   
Realism, as described by Masataka (2012), is based on the premise that states 
must use their capacity to achieve a balance of power that protects their own interests and 
advances those interests when and where possible. Realists are pessimistic, but they 
perceive states as the most appropriate actors in the geopolitical arena. Realist policies 
can include both engagement and isolation as needed to benefit the state (Ford, 2013). 
For President Bill Clinton (2000), Syria mattered because of its geographic position and 
the possibility that the Al Assad regime could be useful in brokering a Middle East peace 
agreement. For President George W. Bush (2003; 2004), Syria was a state to be viewed 
with great suspicion and a country whose behavior was often antithetical to the best 
interests of the United States. The Bush administration used sanctions to impress upon 
Syria the contention of the United States that no aid or comfort should be given to the 
Iraq regime of Saddam Hussein after the United States invaded the country.  
We should also note that President George W. Bush was very much focused in all 
of his foreign policy activities on building democracies (Rada, 2014). As a 
neoconservative, President Bush saw the world as dangerous and unstable and also 
positioned America as a necessary actor in building democracies where democracies did 
not previously exist (Muravchik, 2007). President Bush as a neoconservative Realist was 
convinced that dangerous regimes should not be allowed to function or to remain in 
place. Unlike both Clinton and Obama, Bush was committed to the use of preemptive 
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strikes and may well have turned his attention toward a military response to Syria had he 
remained in office longer (Krauthammer, 2005). 
President Obama, also a Realist, can be thought of as a Liberal Idealist. He 
viewed military engagement as foreign policy tool of last resort (Richmond, 2011). He 
resisted calls to enhance the American military presence in Syria, even after having 
drawn a red line in the sand regarding Bashar Al Assad’s use of chemical weapons 
against his own people. Criticisms of President Obama include the idea that his policies 
regarding Syria were confusing (Abdul-Azziz, 2014) and poorly focused. The red line in 
the sand, once established, was never further addressed let alone enforced.   
Judis (2014) pointed out that the Obama administration turned to the United 
Nations for a solution to the crisis, but Berman (2014) suggests that the ideological 
orientation of President Obama towards Liberalism and Idealism undermined his 
Realism. Friedman (2013) stated that President Obama’s strong desire to meld moral 
principles and national strategy created a very real tension in American foreign policy 
and further created a situation in which only unmanned drones and were deployed by the 
Obama administration as his term came to an end.   
The second sub-question asked at the outset of this study was: what are the 
situational elements that have contributed, over time and in the present, to the 
development of America foreign policy toward Syria? One can certainly conclude that 
the situation in Syria and in the region surrounding Syria has changed dramatically in the 
25 years since Bill Clinton took office. At that time, Syria was a country that the U.S. 
perceived as a potential ally in the Middle East (Clinton, 1994; 2000). President Clinton 
and Haffez Al Assad (1994) pledged mutual cooperation with regard to negotiating a 
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peace agreement between Israel and her Arab enemies.  At that time, it was believed that 
the U.S. and Syria could work effectively together as coalition partners. There were no 
significant concerns being expressed in the United States at that time with regard to major 
humanitarian issues emerging from the treatment of Syrian citizens by the Al Assads 
(Abdul-Azziz, 2014). 
No such peace deal was forthcoming. President George W. Bush (2004; 2007) 
perceived Syria as directly associated with the Axis of Evil consisting of Iraq, Iran, and 
North Korea.  President Bush and his Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton regarded 
Syria as a rogue state – a state that sponsored terrorism, a state pursuing or having the 
potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction, and a state whose behavior was 
antithetical to the interests of the United States.  This led President Bush to 
enthusiastically support sanctions against Syria and to criticize Al Assad for being an ally 
of Iran and a country making mischief in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon.   
Certainly, during the period when President Bush was in office Bashar Al Assad 
became engaged in conflict with his own people. As President Bush left office, the 
Obama administration attempted to reset American relations with Syria, even though the 
crisis had escalated dramatically (Roth, 2016). Syria’s civil war had become a full-blown 
conflict made more complex by the emergence of ISIS/ISIL. Rather than increasing 
American military presence in the region, President Obama decreased it. One can 
certainly conclude that over time, Syria became an increasingly troubling hot spot and 
one that became a more significant element in the formation of U.S. foreign policy. As of 
this writing, Syria remains a country in crisis and is essentially a failed state that will 
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continue to occupy the attention of leaders across the world as efforts to maintain a 
ceasefire, end the refugee crisis, and resolve domestic conflicts go forward.   
Conclusions 
If we assume that each of the three American presidents discussed herein 
represent a version of the Realist orientation, then we must also determine whether or not 
Realism in and of itself is likely to be more or less associated with military policies. It 
seems, based on this study, that while George W. Bush was more than willing to use 
military power when he felt it was necessary, Presidents Clinton and Obama were 
substantially less likely to do so. President Obama has used military actions on a limited 
basis, providing on the ground advisers to the Syrian moderates and supporting them with 
air strikes. However, there was no indication in the final months of President Obama’s 
time in office that he was interested in the use of enhanced military engagement in Syria. 
This was the case before the Russians and the Iranians became critical actors in Syria and 
has remained the case ever since 
At the present time, there is no indication that President Donald Trump will be 
using a military response to the Syrian question per se. It is true that President Trump did 
campaign on a platform that included a substantial number of references to eliminating 
ISIS/ISIL. Less than 100 days into his administration, however, no policy announcements 
regarding Syria have been forthcoming. It therefore remains to be seen whether or not 
there will be any developments with respect to boots on the ground in Syria in the context 
of American foreign policy. We cannot conclude that it is neither likely nor unlikely that 
such a policy shift will emerge in the next several months or years. 
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The study did examine the potential for Coalition Building as a conflict resolution 
strategy. On balance, as Charap (2013) has suggested, this particular approach to conflict 
resolution is applicable in cases where there are multiple parties with vested interests in 
the outcome of the conflict or disagreement. There are admittedly some stumbling blocks 
which must be addressed before such a strategy can be fully implemented in hopes of 
achieving a permanent peace. The talks that are ongoing at Astana have provided unique 
opportunities for some participants to achieve consensus (Syrian peace talks…, 2017).   
However, many of the opposition groups with a strong military presence in Syria 
have not participated in these talks and have shown no willingness to back down on the 
demand that Bashar Al Assad be removed from office. Additionally, the Syrian 
government delegation to Astana, led by Bashar Al Ja’afri, has stated that no discussion 
of the possibility of a new Syrian constitution was on the table. In light of the fact that 
there were violations of the ceasefire following the Astana talks of early March 2017, one 
must question whether or not these talks have been as profitable and productive as 
participants initially suggested (Syria peace talks…, 2017). 
This does not mean, however, that the Coalition Building framework presented 
above should be abandoned. Iran and Russia have enormous influence over the Al Assad 
regime and should these two nation-states determine that it is in their best interests that 
Al Assad stand down, a consensus may ultimately be reached with rebel participation. 
Perhaps offering key government functionaries amnesty would be a useful strategy for 
encouraging the Assad government to submit itself to restructuring.   
Here, U.S. foreign policy could clearly be supportive of a transformation of the 
fundamental chains of command in Syria. Syria has found some common ground with 
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armed rebel groups (Astana talks become…, 2017). Bringing in regional powers as well 
as European powers could be helpful in pressuring Bashar Al Assad to accept the 
necessity of standing down.   
This is clearly a case in which Russia and Iran and also Turkey are in ideal 
positions to persuade the Al Assad regime that it is time to go (Roth, 2016). There are 
those who feel quite strongly that amnesty should not be given to Assad and his inner 
circle. Roth (2016) has stated that “since the early 1990s, the international community 
has rightly withheld its imprimatur from amnesties due to mass atrocities” (p.1). That 
said, it is also possible, according to Roth (2016), that Assad and his inner circle could 
flee to Moscow or Tehran where they would likely find a safe haven and be able to avoid 
prosecution at The Hague for war crimes. 
The various parties to negotiations in a conflict resolution action will need to 
determine whether removing Bashar Al Assad at the cost of amnesty is worth it. Creating 
a coalition government that includes Syria’s Sunni majority and Alawite and other 
minorities could then become the focus of negotiations between the various Syrian 
opposition groups. It should also be apparent that if the danger presented by ISIS/ISIL is 
to be directly eliminated, it will first be necessary to restore order in Syria itself (Russian 
air force destroys…, 2015). 
This is a goal that Russia, Iran, and the United States can agree upon. It is also a 
goal that should appeal to the various Syrian rebel groups (BBC News, 2013). The UN 
Special Envoy for Syria can play a vital role in bringing these issues to the table. 
American policy in the new Trump administration should ideally reflect these particular 
goals and concerns.  
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Recommendations 
Two sets of recommendations based on this study can be offered. The first set 
pertains to additional research while the second set pertains to resolving the Syrian crisis 
and/or shaping American foreign policy going forward. In terms of further academic 
research, a study that examines the policies of newly elected President Donald Trump 
would be of value. Whether the United States is/is not likely to, at some point in the 
future, increase its military presence in Syria is certainly an important issue and one that 
was beyond the scope of this particular research effort.   
Secondly, in-depth research on the interactions between the United States and the 
three countries that are guarantors for the Astana negotiations would be helpful. At this 
time, the United States finds itself in the position of being an auxiliary rather than a 
dominant partner in these negotiations. Any American president would certainly want to 
position the country more favorably in resolving a crisis that affects an entire region of 
the world and has destabilized relationships for some time.  
Were it possible to obtain access to leaders of the various Syrian opposition 
groups, interviews and surveys of these individuals would be useful. Information 
obtained from these groups could be employed to good purpose in ongoing peace 
negotiations. Similarly, research that is focused on obtaining opinions of the Syrian 
public could be valuable.   
The second set of recommendations speaks to questions of conflict resolution in 
general and Coalition Building in particular. The reports on the Astana talks indicate that 
the participants generally feel positive about their potential for success. Research that 
secures information as to the specific negotiable and nonnegotiable goals and objectives 
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of different groups could be conducted under the aegis of the UN Special Envoy on Syria. 
The negotiations would certainly go more smoothly if they are based on a comprehensive 
understanding of the requirements of key actors. This would inevitably include members 
of the Assad regime as well as the various rebel groups. Developing a common cause 
with respect to ISIS/ISIL is certainly a strategy that should be considered.  
Finally, outreach to the Syrian opposition is critical. Under the aegis of the United 
Nations Special Envoy, talks in both Astana and Geneva must go forward. The Syrian 
opposition has called for applying pressure to Bashar Al Assad, and Russia and Iran are 
in an ideal position to do so. Rebel groups must be convinced that if they wish to be 
viable partners in the resolution of the conflict, they must attend Astana negotiations and 
must agree to sit down with representatives of the current Syrian regime. The Al Assad 
regime must maintain the ceasefire and acknowledge that there is a necessity for 
developing a new constitution.   
This study serves as a springboard to additional research. It offers an insight into 
how American foreign policies have changed over time and how a particular approach to 
conflict resolution can be used in order to bring about peace and a return to national 
stability in a country that is essentially a failed state at the present time. Syria has been a 
hot spot in the Middle East for much too long. Because President Obama failed to 
acknowledge that the red line in the sand he drew had been crossed, or failed to act when 
this occurred, it now seems that the countries that are going to be able to broker peace in 
Syria are Russia and Iran with support from Turkey. Nevertheless, the United States has a 
place at the table at Astana and should be there. It will be interesting to see what policy 
initiatives are forthcoming from the Trump administration.      
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Appendix A: Chronology of Syrian Conflict 
2000 June - Assad dies and is succeeded by his second son, Bashar.  
2000 November - The new President Assad orders the release of 600 political prisoners.  
2001 April - Outlawed Muslim Brotherhood says it will resume political activity, 20 
years after its leaders were forced to flee.  
2001 5 May - Pope John Paul II pays historic visit.  
2001 June - Syrian troops evacuate Beirut, redeploy in other parts of Lebanon, following 
pressure from Lebanese critics of Syria's presence.  
2001 September - Detention of MPs and other pro-reform activists, crushing hopes of a 
break with the authoritarian past of Hafez al-Assad. Arrest continue, punctuated by 
occasional amnesties, over the following decade. 
2001 November - British PM Tony Blair visits to try shore up support for the campaign 
against terror. He and President Assad fail to agree on a definition of terrorism.  
2002 May - Senior US official includes Syria in a list of states that make-up an "axis of 
evil", first listed by President Bush in January. Undersecretary for State John Bolton says 
Damascus is acquiring weapons of mass destruction.  
2003 April - US threatens sanctions if Damascus fails to take what Washington calls the 
"right decisions". Syria denies US allegations that it is developing chemical weapons and 
helping fugitive Iraqis.  
2003 September - President Assad appoints Mohammed Naji al-Otari prime minister.  
2003 October - Israeli air strike against Palestinian militant camp near Damascus. Syria 
says action is "military aggression".  
2004 January - President Assad visits Turkey, the first Syrian leader to do so. The trip 
marks the end of decades of frosty relations, although ties sour again after the popular 
uprising in 2011.  
2004 March - At least 25 killed in clashes between members of the Kurdish minority, 
police and Arabs in the north-east.  
2004 May - US imposes economic sanctions on Syria over what it calls its support for 
terrorism and failure to stop militants entering Iraq.  
2005 February-April- Tensions with the US escalate after the killing of former Lebanese 
PM Hariri in Beirut. Washington cites Syrian influence in Lebanon. Damascus is urged to 
withdraw its forces from Lebanon, which it does by April.  
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2005 October - Interior minister and Syria's former head of intelligence in Lebanon, 
Ghazi Kanaan, dies in what officials say is suicide. UN inquiry into assassination of 
former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri implicates senior Syrian officials.  
2005 December - Exiled former vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam alleges that Syrian 
leaders threatened former Lebanese PM Hariri before his assassination.  
2006 February - Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus are set on fire during a 
demonstration against cartoons in a Danish newspaper portraying the Muslim Prophet 
Muhammad.  
2006 September - Attack on the US embassy in Damascus. Four gunmen open fire and 
throw grenades but fail to detonate a car bomb. Three of them are killed, one is captured.  
2006 November - Iraq and Syria restore diplomatic relations after nearly a quarter 
century.  
2007 March - European Union relaunches dialogue with Syria.  
2007 April - US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi meets President Assad 
in Damascus. She is the highest-placed US politician to visit Syria in recent years. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meets Foreign Minister Walid Muallem the 
following month in the first contact at this level for two years.  
2007 May - Leading dissident Kamal Labwani and prominent political writer Michel Kilo 
are sentenced to a long jail terms, only weeks after human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni 
is jailed.  
2007 September - Israel carries out an aerial strike against a site in northern Syria that it 
said was a nuclear facility under construction. In 2011 the UN's IAEA nuclear watchdog 
decides to report Syria to the UN Security Council over its alleged covert nuclear 
programme reactor programme at the site. 
2008 March - Syria hosts Arab League summit. Many pro-Western states send lower-
level delegations in protest at Syria's stance on Lebanon.  
2008 April - The US accuses North Korea of having helped Syria to build a secret nuclear 
reactor at the site bombed by Israel in 2007.  
2008 July - President Assad meets French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris. The visit 
signals the end of the diplomatic isolation by the West that followed the assassination of 
former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri in 2005. While in Paris, President Assad also meets the 
recently-elected Lebanese president, Michel Suleiman. The two men agree to work 
towards the establishing of full diplomatic relations between their countries.  
2008 September - Damascus hosts four-way summit between Syria, France, Turkey and 
Qatar, in a bid to boost efforts towards Middle East peace. Explosion kills 17 on the 
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outskirts of Damascus, the most deadly attack in Syria in several years. Government 
blames Islamist militants.  
2008 October - Syria establishes diplomatic relations with Lebanon for first time since 
both countries established independence in 1940s.  
2009 March - Jeffrey Feltman, acting assistant US secretary of state for the Near East, 
visits Damascus with White House national security aide Daniel Shapiro in first high-
level US diplomatic mission for nearly four years. Meets Foreign Minister Walid 
Muallem.  
Trading launches on Syria's stock exchange in a gesture towards liberalising the state-
controlled economy.  
2009 May - Syrian writer and pro-democracy campaigner Michel Kilo is released from 
prison after serving three-year sentence.  
2009 June - The UN nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, says traces of undeclared man-made 
uranium have been found at second site in Syria - a reactor in Damascus. The IAEA was 
investigating US claims that the site destroyed in the 2007 Israeli raid was a nuclear 
reactor.  
2009 July - US special envoy George Mitchell visits for talks with President Assad on 
Middle East peace.  
2009 August - Iraq and Syria recall their envoys in a deepening rift over charges of 
responsibility for a string of deadly bomb attacks in Baghdad. They restore ties later in 
2010. 
2010 February - US posts first ambassador to Syria after a five-year break.  
2010 May - US renews sanctions against Syria, saying that it supports terrorist groups, 
seeks weapons of mass destruction and has provided Lebanon's Hezbollah with Scud 
missiles in violation of UN resolutions.  
2011 March - Security forces shoot dead protestors in southern city of Deraa demanding 
release of political prisoners, triggering violent unrest that steadily spread nationwide 
over the following months.  
2011 May - Army tanks enter Deraa, Banyas, Homs and suburbs of Damascus in an 
effort to crush anti-regime protests. US and European Union tighten sanctions. President 
Assad announces amnesty for political prisoners.  
2011 June - The government says that 120 members of the security forces have been 
killed by "armed gangs" in the northwestern town of Jisr al-Shughour. Troops besiege the 
town and more than 10,000 people flee to Turkey. President Assad pledges to start a 
"national dialogue" on reform.  
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2011 June - The IAEA nuclear watchdog decides to report Syria to the UN Security 
Council over its alleged covert nuclear programme reactor programme. The structure 
housing the alleged reactor was destroyed in an Israeli air raid in 2007. 
2011 July - President Assad sacks the governor of the northern province of Hama after 
mass demonstration there, eventually sending in troops to restore order at the cost of 
scores of lives.  
2011 October - New Syrian National Council says it has forged a common front of 
internal and exiled opposition activists.  
2011 November - Arab League votes to suspend Syria, accusing it of failing to 
implement an Arab peace plan, and imposes sanctions.  
2011 December - Twin suicide bombs outside security buildings in Damascus kill 44, the 
first in a series of large blasts in the capital that continue into the following summer.  
2012 February - Government steps up the bombardment of Homs and other cities.  
International pressure 
2012 March - UN Security Council endorses non-binding peace plan drafted by UN 
envoy Kofi Annan. China and Russia agree to support the plan after an earlier, tougher 
draft is modified.  
2012 May - France, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada and Australia expel senior Syrian 
diplomats in protest at killing of more than a hundred civilians in Houla, near Homs. 
2012 June - Turkey changes rules of engagement after Syria shoots down a Turkish 
plane, declaring that if Syrian troops approach Turkey's borders they will be seen as a 
military threat.  
2012 July - Free Syria Army blows up three security chiefs in Damascus and seizes 
Aleppo in the north.  
2012 August - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defects, US President Obama warns that use of 
chemical weapons would tilt the US towards intervention. 
2012 October - Syria-Turkish tension rises when Syrian mortar fire on a Turkish border 
town kills five civilians. Turkey returns fire and intercepts a Syrian plane allegedly 
carrying arms from Russia.  
Fire in Aleppo destroys much of the historic market as fighting and bomb attacks 
continue in various cities. 
2012 November - National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces 
formed in Qatar, excludes Islamist militias. Arab League stops short of full recognition.  
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Israeli military fire on Syrian artillery units after several months of occasional shelling 
from Syrian positions across the Golan Heights, the first such return of fire since the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973. 
2013 January - Syria accuses Israeli jets of attacking a military research centre near 
Damascus, but denies reports that lorries carrying weapons bound for Lebanon were hit. 
Unverified reports say Israel had targeted an Iranian commander charged with moving 
weapons of mass destruction to Lebanon. 
International donors pledge more than $1.5bn (£950m) to help civilians affected by the 
conflict in Syria.  
2013 March - Syrian warplanes bomb the northern city of Raqqa after rebels seize 
control. US and Britain pledge non-military aid to rebels. 
2013 April -Government forces have faced - and denied - repeated allegations of 
chemical weapons use 
2013 June - Government and allied Lebanese Hezbollah forces recapture strategically-
important town of Qusair between Homs and Lebanese border. 
2013 July - Saudi-backed Ahmed Jarba becomes leader of opposition National Coalition, 
defeating Qatar-backed rival. 
2013 September - UN weapons inspectors conclude that chemical weapons were used in 
an attack on the Ghouta area of Damascus in August that killed about 300 people, but do 
not explicitly allocate responsibility. 
2013 October - President Assad allows international inspectors to begin destroying 
Syria's chemical weapons on the basis of a US-Russian agreement. 
2013 December - US and Britain suspend "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern 
Syria after reports that Islamist rebels seized bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. 
2014 January-February - UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva fail, largely because Syrian 
authorities refuse to discuss a transitional government. 
2014 March - Syrian Army and Hezbollah forces recapture Yabroud, the last rebel 
stronghold near the Lebanese border.  
2014 May - Hundreds of rebels are evacuated from their last stronghold in the central city 
of Homs. The withdrawal marks the end of three years of resistance in the city. 
2014 June - UN announces removal of Syria's chemical weapons material complete. 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria militants declare "caliphate" in territory from Aleppo to 
eastern Iraqi province of Diyala.  
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2014 August - Tabqa airbase, near the northern city of Raqqa, falls to Islamic State 
militants, who now control all of Raqqa province.  
2014 September - US and five Arab countries launch air strikes against Islamic State 
around Aleppo and Raqqa.  
2015 January - Kurdish forces push Islamic State out of Kobane on Turkish border after 
four months of fighting.  
2015 March -Opposition offensives push back government forces. New Jaish al-Fatah 
(Army of Conquest) Islamist rebel alliance, backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
captures provincial capital of Idlib.  
2015 May - Islamic State fighters seize the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria and 
proceed to destroy many monuments at pre-Islamic World Heritage site. 
Jaish al-Fatah takes control of Idlib Province, putting pressure on government's coastal 
stronghold of Latakia.  
2015 June - Kurds take Ain Issa and border town of Tal Abyad, Islamic State attacks 
Kobane and seizes part of Hassakeh, the main city in north-eastern Syria. 
2015 September - Russia carries out its first air strikes in Syria, saying they target the 
Islamic State group, but the West and Syrian opposition say it overwhelmingly targets 
anti-Assad rebels. 
2015 December - Britain joins US-led bombing raids against Islamic State in wake of 
Paris suicide bombing attacks. 
Syrian Army allows rebels to evacuate remaining area of Homs, returning Syria's third-
largest city to government control after four years. 
2016 February - A US-Russian-brokered partial ceasefire between government and major 
rebel forces comes into effect, after a major pro-government drive to capture Aleppo. 
Islamic State is not included. 
2016 March - Syrian government forces retake Palmyra from Islamic State, with Russian 
air assistance.  
2016 May - The US-Russian-brokered ceasefire is extended to Aleppo after an upsurge in 
fighting there (BBC News, Syrian Conflict, 2016, pp. 1 – 3. 
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Appendix B: Primary Parties/Coalitions/Groups in Syria 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) is the main secular armed opposition group in Syria. The FSA 
wants to overthrow the regime and replace it with a secular, democratic government. 
Membership is composed of various factions, each with their own command structure 
and internal politics. Some of the more moderate FSA factions receive support - money, 
training and weapons - from Western and Gulf states. The FSA is composed of 
defected Syrian Armed Forces personnel and volunteers. 
 
 
 
The Syrian Military Council (SMC) is the military arm of the Syrian Opposition 
Coalition, which is the main political representative of the Syrian opposition. The SMC is 
led by Abdul-Ilah al-Bashir, and is based in Turkey.  
 
  
 
Jabhat al-Nusra is a jihadist opposition group that wants to overthrow the regime and 
replace it with an Islamic state. Nusra is al-Qaeda’s franchise in Syria and Lebanon, and 
fighters claim allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda. As the US has 
designated it a terrorist organisation, Nusra receives no Western backing, but it is 
allegedly supported by some Gulf actors. Nusra is known to have a significant 
membership of foreign fighters, from Chechnya, Afghanistan, North Africa, Europe and 
beyond. 
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The Islamic Front is a coalition of opposition Islamist fighting groups that differ from 
Nusra on account of being less extremist. The Islamic Front recently declared its goal 
was to bring about a revolution that was religious, but not fundamentalist or radical. The 
Islamic Front’s ideology includes Salafism. It relies heavily on Saudi Arabian funding. 
 h 
 
 
 
The Syrian government is headed by President Bashar al-Assad. The regime’s military 
might is provided by the Syrian Arab Army and the Syrian Air Force. The regime has 
declared those fighting its rule to be armed terrorists, and it relies heavily on backing 
from its allies Russia (weapons, money) and Iran (weapons, Hezbollah fighters), as well 
as Shiite fighters from Iraq. (A Guide to Syria’s Key Opposition groups,” 2016, pp. 1 – 2.  
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/guide-syrias-key-factions-2062980927. 
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Appendix C: Syrian Opposition: Organization 
 
(A Guide to Syria’s Key Opposition groups,” 2016, p. 1.  
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/guide-syrias-key-factions-2062980927). 
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Appendix D: Chronology of US Foreign Policy Shifts Toward Syria 
2004-2015 
x In May 2004, the US imposed economic sanctions on Syria, charging Syria with 
supporting terrorism and failing to stop militants entering Iraq. 
x Responding to the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, 
Washington urged Syria to withdraw from Lebanon which it does in April of 
2005. 
x In September of 2006, four gunmen attacked the US embassy in Damascus and 
three are killed while one was captured.  
x In April of 2007, US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi meets 
Assad in Damascus and in May, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meets 
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. 
x In March of 2009, US officials from the Department of State and the White House 
held meetings in Damascus with their Syrian counterparts. 
x In July of 2009, US special envoy George Mitchell confers with Assad on Middle 
East peace. 
x In 2010, US posts its first ambassador in five years, but in May of that year 
renews sanctions against Syria and charges that it supported terrorist groups, was 
developing weapons of mass destruction, and was supporting Hezbollah with 
Scud missiles and other weaponry. 
x In December 2012, the US, Great Britain, France, Turkey, and the Gulf States 
formally recognize Syria’s opposition National Coalition as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people. 
x In April of 2013, US and Britain demand investigations into reports that Assad 
used chemical weapons against his own people.   
x In 2013, the U.S. and Britain suspend nonlethal support for Northern Syrian 
rebels after reports that Islamist rebels had taken control of bases of the Western 
backed Free Syrian Army. 
x In September 2014, President Barack Obama said he will not hesitate to take 
action against ISIS in Syria and Iraq and US forces joined by five Arab countries 
launch air strikes against militants in Aleppo and Raqqa. 
x In 2015, Jordan increases its participation in American led air strikes on ISIS held 
positions in Syria. 
(BBC News, 2015, p. 1).  
